فرائت سنتی از دين يا دين تاريخی در دو محور در حوزه شهروندی با اعلاميه جهانی حقوق بشر وميثاقهای ملازم آن در تعارض است :
1- عدم برابری حقوق بين آحاد بشر به واسطه دين، مذهب، جنسيت، حريت (و رقيت) و گاه فقاهت، و فائل بودن "حق ويژه" و امتياز حقوقی برای برخی اصناف جامعه از جمله مومنان.
2- غير قابل گفتگو بودن و فراتر از نقد بودن احکام و تعاليم دينی، به نحوی که اين ضوابط و احکام نيازی به توجيه عقلایي ندارند و در صورت تعارض با حقوق شهروندی و حقوق بشر، احکام و تعاليم دينی از حق وتو برخورداراست.
قرائت روشنفکرانه از دين با نفی هر نوع نابرابری حقوقی از يک سو، و قابل گفتگو دانستن همه احکام دينی و نياز تعاليم دينی به توجيه عقلائی و ورود دروادی گفتگوی خردمندانه، در محور ديگری با لائيسيته چالش دارد. لائيسيته چه در قرائت حداکثری آن (دين زدائی از زندگی) و چه در قرائت حداقلی آن (دين زدائی از عرصه عمومی) هر نوع ابتناء مناسبات اجتماعی بر ارزشها و تعاليم دينی را برنمی تابد، و عرصه عمومی را "مشروط به نفی دين" يا "لا اقتضاء نسبت به دين" تعريف می کند.
از ديدگاه روشنفکر دينی عرصه عمومی را "مشروط به نفی دين" کردن مبتنی بر پيش فرض غير قابل اثبات (يا حداقل غير اتفاقی) مرجوحيت دين يا مردوديت آن است. اما عرصه عمومی را "لا اقتضاء نسبت به دين" تعريف کردن در حوزه های مورد اختلاف دينداران و لائيک ها ممتنع است، زيرا در حوزه ياد شده امر دائر بين نفی و اثبات دينی است. در واقع "لا اقتضاء نسبت به دين" به "مشروط به نفی دين" بر می گردد.
بحث در حوزه مورد اختلاف دينداران و لائيک ها (تعلیمات عمومی ابتدائی در مکاتب دولتی بلکه تعليمات عمومی اجباری، وسائل ارتباط جمعی عمومی، روابط آزاد جنسی خارج از ازدواج به ويژه پيش از ازدواج، همجنس گرائی،مشروبات الکلی و مواد مخدر، مرگ از روی ترحم، دخالت در ژنتيک انسان و . . . ) به يک بحث مبنائی منجر می شود. در اين بحث مبنائی اگر دينداران و لائيک ها نتوانند يکديگر را قانع کنند – آنچنانکه تا کنون نتوانسته اند – نمی توان به گزاره اثبات نشده يا تابوی مدرن "حقوق بشر بالذات لائيک است" استناد کرد. در اينجا دو "باور پايه" کاملا متفاوت مطرح است. از ديدگاه دينداران اينکه موارد حوزه ياد شده در زمره حقوق بشر است جای سوال دارد. بنا براينبحث به سوال بنيادی "قلمرو حقوق بشر و شهروندی" باز می گردد
Saturday, August 30, 2008
فرائت سنتی از دين يا دين تاريخی در دو محور در حوزه شهروندی با اعلاميه جهانی حقوق بشر وميثاقهای ملازم آن در تعارض است :
Monday, August 18, 2008
US National Intelligence Estimate in1995 had warned of a new type of terrorism, many officials continued to think of terrorists as agents of states (Hezbollah acting for Iran ) or as domestic criminals (Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City ). The report tipped off that terrorists would strike on U.S. soil at landmarks in Washington or New York , or through the airline industry.
Back then US didn’t recognize Osama bin Ladin as the most serious threat to America . US state department, terrorism report, in 1995 recognizes Rabbani regime in Kabul as terrorism sympathizer; the report admits the regime has done little to curb the training of foreign militants. Abdul-Rasul Sayyaf, a regime backer is listed as a terrorism supporter who harbors and train potential terrorists in his camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan .
