UN celebrating peace day

I just saw some correspondence from UN office in Afghanistan, they are trying to encourage Afghan media to celebrate peace day. The UN’s motto is “what are you doing for peace” in a few posts I will try to see how much UN has done for peace in Afghanistan. I believe the UN has been the biggest threat to Afghan peace and it hasn’t done enough to ensure peace or even when it has intervened, UN middling has been total political and resulted in worsening the situation.

 

UN and Geneva peace Accord:

 

Still, as the Cold War drew to a close, Afghanistan seemed close to solving its internal strife. In accordance with the 1988 Geneva Accords, the Soviet Union withdrew all of its troops as of February 15 1989. Further, the United Nations appeared to have achieved the beginnings of a legitimate regime. But instead of experiencing a transition to a stable government and despite Najibullah.s resignation, Afghanistan plummeted into civil war. The Mujahideen had splintered, regional powers supported different actors and both Russia and the USA retreated from Afghanistan’s internal strife, both powers instead focusing on after effects of the Soviet Union’s disintegration as well as other more strategically relevant crises. So, Afghanistan degenerated into political anarchy and rampant violence, the United Nations would seem a likely actor to return order and stability. Indeed, it is written into the Charter of the United Nations for the member countries .to unite [their] strength to maintain international peace and security. Along a spectrum of possibilities, there are two general methods for the UN to address such crises: mediation and peace enforcement. But each possesses deficiencies, and the events in Afghanistan demonstrate these flaws. According to Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, Afghan finance minister, the four major influences on chances of success through mediation are the nature of dispute, the disputant’s characteristics, the attributes of mediator and the strategy of mediation. Ahady continues, arguing that since 1982, the UN had used this technique to address the conflict in Afghanistan, but when attempting to negotiate a transition regime, the UN faced insurmountable obstacles in each of these categories. First, regarding the nature of the dispute, there is generally a smaller probability of success when the mediation concerns a sovereignty transfer. This is due to the complications in convincing an armed group to relinquish its hold on power. After achieving the Soviet withdrawal, the United Nations had begun to work towards the creation of a legitimate government formed by a coalition of the rebel warlords, with the intention of replacing the Najibullah government. Beyond the inherent difficulties in convincing Najibullah to resign, the Mujahideen also refused to view the regime as legitimate. Thus, they denounced any negotiations or power sharing schemes that involved Najibullah remaining in power, arguing that the Soviet client regime was so obviously illegitimate that they would not even acknowledge it by engaging in dialogue. For the second aspect, the characteristics of the belligerents, Ahady argues that when power is not balanced, or even perceived not to be imbalanced, mediation will likely be resisted. This affected the Afghanistan situation because with the assistance provided by regional actors, and the USA prior to 1991, the Mujahideen had the upper hand in an unequal of distribution of power. Therefore, in addition to their argument that the illegitimate government deserved no recognition, the Mujahideen likewise had no motivating factor to consent to a UN arrangement. This, however, might have been overcome with foreign pressure, but since American intelligence predicted that Pakistan would continue to support the resistance and that any drop in support for the rebels would result in the triumph of the Soviet puppet regime, the USA decided against pressuring. The Najibullah regime eventually did collapse in 1991, and with the widespread availability of small arms, the state fragmented as power shifted to various Mujahideen warlords across the country. In fact, it is estimated that that by 1992, 2 million weapons were in circulation, acting as a kind of currency and working to sustain the stalemate between the rival factors. Despite this movement towards an actual balance of power, with the military support from international actors, each warlord believed he was stronger than the other rebels. As such, the downfall of the regime .frustrated a UN plan for a peaceful transfer of power from the communist regime to a transitional government, led to an intense power struggle among the Mujahideen groups who had taken over different parts of the country and seized or looted weapons and heavy equipment. The third aspect describes the strategy of the mediator and as Ahady maintains, it can take one of three forms, facilitation, formulation, and manipulation. Of the three, not only does manipulation have the best chance at success, but it is also necessary in instances of high tensions and conflict. For a facilitating strategy, the mediator would simply provide the forum for discussion. Formulation would then involve suggestions by the mediator for the consideration of the disputants. Manipulation though, would occur when the mediator compels the two sides to accept an agreement. The two former options are quite passive; they will function best in situations where all sides are eager to reach an agreement. The latter strategy is required when the disputants are verbally or physically hostile towards one another, and so with the extremely high levels of tensions in Afghanistan, the United Nations would have to use manipulation

as a strategy.

