following my last post on dynamics of power in Konduz and in the series of analysing the situation in this post I will be focusing on:
From Harpoon to Tycoon
Jihadi
commanders now in charge of local governance are effectively controlling the
state they have a say in earmarking, permission and certification of
international development funds. Instead of using to procedure to enhance
efficiency in private and non-profit sector implementation of development
projects it’s used as a source of revenue by collecting kickbacks in exchange
for permission to implement projects.
The
strongmen was also directing international funding that was aimed at bringing
anti-government forces or armed groups into the social fold. Hundred of
millions of dollars was spent through programmes such as Commander’s Emergency
Response Programme (CERP) or Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program
(APRP), this money was used by the Strongmen to expand their patronage network.
The
most viable source of strongmen is a drug trade which is likely to continue
after most western aid has dried out. Many sources report that Kunduz strongmen
run a lucrative drug network smuggling narcotics to Russia and Europe through
Tajikistan.[1]
In June 2012 the government of Tajikistan issued an extradition warrant for Mir Alam and Latif Ibrahimi the governor of
neighboring Takhar province to face trial for charges of drug trafficking,
terrorism and other crimes.[2]
Needless to say the government of Afghanistan is unable to effectively respond
to the request.
The
private armies the strongmen are funded to maintain are not only a revenue
source but a security asset for the protection of narcotic business.
In September 2012 after more than 12 civilians
were killed in clashes between militia inside the provincial capital the
attorney general office issued a warrant for Mir Alam to be presented in Kabul
for questioning. Many sources put him at the scene of the killing and he was
one of the prime suspects.[3]
Thousands of people took to streets to protest against the decision and Kunduz
governor downplayed the warrant which eventually died out.[4]
The ability to insert influence with such impunity and in the face of states
inability to curb strongmen power many
The strongmen as an effective anti
government force
Another perspective into the debate
would be to ask the question why is the state better than local strongmen? It could be argued the role played by the
strongmen in much of Afghanistan has convinced some that it was efforts to
reform the corrupt and warlord-dominated Afghan state that kicked off the
insurgency by weakening those who had been holding a lid on it and depriving
the Afghan government of key sources of support.[5] US President Barack Obama
acknowledged this in 2009 and dubbed a tactical errors, described as too few
boots on the ground, disenfranchising the Afghan population and allowing
corrupt elites too much leeway to develop clientelist structures of personal dependencies.[6]
Obama remedied it by a “surge” strategy which was “clear, hold, build” and then
“transfer” to local state authorities.[7]
But there was no one to transfer to as Antonio Giustozzi[8]
notes there are few professional police to go around same goes for district
level civil servant. By 2010 the Obama administration was convinced that the
Afghan state does not have the capacity to create responsive subnational
governance and launched several projects to strengthen local governance with
little success, key among them was an alternative to local governance and
support for local strongmen to fill the void through Arbaki and ALP programs. Maj. Michael Waltz, a former Special
Operations Forces officer told New York Times in an interview: “We can’t
sacrifice security for this multigenerational effort to build rule of law.”[9]
Few can argue with Waltz on militia
effectiveness, the mobilisation of these militias, often in agreement with
local police forces already staffed by individuals linked to the same strongmen
in the past, represented a turning point, where NATO, Afghan police, and the
Afghan army had until then been unable to contain the expansion of the
insurgency.[10]
Jamiat and its effective offshoot
Shurai Nizar are wary of elements inside the Afghan government, which are
willing to reach a compromise with the Taliban; this is perceived as a threat
to security in the north. Amrullah Saleh leader of Afghan Green Trend, former
head of Afghan spy agency (NDS) and prominent affiliate of Jamiat wrote on his
Facebook page that there are elements in the government seeking to eliminate
remnants of Jamiat in Kunduz province. [11] During
a visit to Kunduz province Ahmad Zia Massood a counsel to the Afghan president,
and brother of the prominent Jamiat figure Ahmad Shah Massood, said the former
Jihadi strongmen are important in defeating the Taliban. This remark is more a
rhetoric of Jamiat than the official line of Afghan government policy, it’s a
curious case of where Mr. Massood allegiance lay. Given high level support of
Jamiat for maintaining militia there are three policy implications.
First, high level of Jamiat
influence on the government with coinciding hardliner American approach in seeking
military solution to what is labelled as the Taliban problem prevented
initiatives for political solution. Without a long term solution tensions in
Kunduz as well as other parts of the north is a ticking bomb that would go off
under certain situation.