Pakistan security forces raided Sayyaf facilities near Peshawar in November 2005 after the bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad . All Mujhideen factions held some foreign militants in their captivity, the militants were arrested from camps run by other factions.
Afghanistan lacked an effective or recognized central government throughout the 1990s, the country was a training ground for Islamic militants and terrorists in 1995. All of the factions competing for political power in Kabul was brought to that position by American support, America had supported their terrorist activities by means of weapon and cash. After America abandoned these factions in the 90s, it still remained reluctant to act against these factions, even in the face of credible intelligence. Rabbani, Sayyaf and Hekmatyar were running camps that have trained terrorists from many nations who have been active in worldwide terrorist activity. Terrorists who trained in camps in Afghanistan perpetrated attacks in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, East Asia, and South Asia, including the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia in June 1995, bombings in France by Algerian militants, and the Manila-based plot to attack Western interests. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, suspected of involvement in this plot as well as the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, is linked to Afghan training. The group that claimed responsibility for the bombing in November of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad , Pakistan , also has extensive ties to the Afghan network.
After the soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan , Mujaheeden factions showed no capability to form a government in Afghanistan . Bloody civil war provided the ground for terrorist groups to take root. America lost interest in Afghanistan and didn’t want to intervene political. America thought it might have a carrot for Afghanistan 's warring factions in a project by the Union Oil Company of California (UNOCAL) to build a pipeline across the country. This was a pure miscalculation on the American side, during years of internal war Mujaheeden showed no will for negotiation and power share. There was never much chance of the pipeline actually being built, America hoped that the prospect of shared pipeline profits might lure faction leaders to a conference table. Mujaheeden has been traditional friends of America ; the US government has invested greatly on them to turn them into a fighting machine. This is when Taliban came to the stage, a group with a vision beyond military success. US turned to Taliban, after years of internal war and support for terrorism, Mujaheeden were no more the best policy option for Clinton administration. The idea with Taliban was to conquer Afghanistan by them, a group which doesn’t have the traditional relation with foreign militants who would also facilitate the ground for the pipeline, U.S. diplomats were willing at the time, as one official said, to "give the Taliban a chance”. U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Bill Richardson, led a delegation to Afghanistan-in April 1998. No U.S. official of such rank had been to Kabul in decades. Ambassador Richardson went primarily to urge negotiations to end the civil war. In view of Bin Ladin's recent public call for all Muslims to kill Americans, Richardson asked the Taliban to expel Bin Ladin. They answered that they did not know his whereabouts. In any case, the Taliban said, Bin Ladin was not a threat to the United States .
American policy returns to Mujaheeden:
Mujaheeden might have not been the best policy tool for America in Afghanistan but it was after 1998 attack that US realized Mujaheeden is their best option for Afghanistan . After the August 1998 attacks, Clinton administration had to reevaluate the threat posed by Bin Ladin. Was this just a new and especially venomous version of the ordinary terrorist threat America had lived with for decades, or was it radically new, posing a danger beyond any yet experienced.
Though hauntingly prescient, the CIA's 1995 National Intelligence Estimate did not yet name Osama bin Laden as a terrorist threat.
Individuals who trained in Afghanistan in 1995 were involved in wars or insurgencies in Kashmir , Tajikistan , Bosnia , Chechnya , and the Philippines . In Tajikistan , the government claimed in May to have arrested a group of Afghan-trained Tajiks who were responsible for attacking a bus carrying Russian border guards in Dushanbe in February. Manila claims that veterans of Afghan camps are working with Philippine opposition groups that attacked and destroyed a village in April.
The Rabbani regime in Kabul has done little to curb the training of foreign militants. Indeed, one regime backer, Abd al-Rasul Sayyaf, continues to harbor and train potential terrorists in his camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan ; the Government of Pakistan raided his facilities near Peshawar in November after the bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad . The Rabbani regime did arrest foreign militants from camps run by other factions. Many remain in jail in Kabul , but some have been released.