 

This in fact leads to the fourth aspect of mediation, the characteristics of the mediator because for a successful manipulation strategy, the mediator must possess enough leverage to change the cost-benefit calculation of the disputants. Afghanistan had achieved true anarchy with warring Mujahideen forces in control of billions of dollars worth of modern weapons and access to millions of dollars in cash from the drug trade. So for the United Nations mediation efforts to succeed, a strategy of manipulation would have to be backed by credible leverage. However, the UN was forced to confront more than just a country filled with military arms and warring clan factions. Following the disengagement of the superpowers, the other interested states entered the political vacuum left behind. These states possessed conflicting views and goals for Afghanistan, and because each actor had a different objective, it became increasingly difficult for them to work together. Moreover, these states no longer had pressure from the USA to cooperate in achieving a settlement, and consequently, "driven by competing interests in Afghanistan and the region, neighboring countries and other foreign states and non-state players supported rival factions in the Afghan civil war, further reducing the UN’s chances for a negotiated settlement. Had the USA instead chosen to put pressure on one or more of its allies, the UN might have possessed the leverage necessary to manipulate negotiations into a political settlement. But the Soviet withdrawal represented, according to Undersecretary of State Michael Armacost, restoration of the strategic balance of the region.. And while it has been argued that even as late as 1992, the USA could have successfully used its position to compel the Mujahideen and regional states to follow the United Nations, the American fundamental goal of defeating the Soviet Union had been achieved, and instead the USA probably wanted to avoid contrasts with Pakistan. Thus, because the USA did not use its position to influence the regional powers or warlords within Afghanistan, the United Nations had little leverage because it could not reward or punish for compliance or non-compliance. And as the military arms and finances continued to flow into the country arming the warring factions, it should not be surprising that anarchy developed. In fact, because of the above problems posed by mediation, Ahady contends that it is weak and ineffective, especially compared with direct intervention.

 

UN is celebrating peace day:

I just saw some correspondence from UN office in Afghanistan, they are trying to encourage Afghan media to celebrate peace day. The UN’s motto is “what are you doing for peace” in a few posts I will try to see how much UN has done for peace in Afghanistan. I believe the UN has been the biggest threat to Afghan peace and it hasn’t done enough to ensure peace or even when it has intervened, UN middling has been total political and resulted in worsening the situation.

 

UN and the Soviet Invasion:

 

In 1979 Soviet troops intervened to assist the Afghani leaders and his faltering dictatorship in the regime’s struggle against rebel forces, which was comprised of the Mujahideen, a rebel force consisting of domestic and foreign Islamic extremists. The USA, motivated by the desire to prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union, became

involved with other regional states, particularly Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to support the resistance. Pakistan possessed the strategic position and intelligence capabilities to channel military resources; Saudi Arabia was willing to provide a large source of funding for the rebellion. As a result, the Mujahideen forces, which were essentially a group of diverse warlords lacking any cohesive element beyond a common enemy, became a substantial force, armed by foreign countries. While each of the USA.s regional allies argued for supporting a different Mujahideen warlord, or group of warlords, the USA preferred a strategy that spread the military resources between several groups to ensure a wider distribution of military aid and therefore more opposition. The Americans then used their influence to enforce this strategy, and so instead of arming a smaller group of cohesive warlords to form the main opposition, a larger, more varied group of warlords each received a smaller amount of military aid. This caused three results that would have a future impact on Afghanistan. First, the simultaneous, rapid, and large-scale arming of opposing forces brought a major portion of the population under arms in the 1980s. A second result was that while enough weapons were being shipped into the country to arm the majority of individuals, monetary finances were spread between too many factions. then, the warlords developed alternative methods of financing their campaign, such as drug trafficking and predatory tactics on civilians. Third, because the arms were being shipped to all of the warlords equally, no one group possessed the capabilities to overthrow the government. This prolonged of the conflict since when the Mujahideen coalition began to falter, no one element was strong enough to defeat the government, even though the general war continued due to the overall strength of the Mujahideen.

 

can terrorists join the war on terror

The United Nations drew a list of international terrorist in 1999, the list included high ranking Taliban official, from top leadership to deputy minister level, as well as their international collaborators of alqaida group. The list included slightly under 500 Afghan Taliban. The Afghan government and international community is looking for a large number of people on the list but at least 19 Taliban officials have reconciled with Karzai's government and some holds government offices. The list is attached. The UN Security Council has been slow to adjust to the changing political realities in Afghanistan.

 

Abdul Hakim Monib, the governor of Afghanistan's Uruzgan province, has drawn praise from U.S. military commanders as a partner in the battle against global terrorism, lending crucial political support for international relief and reconstruction projects in territory contested by Taliban insurgents. But Monib, who served as deputy minister of frontier affairs in the prior Taliban government, is also on a U.N. list of suspected international terrorists, and Russia has repeatedly blocked U.S. and NATO efforts to take him off it. Monib's case underscores how U.S.-sponsored sanctions in the United Nations can backfire, placing American and NATO commanders in Afghanistan in the awkward position of potentially violating U.N. resolutions by funding programs that benefit Monib. "We try to engage almost all the governors and elected officials, even if they have somewhat undesirable backgrounds," said Col. John Thomas, a U.S. spokesman for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. There are some "reformed Taliban in the government that are quite helpful."

