can terrorists join the war on terror

The United Nations drew a list of international terrorist in 1999, the list included high ranking Taliban official, from top leadership to deputy minister level, as well as their international collaborators of alqaida group. The list included slightly under 500 Afghan Taliban. The Afghan government and international community is looking for a large number of people on the list but at least 19 Taliban officials have reconciled with Karzai's government and some holds government offices. The list is attached. The UN Security Council has been slow to adjust to the changing political realities in Afghanistan.

 

Abdul Hakim Monib, the governor of Afghanistan's Uruzgan province, has drawn praise from U.S. military commanders as a partner in the battle against global terrorism, lending crucial political support for international relief and reconstruction projects in territory contested by Taliban insurgents. But Monib, who served as deputy minister of frontier affairs in the prior Taliban government, is also on a U.N. list of suspected international terrorists, and Russia has repeatedly blocked U.S. and NATO efforts to take him off it. Monib's case underscores how U.S.-sponsored sanctions in the United Nations can backfire, placing American and NATO commanders in Afghanistan in the awkward position of potentially violating U.N. resolutions by funding programs that benefit Monib. "We try to engage almost all the governors and elected officials, even if they have somewhat undesirable backgrounds," said Col. John Thomas, a U.S. spokesman for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. There are some "reformed Taliban in the government that are quite helpful."

The U.N. Security Council first imposed sanctions on the Taliban in October 1999 for providing a safe haven to Osama bin Laden and for refusing to surrender him to face trial in New York for masterminding the August 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa. Monib and more than 100 other Taliban leaders were placed on a sanctions list in January 2001, a year before he broke ranks with the Islamic movement and joined forces with Hamid Karzai, the Washington-backed president of Afghanistan. After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the United States ushered through resolutions that expanded the list of sanctioned people to suspected al-Qaeda members. The measures included a travel ban, an arms embargo and a prohibition on the direct or indirect provision of funds or economic resources to Monib and 489 other people and groups.

Richard Barrett, chairman of the U.N. Security Council's Al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions panel, which monitors compliance with the resolution, said that the ban on financial assets and economic resources raises troubling legal questions. "Does giving him a ride in an armored car or an airplane or giving aid through him to some sort of program within Uruzgan province constitute a breach of the sanctions?" Barrett asked. "Some of the legal advice that states have been getting suggest that it may."

In March 2006, the United Nations instructed its staff in Afghanistan to steer clear of Monib over concerns that they might breach the sanctions. But the prohibition was partially lifted after U.S. and European officials objected. U.N. staff members are now allowed to interact with Monib but not to engage in activities that could be construed as violating sanctions, such as flying him in a U.N. aircraft. However, one U.N. official in Afghanistan said the mission has been privately urging donor countries to increase aid to Uruzgan. Monib is "seen as being a relatively capable governor," but his designation on the list "does present difficulties," said Adrian Edwards, a U.N. spokesman in Afghanistan. "We have to abide by" U.N. resolutions, he said.

The Netherlands and Australia -- which also has troops in Uruzgan -- insist that they have not breached U.N. sanctions because they have channeled aid through the government, not through Monib's private accounts. "We do talk to Monib, which is not prohibited," said a Dutch official who tracks the issue. But "we do business with the province of Uruzgan." An Australian spokeswoman insisted that "Australia has strictly complied with the sanctions." She added that "Australian personnel in Afghanistan will ensure they do not engage in any dealings with Monib which would be contrary to Australian law" or Security Council resolutions.

Monib's dilemma underscores a broader failing of the U.N. role in the battle against terrorism, said Eric A. Rosand, who oversaw U.N. counterterrorism efforts for the United States until 2005. He said that the council has not responded to evolving terrorist threats and that many countries have stopped cooperating with it. For instance, the council has not added a new Taliban figure to the list since 2001. That included the movement's military commander, Mullah Dadullah, who was killed by allied forces in May. "The whole thing is broken," said Rosand, who now tracks the council's terrorism efforts for the Center on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation. "Everyone knows that most countries are not even implementing the sanctions."

The council, meanwhile, is also facing a political backlash from European governments, courts and human rights advocates, who say it offers inadequate legal protection for people on the list. The council has introduced new measures to strengthen due process, including the establishment of a U.N. office to hear complaints. But the new office lacks the authority to recommend that the council remove a person from the list, and a single member of the council can still block the delisting process. "This is a perfect case where time has passed, things have changed, but the committee hasn't and the list hasn't," Rosand said. "The list is so poorly managed that no one has confidence in it anymore, and nobody puts forward names."

 

 

خانم سوزی

يك خانم جوان باشنده  ولايت بادغيس  شب چهارشنبه  خودش را اتش زده وبزندگيش خاتمه داد.

 

اين خانم  30 ساله ؛ به اساس مشكلات خانوادگي كه با مادرشوهرش داشت باریختن تیل بروجودش خودش را آتش زد .

