following on my last post on the summary of the situation in this post I will analyse:
The Dynamics of Power and Politics in
Kunduz
The
Northern Alliance which consists of Jamiat Islami, Ittahad Islami, Junbish
Islami, Hizb Wahadat and smaller Tanzims[1]
gained power after the fall of Taliban, on the insistence of the West and
particularly the US Hamed Karzai was installed as the president but for the
first few years he lacked any real power and all important official positions
below the president on the national level was occupied by northern alliance.
One
of the key challenges Karzai faced during his entire term was to make the
government national by reducing the influence of military political faction,
i.e. Northern alliance and make the government inclusive by giving place to
Pashtuns in the government. Hamid Karzai installed a range of Pashtuns and
Tajik technocrats at important positions in Kabul and Pashtuns to replace
Northern Alliance at provincial level. Most Pashtuns were formerly members of
Hizbi Islami or Taliban, the staunch enemy of Northern Alliance.
Kunduz
traditionally have had strong Tanzim presence with strong local commanders, the
provincial capital of Kunduz was overrun by Jihadists early in August 1988
right after Soviet combat troops withdraw from the city garrison but was
recaptured by the government forces that only remained in control of the provincial
capital.[2]
Hizb, Jamiat and Ittahad have had military base in Kunduz, some of the
strongest commanders such as Aref Khan, Arbab Mohammad Hashem, Mirza Mohammad Naseri, Latif and Rauf
Ibrahimi defected to Taliban and in the post 2001 climate where power was
assigned by the US they remained marginalised or were killed. In addition,
several hundred sub-commanders of Kunduz that surrendered to Northern Alliance
with their 4000 men in 2001 were massacred by Dustom men in Dasht lailly. Two
commanders of Jamiat Gen. Daud Daud and Mir Alam became the most influential strongmen
of Kunduz after successfully reducing most opponents with assistance from the
US military.
General
Daud and Mir Alam run Kunduz like a fiefdom, this was not acceptable for the
Kabul government, in an attempt to break their grip Karzai lured Gen. Daud to
Kabul by appointing him as the national deputy minister of interior in 2004.
Mir
Alam for his influence was not bestowed with a position in the government. A
state position would greatly enhance his legitimacy and contact with regional,
national and international powers. He started to cause trouble for the Kabul
regime, for instance in 2005 Mir Alam men launched several attacks on Afghan
police and security forces.[3]
This is just before the parliamentary election when security is paramount; in
order to ensure security Karzai’s most viable choice was to reward Mir Alam
with a senior position in the government. Mir Alam was appointed chief of
police of neighbouring Baghlan province in June 2005. To become the chief of
police, he had to hand over a large cache of 765 weapons plus ammunition to
Motaleb Beg as part of the deal.[4] Mir Alam soon found himself in quarrel with
another Jamiat strongman, the commander of the North and Northeast Highway
Police brigade turned 20th AMF Brigade, Abdul Khalil Andarabi. According to US government
information, they competed for the control of drug traffic routes[5].
Since Andarabi and his influential father, Juma Khan, originated from this
province, he apparently gathered more supporters and edged out Mir Alam.
From
2009 with the US military surge and the accompanying worsening security
situation Shurai Nazar faction and Jamiat Islami also successfully used efforts
to contain the Taliban to improve their own power position.
In
2010 the Americans enlisted Mir Alam among others to run the Arbaki programme
in Kunduz. He received millions in cash and weapon in exchange for fighting the
Taliban, which very often meant his political opponents.[6]
Given military power without any political strain meant that Mir Alam men had a
free rein in looting the villagers with impunity.
In
September 2010, the appointments of two other famous commanders of Jamiat also affected
the security set up in Kunduz. General Daud returned as 303rd Pamir Police Zone
commander to the north. The charismatic Sayedkheli became the Kunduz provincial
chief of police. He had gained a legendary reputation in Shura-ye Nazar as the
defender of his home area, Shomali near Kabul, against Taliban and Pakistani
forces in the late 1990s. In Kunduz, Sayedkheli successfully sidelined the mayor of Kunduz
City, Mohammad Ghulam Farhad, a Pashtoon who supported Taliban in the 1990s.
Bismillah,
Daud, and Sayedkheli all Shurai Nizar of
Jamiat acted as trio in fighting the Taliban in Kunduz. From his ministerial
position, Bismillah provided 1,125 ALP positions for the organisational chart (tashkeel)
of the province in addition to the original 1,810 regular ANP officers. Of
these ALP positions, 300 each went to Chahar Dara, Dasht-e Archi, and Imam
Sahib, while Kunduz district received 225. In Kunduz, Sayedkheli therefore
could use the ALP positions to establish a clientele. Mir Alam’s force, which
was mainly in Khanabad, was not integrated. Since no complaints by him are
known, it seems that he preferred to remain in the NDS-operated Arbaki
programme. Nabi Gechi on the other hand, who had fought previously against
Shura-ye Nazar got nothing.
In
October 2010, Sayedkheli negotiated successfully with Taleban leaders in who
had previously fought on the insurgents’ side. He persuaded them with positive
incentives – assets in the form of ALP positions and goods from the
internationally funded Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) to
‘reintegrate’ insurgents – and with threats – such as bringing down the wrath of the
mighty US army on them. These successful negotiations allowed Sayedkheli’s ANP
and US infantry forces, together with militias led by Mir Alam and another
Shurai Nizar subcommander Nawid, to recapture Aliabad and the south of Chahar
Dara district in October and November 2010.
The
US surge of 2010 and the Afghan militia campaign delivered a serious blow to
the Taliban in Kunduz; after 2010, they did not control significant territory
anymore. However, they continued to exist as an armed group and successfully
changed their strategy, refocusing on clandestine operations.
[1] A political and military
organisation that is expanding since the demise of the monarchy. A Tanzim is a conglomerate of local
commanders who are loose loyal to the organization for foreign support and
balancing regional power structure.
[2] Soviets Complying On Afghan
Withdrawal, U.S. Says, August 16, 1988|By Thom Shanker, Chicago Tribun http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1988-08-16/news/8801230289_1_afghan-withdrawal-soviet-soldiers-afghan-army
[3] Schetter
and Glassner, ‘Neither Functioning, nor Failing . . .’, [see FN 5], 145
[4] Radio
Afghanistan, ‘Commander Surrenders Weapons in Afghan North’, BBC Monitoring
South Asia, 25 June 2005; Stapleton, ‘Disarming the Militias . . .’,
[see FN 123], 7–8.
[5] US Embassy
Kabul, ‘Kunduz Politics . . .’, [see FN 142]
[6] Commander Rauf of the
Ibrahimi family of Hezbi Islami Tanzim integrated surrendered Taliban fighters
into his force and occupied the old fortress of Kunduz, Bala Hisar. Mir Alam
group called in US warplane and bombed the fortress. Rauf had to move from his
position, which was immediately taken by Mir Alam’s men. Interview with
police officer and former fighter of Jamiat, Kunduz, December 2012;
International Crisis Group, ‘Disarmament and Reintegration . . .’, [see FN 72],
10