Initially, the DCI's Counterterrorist Center and its Bin Ladin unit considered a plan to ambush Bin Ladin when he traveled between Kandahar , the Taliban capital where he sometimes stayed the night, and his primary residence at the time, Tarnak Farms. After the Afghan Mujaheeden reported that they had tried such an ambush and failed, the Center gave up on it, despite suspicions that the Mujaheeden story might be fiction. Thereafter, the capture plan focused on a nighttime raid on Tarnak Farms.
Although not all CIA officers had lost faith in the Mujaheeden capabilities-many judged them to be good reporters-few believed they would carry out an ambush of Bin Ladin. The chief of the Counterterrorist Center compared relying on the Mujaheeden to playing the lottery. He and his associates, supported by Clarke, pressed for developing a partnership with the Northern Alliance, even though doing so might bring the United States squarely behind one side in Afghanistan 's long-running civil war.
The Northern Alliance was dominated by Tajiks and drew its strength mainly from the northern and eastern parts of Afghanistan . In contrast, Taliban members came principally from Afghanistan 's most numerous ethnic group, the Pashtuns, who are concentrated in the southern part of the country, extending into the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces of Pakistan .
Because of the Taliban's behavior and its association with Pakistan , the Northern Alliance had been able at various times to obtain assistance from Russia , Iran , and India . The alliance's leader was Afghanistan 's most renowned military commander, Ahmed Shah Massood. Reflective and charismatic. But his bands had been charged with more than one massacre, and the Northern Alliance was widely thought to finance itself in part through trade in heroin. Nor had Massood shown much aptitude for governing except as a ruthless warlord. Nevertheless, Tenet assessed Massood as the most interesting possible new ally against Bin Ladin.
In February 1999, Tenet sought President Clinton's authorization to enlist Massood and his forces as partners. In response to this request, the President signed the Memorandum of Notification whose language he personally altered. Tenet says he saw no significance in the President's changes. So far as he was concerned, it was the language of August 1998, expressing a preference for capture but accepting the possibility that Bin Ladin could not be brought out alive. "We were plowing the same ground," Tenet said.
In fall 1999, DCI Tenet unveiled the CIA's new Bin Ladin strategy. It was called, simply, "the Plan." The Plan aimed to close gaps in technical intelligence collection (signal and imagery) as well. In addition, the CIA would increase contacts with the Northern Alliance rebels fighting the Taliban.
It was in 2001 that Bush administration decided to form a post Taliban government, after the 9/11 attacks. Mujheeden were used to chase out Taliban from Kabul and Kandahar after American air bombardment. The new government is predominantly made up of Mujheeden elements.
Wednesday, August 13, 2008
Despite the tailwind from the West, one thing is nevertheless clear: The Georgian president has grossly miscalculated. The Georgian president has confused his desires with reality, and blatantly misjudged the situation. He did not seriously reckon with retaliation by Moscow. Either that or he simply planned to blame Russia. In the first instance any student of politics would understand that Russia would not reserve the use of force when threatened by a small nation or group; Russian compaign of Czechoslovakia 1968, Afghanistan 1979-1989 and Hungary 1954 are my proof. If Saakashvili knew the overwhelming response of Russia but counted on NATO to come to its rescue then the man was wrong again. Nato would never confront Russia, it successfully avoided it during the cold war and would not confront Russia even if Georgia is annexed. It seems like Saakashvili want to play the blame game and gain some sympathy of the west by victimising the Georgian nation. Such a notion is anti-democratic in principle and counter productive in action. Georgia will lose foreign investment because the country has proven instable and Georgia’s way to Nato and EU has become even bumpier. Nato and EU do not want Georgia with outstanding territorial disputes and conduct of aggression. The failure of Georgia in the last fifteen years to comply with the Council of Europe Declaration on minorities, which Georgia is a signatory to, is one thing but its policy of aggression against minorities is another.