Second, attempts to build support
for a national state by addressing community grievance and insert sovereignty
of state by monopolising violence will hit significant political and factional
obstacles. Elders from Kunduz petitioned former President Karzai to address
militia problem in Kunduz.[12] Anwar
Jagdalik the former governor of Kunduz and Karzai nominee was sent to Kunduz
from Kabul with the mandate to resolve the militia problem that was already
causing headache in 2011. Karzai got the Americans behind the project by
cutting funds for militia in Kunduz.[13]
The task of dismantling, disarming and melding was left to Anwar Jagdalik, it did
not take place.[14] Perhaps
because the international mission was winding down its military operation and
there was little interest or funding for what could potentially be a long-term
strategy of disarmament and reintegration. The governor lacked the resources had
less than 1500 national police at its disposal that clearly was not enough to
take on the militia.
Third, the infighting within the
Afghan government of unity on the one side Ashraf Ghani and his team and on the
other side Abdullah Abdullah with support from Northern Alliance will lend
itself for exploitation by anti government forces. Wall street Journal has
argued that Taliban have already exploited the rift,[15] in
an interview with Ashna Television Mirza Mohammad Yarmand former Deputy
minister of interior has argued that the instability in Kunduz is caused by
rivalries in Afghan National Unity government.
First of all support and funding
militia is contrary to the aim of state building which was the US official
state strategy for Afghanistan and against the doctrine of COIN, counter
insurgency, which emphasises on political solution in addressing the root cause
of war.
Organising a large-scale war effort
on the basis of armed forces organised patrimonially is difficult and
inefficient. The individual strongmen will demand rewards for their
participation, which may constrain the ability of the government to make
decisions and appoint officials as required by the political environment. In
the North, sources in contact with several of the strongmen involved in the
militia movement report that most of them have negotiated deals with the
Taliban, carving out spheres of influence and focusing on the control of their
home turfs.129 There is therefore a strong argument that, relatively unhindered
by an inefficient repression, the Taliban kept spreading around Afghanistan.
The outlying districts of Kunduz are
run by militia who are unpopular among the community, they do not provide an
efficient repression force to keep the Taliban in check due to lack of command
and control. The militia project the power of strongman and is a tool for the
commander to pursue his interests; in exchange militia members are given a free
hand in extorting from the population. For the population the Taliban provide a
better alternative with proven record of stamping out thievery and criminality.
The militia can only fight a war against another militia if they launch
preemtive strikes and organise effective defences. The militia does not have
the discipline to carry out force protection, guard duties and orchestrated
battles with segmented group tasks. Pre-emptive strike and effective defences
depend on good intelligence and surveillance for which the militia need to be
well connected to the community, without strong community support the militia
have no chance of fighting the Taliban.
[1] Afghanistan News centre, who
is controlling the drug routes, http://www.afghanpaper.com/nbody.php?id=29832
[2] Roushd News Agency, Jihadi
leaders are disturbing security in Badakhshan of Tajikistan, http://www.roushd.com/newsIn.php?id=11164
[4] Razaq Mammon, September 2012,
Mir allam is accused of the Killing in Kunduz, http://www.razaqmamoon.com/2012/09/blog-post_8895.html
[6] (A. Rashid, 2008)
[7] (Bowman, 2011: 154)
[8] Drivers of anti government
mobilization in Afghanistan, AREU, http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1203E-Drivers%20of%20Conflict%20IP%202012.pdf
[12] Gul
Rahim Niazman, ‘The Short Arm of the State’, Afghanistan Today, 17
January 2012, accessed 31 July 2013, http://www.afghanistan-
today.org/article/?id=203
[13] Anand Gopal, The Wrong Afghan Friends,
30 May 2014,NY
times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/31/opinion/the-wrong-afghan-friends.html
[14] Gul
Rahim Niazman, ‘The Short Arm of the State’, Afghanistan Today, 17
January 2012, accessed 31 July 2013, http://www.afghanistan- today.org/article/?id=203
[15] NATHAN
HODGE and HABIB KHAN TOTAKHIL, Taliban Heat Up Battle in Kabul, Militants
Exploit Government Infighting, Seek to Oust Foreigners. Nov. 30, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/taliban-heat-up-battle-in-kabul-1417385209?mod=WSJ_hppMIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsSecond
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