Friday, October 05, 2007

growth and decline of afghan media and telecommunication

 The development of telecommunication and media is one of the single largest achievements that could be point at in the last five years. Media and telecommunication are large technical system dealing with the ways in which innovation is behind the rate and direction of system growth. The support of international community got the sector moving. Growth in media and telecommunication systems has to account for the economic drive to realize economies of scale and scope. Which is lacking in other sectors of Afghanistan – e.g. education, health, security, governance… - I am also arguing that the growth in media and telecommunication is coming to a stop because the economy of system is lacking to reduce service and operation costs. By economy of system I mean a framework which accounts far the ways in which growth and economics mix with politics in the development of telecommunications and media. In other words lack of political vision is going to negative affect the economics of telecommunication and media.

 

Media and telecommunication are economies of scale which stem from improvements in the capacity to handle large quantity and volumes to a greater number of subscribers at a lower cost. Economies of scope are derived from using the same plant and equipment to provide a range of telecommunications services at a lower cost than that of providing each service separately, or using same material of an interview for a weekly feature and news clip.

Economy of scale and scope drove development of media and telecommunication, but now that the industries are large and expensive, its essential characteristic of large technical systems to have a mechanism for controlling a system of interrelated components. And that is the political regime with social causes.

 

 

 

 

Thursday, September 27, 2007

a post ideological afghanistan

 

 

I went to General Staff College the other day, senior army officers and generals go to GSC for specialized training and in service skill building. GSC is the most prestigious military academy in Afghanistan.  Around twenty brigade and regiment commanders came to kabul from around the country to participate in two week seminar, telling them what is happening in the country and how things are developing. I thought it would be useful to talk with them and get them on our side.

 

I am happy I went there to talk with them, so I could give them a different perspective into issues. most of Afghan Armed Forces (AAF) general and senior officer undergo extensive training by Americans, security contractors such as Dycorps and other NATO mentors. AAF, especially police force is the public face of the government and the most important pillar of law enforcement. But AAF has been accused of corruption and low discipline. The government, Nato and international community haven’t thoroughly looked at the decision making process and judgment of commanders, and it’s connection with the kind of training they acquire as well as it’s significance in AAF performance.

 

The trainers in GSC and other AAF academies decent in the compound without much knowledge of where they are, an official in GSC who wanted to remain anonymous told me, a visiting American trainer after a few days in GSC found out that he was in Afghanistan. Foreign AAF trainers might have the best skill and knowledge but they are detached from Afghanistan and lack communication and language ability to pass optimal skills to Afghans and to learn about Afghanistan. Even if foreign trainers were willing to communicate more effectively and in a trust building manner they wouldn’t be able  to do it because they rotate every three months and that wouldn’t give them a chance to learn much. 

 

The time of communication in GSC is very persuasive and designed to reform social attitude of the Afghan officers, persistent seminars comprises social influences capable of producing substantial behavior and attitude change through the use of persuasion tactics, via interpersonal and group-based influences. this could be considered.

 

I am sitting there and waiting for my turn to tell them about Afghan media. Before me Colonel O’Brian from US army is telling them about the importance of media in covering the success of army. But he could not outline a single story afghan or international media on afghan army and it’s potential influence on public perception.

All the examples he give was either about WW II or Vietnam or Balkans or Cold war. O’Brian also mentioned the name of broadcasters and agencies, it was either CBS, BBC, NPR or some other western agency. I do think O’Brian was sincere in telling them media is important and the army should help media cover the war but the way he was telling has proved to be counterproductive. The commanders of Afghan army get to hear about western journalism and they start to respect western journalism. We have seen western journalist have been provided with information by the army that they would never offer to afghan media, western media has been extended especial courtesies while Afghan media has been restricted by the army. When a discussion started on the latest military stories in media, Afghan generals were of course talking what they have seen on Afghan broadcasters but O’Brian was saying “I can’t comment on that, but there was a story on BBC…..” since he was leading the discussion he went on to analyze the story. I think this is a great way to undermine Afghan media. If the significance of Afghan media is not stressed by O’Brian, an Afghan commander would less value it. O’Brian tells all sort of anecdotes about some little town paper and how they mobilized the town community, these sorts of anecdotes glorifies American way of living and indirectly misrepresent afghan media. Glorifying American way of reporting and journalism would negatively represent Afghan media in the eyes of army generals.  

 

Colonel O’Brian continues his speech on media, the discussion comes to Aljazeera and the officers condemn the station for having links with Taliban and Alqaida. O’Brain says; Aljazeera is not the example of a good media, what kind of journalism is propagating the message of hatred. It’s bad media. They are showing footage of Taliban crimes. Medley a civilian media advisor to NATO adds; media professionals deny any link between media and violence, but there is, media has exacerbated a conflict to genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Taliban had a radio station, Radio Sharia, propagating their version of Islam.

 

Clearly, O’Brian and Medley, two senior Nato representative (one military and the other civilian) don’t understand that Aljazeera has a broader agenda which extends behind reporting. If Aljazeera gets exclusive footage from Alqaida and Taliban it shows they are doing a good job. Alqaida and Taliban are the hot topic and Aljazeera is a new channel which came up with format to get access to the hot topic and audience survey shows Aljazeera is growing. This is what media business is about. O’Brian and Medley also forgets that their media promotes violence to and it’s more graphically than Aljazeera. When I was studying in Poland I was attending physical exercise and i was asked, as one does, where I came from. When I said Afghanistan, the girl promptly responded; Oh, Rambo 3, this tells a lot. Since the 1980s and especially since 2002 Hollywood's depiction of Afghans has gradually shown signs of vilifying Afghans.

