Sanjar Qiam: An analysis of the deteriorating Security in Kunduz Province

situation summary

Since 2013 anti government forces are mounting pressure to capture an entire province outside the volatile south and east; thousands of anti government fighters has been battling Afghan forces for the control of Kunduz. Major fighting took place around 23 April 2015 and 28 September 2015. Since early 2015 Afghan officials have said that several areas of Kunduz Province have been under the jihadist control, giving them positions from which to besiege Kunduz city - including positions to the south of the city where the strategic Kunduz Airport is located[1]. The Jihadist captured the provincial capital on the 28 September 2015.

Taliban forces assaulted the districts of Imam Sahib, Aliabad, and Qala-i-Zal as well as areas in Kunduz city in April 2015. The chief of Kunduz’s provincial council claimed that “about 2,000 heavily-armed insurgents attacked” the district centre in Imam Sahib, and that contact with more than 500 Afghan security personnel in the district has been lost, Pajhwok Afghan News reported.[2] The Taliban has released a videotape on its website showing the group in control of Imam Sahib after the fighting and displays a large some of weapons, vehicles and security forces captured by Jihadists. The film shows inside the military bases that now seem to be in Taliban control.[3]

Since the beginning of 2015 the head of the provincial council estimated that more than 65 percept of the province is under Taliban control. The governor of Mohammad Omar Safi told RFERL that this is going to be a very tough fight for them without the combat support of NATO. The power structure and politics of Kunduz led to the fall of a major city into the Jihadist hands.

I argue this is directly related to US priority to wage punitive war against remnant of Taliban that ignored dynamics of politics in Afghan countryside as well as undermined the Afghan state that should have been its key ally. The US allied itself with local strongmen particularly those affiliated with Northern Alliance, staunch opponent of Taliban, in exchange for rewards and power. The US recruited a network of spies and mercenaries whom often sought to settle old scores with their rivals using the US war machine. Pashtuns as well as Tajiks and Uzbeks who were not aligned with Northern Alliance perceived this as another proof that the Northern Alliance has got Americans in their pockets, which hindered the creation of a broad base national government.

Some of the strongmen militia were institutionalised under programmes such as Arbaki and Afghan Local Police. This approach was widely condemned by Afghans and international community due to a track record of human rights abuse by the militia. Irregular Militia is not an alternative to the state bound by the rule of law and aimed at furthering population wellbeing. The militia have a loose command structure and serves the interests of local strongmen; they lack training, vetting, oversight and accountability. They generally live of the population and use fear and brutality to impose its authority.[4] This oppression is misconceived as effective counterinsurgency and stability while in reality it impeded reconciliation and caused further community fragmentation that eventually led to full-blown hostilities.

in posts to come I will continue the analysis of the situation.