In the aftermath of the conflict, we ought to see some implications: Russia will have a stronger position in the Georgian separatist enclaves and its influence will stretch behind pre war borders. If any decision is to be reached regarding the faith of the separatist regions, it is going to be placing them more out of Georgian control. Secondly, there is going to be mounting pressure on Saakashvili to leave the office for killing thousands and putting Georgia even further from it’s aspiration to join Nato and EU. This time it won’t be the same as the ‘Rose Revolution’ of 2003 which brought Saakashvili to power, but it is going to be rather down the stem, something similar to a ‘thorn revolution’. Saakashvili is a student of George Bush and a follower of his policies. He relies on the creation of an external enemy to justify his policies and position in power. Saakashvili is an hypocrite, same as Bush, and uses Neocon rhetoric i.e. freedom, democracy… to appeal to sensationalism.
It is going to be wrong to blame Saakashvili for all political failures of Georgia. It has been established that democracies doesn’t work in politically and economically instable countries. In the aftermath of the war, it is to be seen which direction Georgia is going to take; pursuing it’s ambition to shift closer to the west or lean back on Russia.
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
در بین این زوج های جوان دانش آموزان، دانشجویان، سینما گران و کسبه کاران وجود داشتند که آنان نسبت به ضعف اقتصادی تا اکنون نتوانسته بودند، محفل یا جهیزیه عروسی شان را تهیه و برگزار نمایند.
این محفل عروسی برای اولین بار در ولایت هرات به صورت دسته جمعی برگزار شده و تا کنون سابقه نداشته است و در این حدود یک و نیم هزار نفر مهمان اشتراک داشتند. محمد حسن حسن زاده یک سینما گر جوان ولایت هرات در حالی که کنار همسرش ایستاده
بود، گفت که وی از یک سال به این طرف به دلیل مشکلات اقتصادی نتوانسته است جشن عروسی اش را برگزار نماید.
وی از این اقدام موسسه خیریه رفاه سپاس گذاری نموده و اشک شوق در چشمانش برق می زد. فاطمه دختر 20 ساله که در کنار همسرش با لباس سفید قرار داشت می گوید: (( اگر کمک این موسسه نمی بود، ممکن بود سال ها به طول می انجامید تا ما می توانستیم
جهیزه آماده نموده و پول مصارف عروسی را تهیه می نمایم.)) وی از خانواده ها می خواهد تا شرایط سخت را در مقابل عروسی اولاد های شان نگذارند تا آنان نتوانند، مصارف عروسی را تهیه نمایند.
فاطمه همچنان از موسسات کمک کننده می خواهد تا در این راستا افراد بی بضاحت را کمک نموده تا فقر و فحشا از جامعه برداشته شود. در این حال محمد انور متین کارشناسان فرهنگی اجتماعی ولایت هرات، ضمن تقدیر از این موسسه خیریه اظهار داشت، که این کار بزرگ فرهنگی و معنوی باید تعمیم بخشیده شده و از آن حمایت گردد، تا مشکلات اقتصادی فرا راه ازدواج جوانان حل گردد.
Tuesday, August 05, 2008
Lutz Rzehak, a professor from Humboldt University in Berlin, gathered data about Taliban in Nimroz Province, a southwestern region, much of it desert, that borders both Iran and Pakistan. Instead of security, the Taliban brought Nimroz a grotesque parody of government. Nimroz is interesting to read because this is not a pashtoon province where Taliban support rests most.
when Taliban first captured Nimroz, in first half of the 1990s, they sent in a governor who had family roots in Nimroz but couldn't speak the local language. Like many Taliban, he had been brought up speaking Urdu in Pakistan. For his own convenience, he made Urdu the language of administration. Those who couldn't speak Urdu, which meant most of the residents, were turned away when they applied for government help. There were three more governors between the years 1995-2001. Two of them, both the products of Afghan enclaves in Pakistan, are remembered as barbarous and, when it came to local customs, woefully ignorant.
One carried a stick and struck people with it. He also burned down the library, with its 15,000 books. Next came a mullah who concentrated on amassing a personal fortune by running drugs across the border and confiscating property. He fled when the American bombs began falling in November, 2001. Taliban made villagers pay 25% of their harvest to support Taliban war or give a girl to be wedded to a Talib soldier as a prize. Taliban did not organise the community in anyway to implement a public project, nothing was done for the province.