 

محمدي مي افزايد كه  این خانم در اخرین لحظات زنده گیش گفته است  که مادر شوهرش با وی در تمام کارها ناسازگاربوده كه اکثرا به مشاجره می انجامید و ناگزیر شب گذشته  پس ازگفتگو لفظی با خشویش تصمیم به حریق كردنش وجودش  گرديد.

 

 این واقعه در حالی صورت گرفته که فعالان حقوق بشردرولايت هرات ازعدم خاتمه اين عمل غيراسلامي اظهارنگراني نموده و بیشتر عامل  ا ینگونه وقایع را فقراقتصادي ؛ موجوديت ازدواج هاي اجباري وعدم سازگاري بين زنان خانواده ميدانند.

 

هرچند بگفته مسئولين رياست امورزنان ولايت هرات گراف خودسوزي ها دراين ولايت نسبت  به سال هاي گذشته كاهش يافته اما هم اكنون تعداد خودسوزي هاي زنان درجريان سال روان به 40 مورد رسيده كه اكثريت شان نسبت به سوختن فيصدي زياد درشفاخانه حوزوي هرات جان داده اند .

 

change the minister

We have formed a committee to protect free expression. The aim is campaigning to change the current minister of information and culture, Kareem Khoram. I was told that some people in the government want us to calm down in the endeavor because the president is planning to replace the minister. Some sources close to Hewadmal, karzai’s advisor on cultural affairs, told a friend of mine that Khoram will be removed soon.

I have also heard from sources in the parliament that he will be replaced by Ismail Yoon, this is indeed going to be catastrophic. Ismail Yoon has lately been promoted by Karzai, he played a major role in the peace jirga as the secretary of Afghan executive committee. Ismail is very dangerous; he is an obvious fascist with anti minority beliefs. His formal arrival in afghan political scene would mean the final departure of any democratic value.

Even if he is going to replace Khoram, the current minister of information and culture, i think journalists shouldn’t quit efforts for the sake of saving the less evil.

 

First of all because, that is exactly how puppet regimes discourages informed citizens from playing an active political role.

Secondly, I believe journalists and civil society is based on fallibility, the civil society constantly battles the government to consider other options. Government tends to make decisions and claims to do the right thing. Since the right thing is behind any human reach and especially in Afghanistan we have never done the right things, for decades governments have only made mistakes. I think the current government or any other government is bias in doing the right thing, the right thing only serves their power purpose. The idea of doing the right thing in Afghanistan is distorted. Civil society need to constantly provide a coherent view of affairs; we need to constantly affect the government view. If Ismail Yoon is appointed to be the minister we should still campaign. i was told today that no matter what media is never going to be happy with any government official, I do think that is right. a supporter of former minister for information and culture, Raheen, told me that media was also critical of the liberal minister. I think that is ok. That is what we do, it’s a process and that is what democracy is it’s never about a result.  

 

US launches war on iran

The Bush administration has leaped toward war with Iran by, in essence, declaring war with the main branch of Iran's military, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which it plans to brand as a terrorist organization.

A logical evolution of US President George W Bush's ill-defined, boundless "war on terror", the White House's move is dangerous to the core, opening the way for open confrontation with Iran. This may begin in Iraq, where the IRGC is reportedly most active and, ironically, where the US and Iran have their largest common denominators.

A New York Times editorial has dismissed this move as "amateurish" and a mere "theatric" on the part of the lame-duck president, while at the same time admitting that it represents a concession to "conflict-obsessed administration hawks who are lobbying for military strikes". The political analysts who argue that the main impact of this initiative is "political" are plain wrong. It is a giant step toward war with Iran, irrespective of how well, or poorly, it is thought of, particularly in terms of its immediate and long-term implications, let alone the timing of it.

Coinciding with President Mahmud Ahmadinejad's highly publicized trip to Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, the news received front-page coverage in the New York Times, next to a photograph of Ahmadinejad and his Afghan host, President Hamid Karzai, as if intended to spoil Ahmadinejad's moment by denigrating the Iranian regime. Just two weeks ago, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice implicitly put Iran on a par with the Soviet Union by invoking comparisons to the Cold War, and in essence compared it to al-Qaeda.

Thus if an unintended side-effect of the Cold War terminology was to enhance Iran's global image, the "terrorist" label for the IRGC aims to deliver a psychological blow to Iran by de-legitimizing the country.

Also, it serves the United States' purpose at the United Nations Security Council, where a British-prepared draft of a new round of sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program has been floating around for a while and will likely be acted on this autumn. The draft calls for tightening the screws on Iran by broadening the list of blacklisted Iranian companies and even may lead to the interdiction of Iranian ships in the Persian Gulf. This is indeed a dangerous move that could easily trigger open confrontation.

With the window of opportunity for Bush to use the "military option" closing because of the US presidential elections next year, the administration's hawks - "it is now or never" - have received a huge boost by the move to label the IRGC as terrorists. It paves the way for potential US strikes at the IRGC's installations inside Iran, perhaps as a prelude to broader attacks on the country's nuclear facilities. At least that is how it is being interpreted in Iran, whose national-security concerns have skyrocketed as a result of the labeling.