 

Western media and especially Hollywood not only portraits a violent picture of Afghanistan but it also slanders and humiliate Afghans too. A new Hollywood movie is, called Domino, about four gangsters, one of whom is an Afghan. The Afghan guy betrays his friends and steals their money and sends it to Afghanistan for the war against American, at the end of the movie the Afghan guy blows up a business tower in a suicide attack. In this movie Hollywood shows all sorts of stereotypes that are attributed to Afghans. Domino might be considered as one of the most subversive films released by a major studio since Fight Club.

 

Hollywood network productions such as 24, escape from Afghanistan, the Beast, September 8 shows Afghan villains. Hollywood misrepresents Afghans and their collective identity.   Hollywood pictures showing Afghans holding hostage and bombing buildings and civilians only reinforces western stereotypes of Afghans being untrustworthy, irrational, cruel, and barbaric

 

The 2004 film Alexander by American director Oliver Stone, portraits a negative and inaccurate picture of Hindu Kush people. the movie portrayed Afghans as poor, gay, barbaric farmers that lives in caves and spends their time killing innocent neighbors. Alexander marries Rukhshana in Afghanistan; the movie shows that Afghans are so gay that Alexander and his army arrive to save their women.

 

A new Hollywood movie called "300" which shows a battle between Spartans and Persians. The movie portrays Persians as "deranged, ghastly, ruthless monsters."

The 2007 film 300 was widely criticized for its "racist” portrayal of Persian combatants at the battle of Thermopylae. 300 depicts the east and specifically Persians decadents sexually flamboyant and evil in contrast to the noble Greeks and the west in general. If 300 had been made in Germany in mid 1940s or earlier it would be studied today alongside ‘The Eternal Jew’, a movie with the central thesis that characterize the Jew as a wandering cultural parasiteas, a textbook example of how racist fantasy and myth can serve as an incitement to total war. 

 

We are living in a post ideological era; neither Hollywood nor Aljazeera is considered inflaming. But I believe the American Colonel and the Afghan Colonels still lives in the cold war era and think in ideological terms. 

Saturday, September 08, 2007

afghanistan's media against Narcotics

CETENAGROUP has been paid millions of dollars to implement a counter narcotics strategy.  The team of the strategy is "Afghanistan’s Media Against Narcotics".

CETENA attempts to harmonize counter narcotic media strategy. They have taken over 34 independent radio station around the country to broadcast their counter narcotic spots.

CETENA pays US$1000 per month for radio stations in exchange for exclusive CETENA advertisement. “Growing poppy is a crime. Government will prosecutor poppy cultivators, if you grow poppy you don’t deserve to live in our society” is a message aired several times in a small radio station in Helmand or Kandahar or Nangarahr “If you are living on poppy money, you are rescuing your life and your family. Afghan government will arrest you and you will spend your life behind bars” government has no control what so ever where this advert is aired and almost everybody grows poppy there. This puts the radio station against the community, especially when it’s not branded. The spot doesn’t say who brings it to the audience. It sounds like it’s a message from the radio station. Opium, like terror, is a dead end for the Afghan people. At an August 9 special narcotic briefing at the State Department, John Walters, director of the President’s Office of National Drug Control Policy said that more than 90 percent of the world’s opium is grown in Afghanistan.


its estimated that the total export value of Afghanistan’s opium was $3.1 billion, representing approximately 32 percent of the country’s total ( licit and illicit ) gross domestic product.
“The big money made off of opium in Afghanistan is made by the upper levels of the chain – the warlords, the traffickers, the corrupt individuals who are involved in this,” Walters said. This is why the radio station this campaigns the radio station. The upper levels of the chain are the sort of people that has a lot of influence in the politics and economy, Karzai is scared of them. That is why none has been prosecuted. A police commander in Kabul city told me that he has several times rang officials in the ministry of interior to tell them that he has intercepted tilted window cars with no number plates, transporting opium. The police commander who asked to remain anonymous was advised by senior ministry official to stay off the matter and not to create headache for them. If the government is scared to confront the upper level traffickers why is American putting the local radio in danger.  “suppressing media is the new American policy. the traditional American way of stabbing on the back, they are misleading media to fight the drug problem. A fight which Americans failed and clearly they are not sincere and committed about fighting narcotics, the objective is not eradicating the poppy but eradicating the media by poppy” said an afghan drug analyst, Asarullahaq Hakimi. 

“There is no miracle crop,” Schweich a US official “There’s nothing that really will equal the income you can get from poppy.”  The chief benefit of not growing the opium poppy, which is a highly labor-intensive crop, is the security of not having to deal with corrupt and violent organizations, he said.

Successful and sustainable agricultural endeavors require electricity, roads and market access.  “It’s important,” Schweich added, “to remember there’s a pathway to go from being a subsistence farmer to having a future for your children and your family that’s better off.”

In explaining the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, released August 9, the officials said the United States plans to focus on high-yield crops such as fruits and nuts that come closer than other crops to replacing the income from the poppy.

The 2007 alternative development campaign, for example, with annual expenditures of $120 million to $150 million, includes short-term cash-for-work projects and comprehensive agricultural and business development projects.


 

korean ransom

South Korea's intelligence chief has refused to deny that his government paid a ransom to the Taleban to release 19 hostages last week.
Kim Man-bok admitted to a parliamentary committee that there were undisclosed terms involved in the deal with the Afghan rebels.
there have been persistent media reports alleging that a multi-million dollar ransom was paid.
A Taleban representative in Ghazni province, where the hostages were held, told the BBC the South Korean government paid $20m but two other Taleban sources told the BBC no ransom was paid.
Afghan officials have said a sum slightly under $1m was handed over.