Nimroz public know the Taliban very well and they have suffered at their hands, yet they are seeing the return of the Taliban with the same old face.
In 2008, sad to say, the revived Taliban are again active in Nimroz. They encourage opium growers and then seize part of their profits. They also deploy human bombs. In recent weeks, Taliban has captured some district centres, kidnapped aid workers; two Taliban suicide bombers attacked in Nimroz, one killed an Afghan soldier and a baby; the other wounded a Canadian soldier.
The return of the Taliban in Nimroz is the direct consequence of the failure of current government. One doesn’t have to be a genius to figure out the government is a failure; it was just last weak that a humanitarian assistance group warned over the worsen situation that would hamper their assistance in parts of the country which has been considered safe. On 24th of June, international crisis group published a report warning that Taliban are also winning the propaganda war. A quick skim of the news in the last few months will show you that the situation has actually got worst; month by month and also over the last few years. Difficult
The return of the Taliban sadly means that there is no political force to prevent their infiltration, the collapse of the power structure in the community means the return of the Taliban. Taliban seem to be the default option of the community. Taliban are not raising from within communities like Nimroz but rather extending themselves to it. Nimroz is not a Pashtoon province like Helmand, Kandahar, Khost or many other Taliban sympathetic provinces. Nimroz is neither attractive nor attracting Taliban, the province is at the bottom of poppy production list, a strong tendency among the community or a strong Narcotic business support for Taliban versus government doesn’t exist. Support for Taliban exists in poppy provinces, the community and Business need Taliban to protect them against government poppy eradication attempts. The taxation paid from poppy money helps to foster local Taliban group.
The international intervention since 2001 seems to not have affected the social infrastructure nor do the way people live in Nimroz. The moment the government is weakened, doors open for Taliban. It’s a return to ten years ago and what has allegedly achieved by international community made no change to ordinary life or at least the way of living and thinking. All this in a province which is not considered Taliban province, the return to pre international intervention is taking place not because the community prefer Taliban but rather they are understood better than modern form of governments. This could be applied broadly to the country when trying to visualise a post international intervention scenario. Once the international community leave Afghanistan for Afghans, which will clearly happen one day, then the volatile government legacy might not last long. Some will oppose the government because they are not politically represented and they are the Pashtoon Taliban sympathisers; the second half of the country will be run over by Taliban, places like Nimroz, because Taliban can impose themselves on the community than any government system.
Saturday, August 02, 2008
Afghanistan economy has always been open market; in the sense, it was never regulated. Non-market institutions and forces have been determinants of trading in Afghan economy. The strength of informal market forces has been stronger than market forces. The creation of informal markets is a resultant of market adjustment to operate under the shadow of political forces. Informal markets and patterns of trading that have developed over many years and operate according to well-established patterns. Market performance depends on extra-market conditions, including history and non-market institutions. The influence of political forces on the market combines market performance elements to exclude many from taking part and enjoying the benefits of participation. Some aspects which could result in exclusion are social and economic structures, gender relations, ethnic identities and spatial patterns of production. In the present condition this pattern of market performance is reinforced and they have the potential to destabilise the country politically.
The booming non-formal economy is highly regulated by informal institutions and is said not to be free. The appearance of economic dynamism hides the fact that informal social regulation actively restricts competition and participation. This lack of competition means that the distribution of the benefits of markets (and therefore of economic growth) is skewed towards those who are already wealthy and powerful.
The way markets are currently functioning is also having a negative effect on political governance and “state-building.” There are close, mutually beneficial links between big business and political and military power holders. Businessmen receive security, tax exemption, credit and in some sectors (such as construction), access to lucrative contracts. For power holders, the linkages provide a means of investment and the potential for money laundering. The accrual of benefits from these markets provides them with the resources to strengthen their military and political power still further.
The costs of these trends to social equity, further growth, political stability and environmental protection are considerable.