"The US double-speak with Iran, talking security cooperation on the one hand and on the other ratcheting up the war rhetoric, does not make sense and gives the impression that the supporters of dialogue have lost in Washington," a prominent Tehran University political scientist who wished to remain anonymous told Asia Times Online.

The US has "unfettered" itself for a strike on Iran by targeting the IRGC, and that translates into heightened security concerns. "The United States never branded the KGB [Russian secret service] or the Soviet army as terrorist, and that shows the limits of the Cold War comparison," the Tehran political scientist said. His only optimism: there are "two US governments" speaking with divergent voices, ie, "deterrence diplomacy and preemptive action", and "that usually, historically speaking, spells policy paralysis".

However, no one in Iran can possibly place too much faith on that kind of optimism. Rather, the net effect of this labeling, following the recent "shoot to kill" order of Bush with regard to Iranian operatives in Iraq accused of aiding the anti-occupation insurgents, is to elevate fears of a US "preemptory" strike on Iran. Particularly concerned are many top government officials, lawmakers and present or former civil and military functionaries who are or were at some point affiliated with the IRGC.

There is also a legal implication. Under international law, the United States' move could be challenged as illegal, and untenable, by isolating a branch of the Iranian government for selective targeting. This is contrary to the 1981 Algiers Accord's pledge of non-interference in Iran's internal affairs by the US government. [1]

Should the terror label on the IRGC be in place soon, US customs and homeland-security officials could, theoretically, arrest members of Ahmadinejad's delegation due to travel to the UN headquarters in New York next month because of suspected ties to the IRGC. Even Ahmadinejad, with his past as a commander of the Basij Corps, a paramilitary arm of the IRGC, risks arrest.

The US has opened a Pandora's box with a hasty decision that may have unintended consequences far beyond its planned

coercive diplomacy toward Iran. The first casualty could be the US-Iran dialogue on Iraq's security, although this would simultaneously appease Israeli hawks who dread dialogue and any hints of Cold War-style detente between Tehran and Washington.

It would also become more difficult for Syria to collaborate with Iran with respect to Lebanon's Hezbollah, who owe much to the IRGC since their inception in the early 1980s. The consensus in Iran is that chaos in Iraq is in Israel's interests, but not that of the US, and that the United States' Middle East policy is being held hostage by pro-Israel lobbyists who have painted an enemy image of the dreaded IRGC that is neither accurate nor in tune with the history of US-IRGC interaction.

The US and the IRGC

The current noise masks a hidden history of cooperation between the US military and the IRGC - in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan and, more and more likely, Iraq.

In Bosnia, the US military and intelligence interacted with the IRGC, which had trained Bosnian Muslims, and fought alongside it against their Serbian enemies. They also funneled arms to the IRGC, mainly through Croatia, with the tacit consent of the US government.

In Afghanistan, US military commanders have had similar interaction with commanders of the IRGC, including the elite Quds division of the IRGC, which supported anti-Taliban forces and helped those forces take over Kabul in 2001 with relative ease.

In Iraq, the IRGC has supported various Shi'ite militias as well as the Iraqi military and intelligence and, unofficially, it can credit for the relative stability of the eight Shi'ite provinces, including those in the south. The new US diplomatic engagement of Iran over Iraq is having direct and immediate effects on Iran's behavior inside Iraq, promising further results by the joint expert committees set up as a result of the latest round in the dialogue.

Yet true to the United States' traditional Janus-faced approach toward Iran, just as Iranian and US military and intelligence officials are about to embark on systematic discussions over Iraq and regional security, they will in effect be prevented from doing so by the labeling of the IRGC as terrorist.

Coming 'war of attrition'?

The idea of an all-out military confrontation between the US and Iran, triggered by a US attack on the IRGC, has its watered-down version in a "war of attrition" whereby instead of inter-state warfare, we would witness medium-to-low-intensity clashes.

The question, then, is whether or not the US superpower, addicted to its military doctrine of "superior and overwhelming response", will tolerate occasional bruises at the hands of the Iranians. The answer is highly unlikely given the myriad prestige issues involved and, in turn, this raises the advisability of the labeling initiative with such huge implications nested in it.

No matter, the stage is now set for direct physical clashes between Iran and the US, which has blamed the death of hundreds of its soldiers on Iranian-made roadside bombs. One plausible scenario is the United States' "hot pursuit" of the IRGC inside Iranian territory, initially through "hit and run" commando operations, soliciting an Iranian response, direct or indirect, potentially spiraling out of control.

The hallucination of a protracted "small warfare with Iran" that would somehow insulate both sides from an unwanted big "clash of titans" is just that, a fantasy born and bred in the minds of war-obsessed hawks in Washington and Israel.

Kaveh Afrasiabi,