Monday, March 04, 2013
Thursday, April 28, 2011
- April 27 - an Afghan pilot had an argument with his american mentors, left the meeting and then returned and forced 9 Americans to remove their weapons before shooting them with a U.S. provided M9 semi-automatic weapon. he then shot himself.
- 25 April - Taliban jailbreak from the Sarposa prison of kandahar, something out of a bad gangster movie. some 500 Taliban got away including prominent commanders and they police and afghan official said to be involved in facilitating it
- April 18 - An insurgent kills two Afghan soldiers and an officer at the Afghan Defense Ministry.
- April 16 - Six American troops, four Afghan soldiers and an interpreter are killed when an Afghan soldier detonates an explosive vest at Forward Operating Base Gamberi in Laghman.
- April 15 - A suicide bomber impersonating a policeman blows himself up inside the Kandahar police headquarters complex, killing the top law enforcement official in the southern province.
- April 4 - Two American military personnel are shot and killed by a man wearing an Afghan border police uniform.
- February - An Afghan solider shoots nine German soldiers, killing three and injuring six.
- January - One Italian soldier is killed and another is wounded after an Afghan soldier opens fire on them.
the afghan national security forces (ANSF) has been growing in numbers but continues to be greatly lacking in quality. Still plagued by widespread corruption, it continues to be deeply resented by the population for its abusiveness. It is still trained mainly as a light paramilitary force to hold off insurgents until the ISAF can arrive on the scene and has little ability to deal with ordinary crime, the daily scourge for Afghans. The lack of order on the street creates important inroads for the Taliban.
The stampede to create militia forces in Afghanistan further complicates the reliability of Afghan security forces. The local police set up by ISAF may have robust vetting and safeguard mechanisms, but the myriad of other militias created by ethnic politicians and local strongmen often don’t have any vetting at all. Their growth reveals the level of ethnic tensions and uncertainty in Afghanistan. Nor does the Ministry of Interior have any clear ability to control any such forces that go rogue.
Karzai, distrustful of and confused by Washington, operates an increasingly narrow patronage network and easily overrides the local officials whom he perceives as threatening, regardless of their performance. Many Afghans, not the least of whom are the Northerners and minorities, are deeply worried about negotiations with the Taliban. Even with quarter of a million Afghan security forces and 160 billion dollars spent in the last ten years, the current political situation in Afghanistan is unstable.
Tuesday, November 30, 2010
Confidential cables to Washington from the American embassy in Islamabad, obtained by WikiLeaks and made available to a number of news organizations, illustrate deep clashes over strategic goals on issues like Pakistan's support for the Afghan Taliban and tolerance of Al Qaeda, and Washington's warmer relations with India, Pakistan's archenemy.
One cable, sent less than a month after President Obama assured reporters that Pakistan's nuclear materials "will remain out of militant hands," expressed concern that a stockpile of highly enriched uranium, stored for years near an aging research reactor in Pakistan , could be used by militants to build several "dirty bombs" or perhaps an actual nuclear bomb.
That cable is among the most unnerving evidence of the complex relationship -- sometimes cooperative, often confrontational, always wary -- between America and Pakistan nearly 10 years into the American-led war in Afghanistan.
Over all, though, the cables portray deep skepticism that Pakistan will ever cooperate fully in fighting the full panoply of extremist groups. This is partly because Pakistan sees some of the strongest militant groups as insurance for the inevitable day that the United States military withdraws from Afghanistan — and Pakistan wants to exert maximum influence inside Afghanistan and against Indian intervention.
In one cable, Ms. Patterson, a veteran diplomat who left Islamabad in October after a three-year stint as ambassador, said more money and military assistance would not be persuasive. “There is no chance that Pakistan will view enhanced assistance levels in any field as sufficient compensation for abandoning support for these groups, which it sees as an important part of its national security apparatus against India.”
In a rare tone of dissent with Washington, she said Pakistan would only dig in deeper if America continued to improve ties with India, which she said “feeds Pakistani establishment paranoia and pushes them closer to both Afghan and Kashmir focused terrorist groups.”
Monday, September 01, 2008
I very much like the work the Mohseni brothers do not because they value Afghanistan and their programs are reflecting Afghanistan; contrary because they don’t care about Afghanistan and all their ideas are foreign, yet they possess the skill to interpret and implement them in Afghanistan. This is a atypical expertise to possess, the international community unlike the Mohsenis failed to implement foreign ideas successfully in Afghanistan. Reality TV programs are dominating western media and Mohsenis have realised "Reality TV is very big all over the world, that's why we wanted to make something where we could both help people, get ideas and also provide entertainment," said Masood Sanjar, a production manager for Tolo TV to a western paper. This is not to say all Mohseni ideas have succeeded. Many program ideas similarly imported from the west failed because Afghan culture did not respond to it the same way as it did to the Afghan Star or other successful programs. The unsuccessful programs were not relevant to the Afghan life and aspirations. Mohsenis quite often face the problem of finding talented and the right people to materialise their ideas or rather the ideas they import. This is not a problem peculiar to Mohsenis or Tolo TV, its hard to find skilled and crafted individuals in Afghanistan. some of the failure stories of Tolo are ‘Parda Hai Raz’ a program about paranormals and supernatural creatures and magic, this is again based on the popularity of such programs in the west. ‘Yak Rouedad wa du Didgha’ is tolo hardtalk which didn’t turn into a bit hit. ‘Diwa’ is an imitation of Talking Movies, Siasat wa Mardum is an imitation of People on Aljazeera. These are off the top of my head but there are many more failures. However in a country like Afghanistan only a few success stories count because everything else is a failure. In the west you can’t afford to fail too often because then you go bankrupted; in Afghanistan you can fail many times to make a few successes and for people like Mohsenis and Tolo TV with a few success stories there is no bankruptcy, at least in the near future, because foreign money supports entrepreneurs who think Western and talk Western.
After hearing about the new program on Tolo I actually saw a couple of stories popping out in western media about the program, the stories were full of gleam and praise, then I wonder if there is ever anything negative about Tolo and Mohsenis in the eyes of foreigners and western media. I spent the morning searching the internet to find something negative about them but no joy. Mohsenis have set up a good TV station for the wrong reasons, but that is a totally different thing. They didn’t come to Afghanistan because they believe in freedom of expression and media but rather to run a business and make money. In some regards they have certainly been dodgy. Mohsenis have dubious relationships with certain power poles in Afghanistan and certainly mistreat their staff. But that is not a source of disconcert for westerners.