A close look at; how Are Markets Run? Who is doing business? What sorts of market tactics are deployed? What sort of business are they doing? How are markets regulated? Despite their usual description as “informal,” markets are heavily regulated by “non-state” forms of regulation. Many of these regulations are embedded in social and ideological norms and institutions. How are government attempts to regulate markets effecting?
the keys areas across Afghan major market sections are: The construction business: a growing sector controlled by a politically-connected oligopoly. this business is highly lucrative. Contracts worth billions of dollars have been assigned to afghan construction companies to build NATO basis, garrisons for afghan armed forces, road construction and many reconstruction projects. Second; The carpet market: a growing sector, but with benefits for whom? And third; Raisin exports: government bureaucracy and bribe-taking, but no quality control or support. Fourth; the aviation industry. Several companies have started their operation in the last couple of years. Carrying passengers internally and internationally. And fifth is the oil business; companies like gas group with close link to the northern alliance have started to operate in the last few months.
The Negative Reality of Afghan Markets
There are four major reasons why the issues identified here matter:
Inequality is worsened by the skewing of benefits from markets. Many of those who emphasise the importance of growth, also recognise that it is not just the quantity of growth that is important, but also the quality. How would the current business environment effect inequalities?
Future growth is constrained: Private sector led development is considered the key to Afghanistan’s longer-term economic development. However, discussions about private sector activities are often based on an assumption that markets in Afghanistan are open and all that is needed is the stimulation of “entrepreneurship” among Afghans. In the current non-competitive environment, those opportunities that are provided are not open to all, but are captured by those who are in a position to do so, creating a self-reinforcing pattern of exclusion.
Existing patterns of political and military control are reinforced and “state-building” diminished. The operation of markets in Afghanistan is closely linked to broader political economy issues. Insecurity reigns throughout the country and the disarmament of warlords and militias in Kabul and elsewhere has been impeded by internal and external politics. The military and political control exerted by regional and local commanders is underpinned by financial resources that come from a variety of licit and illicit sources, including the narcotics trade, customs revenues, revenues from mines in some regions, and unofficial taxation.
The failure to understand linkages between political power (both inside and outside central government) and the economy sometimes leads to an assumption by policy makers of an inherently mutually positive relationship between economic growth and “good governance,” with a lack of clarity about the direction of causality. The realities of the Afghan political economy are that while improved governance may improve the distribution of economic benefits, economic growth will not necessarily lead to improved political governance. Indeed, unless there are concurrent changes in the ways that markets function and in the distribution of the benefits of economic growth, the chance of genuine democratic change and increased security may actually decrease with further economic growth.
Friday, August 01, 2008
"Islamists threaten to murder lawyer defending Pervez," by Jerome Starkey for The Independent, August 1:
The Afghan lawyer defending a journalist on death row in Kabul has been bombarded with death threats urging him to drop the case.
Islamic extremists repeatedly threatened to murder Afzal Nooristani after he agreed to defend Sayed Pervez Kambaksh in his high-profile appeal.
The 23-year-old student writer was sentenced to death for circulating an article about women's rights. He was tried in a closed court, and denied a defence lawyer. His case has sparked worldwide protests.
In Afghanistan, conservative clerics have led rallies endorsing his conviction, while others have marched for his release. Most lawyers were too afraid to take his case.
"I received phone calls threatening to kill me," said Mr Nooristani. "I answered two of them and got lots of missed calls. But I told them they could do what they like. It didn't stop me taking the case."
More than 100,000 people have signed an online Independent petition demanding justice for Mr Kambaksh. The United Nations' high commissioner for human rights, Louise Arbour, the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and Afghanistan's President, Hamid Karzai, have all called for justice to be done.
But speaking at the inaugural meeting of the Afghan Bar Association yesterday, Mr Nooristani warned that the appeal was already deeply flawed, and he said it is almost impossible for Mr Kambaksh to get a fair trial.
"There's no concrete evidence against him, but still the court insists on keeping him in jail and postponing the trial," he said.
Mr Kambaksh was moved to Kabul, from his local jail in Mazar-e Sharif, to improve his chances of a fair trial. But the case has been postponed indefinitely following a brief court appearance in May.
"Even in Kabul the judge played the role of the prosecution. Now the court has to set a date for the trial but we haven't received anything for months," Mr Nooristani added.
Guilty until proven dead. Then still guilty.