The U.N. Security Council first imposed sanctions on the Taliban in October 1999 for providing a safe haven to Osama bin Laden and for refusing to surrender him to face trial in New York for masterminding the August 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa. Monib and more than 100 other Taliban leaders were placed on a sanctions list in January 2001, a year before he broke ranks with the Islamic movement and joined forces with Hamid Karzai, the Washington-backed president of Afghanistan. After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the United States ushered through resolutions that expanded the list of sanctioned people to suspected al-Qaeda members. The measures included a travel ban, an arms embargo and a prohibition on the direct or indirect provision of funds or economic resources to Monib and 489 other people and groups.

Richard Barrett, chairman of the U.N. Security Council's Al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions panel, which monitors compliance with the resolution, said that the ban on financial assets and economic resources raises troubling legal questions. "Does giving him a ride in an armored car or an airplane or giving aid through him to some sort of program within Uruzgan province constitute a breach of the sanctions?" Barrett asked. "Some of the legal advice that states have been getting suggest that it may."

In March 2006, the United Nations instructed its staff in Afghanistan to steer clear of Monib over concerns that they might breach the sanctions. But the prohibition was partially lifted after U.S. and European officials objected. U.N. staff members are now allowed to interact with Monib but not to engage in activities that could be construed as violating sanctions, such as flying him in a U.N. aircraft. However, one U.N. official in Afghanistan said the mission has been privately urging donor countries to increase aid to Uruzgan. Monib is "seen as being a relatively capable governor," but his designation on the list "does present difficulties," said Adrian Edwards, a U.N. spokesman in Afghanistan. "We have to abide by" U.N. resolutions, he said.

The Netherlands and Australia -- which also has troops in Uruzgan -- insist that they have not breached U.N. sanctions because they have channeled aid through the government, not through Monib's private accounts. "We do talk to Monib, which is not prohibited," said a Dutch official who tracks the issue. But "we do business with the province of Uruzgan." An Australian spokeswoman insisted that "Australia has strictly complied with the sanctions." She added that "Australian personnel in Afghanistan will ensure they do not engage in any dealings with Monib which would be contrary to Australian law" or Security Council resolutions.

Monib's dilemma underscores a broader failing of the U.N. role in the battle against terrorism, said Eric A. Rosand, who oversaw U.N. counterterrorism efforts for the United States until 2005. He said that the council has not responded to evolving terrorist threats and that many countries have stopped cooperating with it. For instance, the council has not added a new Taliban figure to the list since 2001. That included the movement's military commander, Mullah Dadullah, who was killed by allied forces in May. "The whole thing is broken," said Rosand, who now tracks the council's terrorism efforts for the Center on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation. "Everyone knows that most countries are not even implementing the sanctions."

The council, meanwhile, is also facing a political backlash from European governments, courts and human rights advocates, who say it offers inadequate legal protection for people on the list. The council has introduced new measures to strengthen due process, including the establishment of a U.N. office to hear complaints. But the new office lacks the authority to recommend that the council remove a person from the list, and a single member of the council can still block the delisting process. "This is a perfect case where time has passed, things have changed, but the committee hasn't and the list hasn't," Rosand said. "The list is so poorly managed that no one has confidence in it anymore, and nobody puts forward names."

 

 

خانم سوزی

يك خانم جوان باشنده  ولايت بادغيس  شب چهارشنبه  خودش را اتش زده وبزندگيش خاتمه داد.

 

اين خانم  30 ساله ؛ به اساس مشكلات خانوادگي كه با مادرشوهرش داشت باریختن تیل بروجودش خودش را آتش زد .

 

محمدي مي افزايد كه  این خانم در اخرین لحظات زنده گیش گفته است  که مادر شوهرش با وی در تمام کارها ناسازگاربوده كه اکثرا به مشاجره می انجامید و ناگزیر شب گذشته  پس ازگفتگو لفظی با خشویش تصمیم به حریق كردنش وجودش  گرديد.

 

 این واقعه در حالی صورت گرفته که فعالان حقوق بشردرولايت هرات ازعدم خاتمه اين عمل غيراسلامي اظهارنگراني نموده و بیشتر عامل  ا ینگونه وقایع را فقراقتصادي ؛ موجوديت ازدواج هاي اجباري وعدم سازگاري بين زنان خانواده ميدانند.

 

هرچند بگفته مسئولين رياست امورزنان ولايت هرات گراف خودسوزي ها دراين ولايت نسبت  به سال هاي گذشته كاهش يافته اما هم اكنون تعداد خودسوزي هاي زنان درجريان سال روان به 40 مورد رسيده كه اكثريت شان نسبت به سوختن فيصدي زياد درشفاخانه حوزوي هرات جان داده اند .