My admiration for Western
technology predates my first encounter; nevertheless the first encounter
remains to be very impressive. When I was 19 I witnessed a grand banger display
of western military might. The US military started bombing Taliban positions in
Kabul in October 2011. The first round of the bombing campaign targeted
command and control centres, communication centres and long range surface to air
batteries. one fine afternoon I was cycling in Karti Parwan area of Kabul when
a Taliban command centre was hit by an incendiary bomb. The target was housed
in a prominent private building which was seized by Taliban. It was one of the
things about the Taliban, they were quite keen on claiming others property. The
smoke was visible from any part of the city. As I was cycling by this huge
house on fire, I had to wade my way through rubbles, body parts, pieces of
Taliban light weaponry all scattered meters away on the main street by the
power of the blast. This building was well known to everyone in Kabul for
housing senior Arab and Pakistani Taliban commanders. In this phase long range
bombers such as B52 and Cruise missiles were used to destroy the targets. The
second tier of bombing targeted military installation, logistic and supply
centres and mobile short range anti-aircraft guns. Then came the last round of
bombing that targeted infantry unites. It was around 4pm that I saw for the
first time an A10 Thunderbolt flying very low and slow. The aircraft slowed
down and fired a round from its heavy rotary cannon while banking sharp left.
The shell hit a car with half a dozen women and children on board. This was the
first unfortunate incident I learned to know about. But it started to occur
more often and more frequently; a week later a stray rocket from a gunship hit
house of a friend of mine. One day I was chatting with my friends toward the
end of Taliban days and one said; “the early days of bombing by B52s was very
accurate but ever since these slow and low aircrafts has entered, the Americans
are starting to miss targets”. I realised that something was going wrong. A10
Thunderbolt and Apache Gunship are exactly designed to penetrate into enemy
controlled territory to seek, accurately identify and destroy enemy targets. So
what was going wrong? Was this a tactical error, sort of an operational level
bug occurring in the beta version and bound to be fixed once Westerners gain
firm and more ground. Or was it a shortcoming that western technology was
suffering?
Allied forces had superb and
real-time information gathered by forward air control, high flying surveillance
aircrafts and stratospheric satellites. This information dominance enabled
allies to destroy enemy units with minimal collateral damage and loss of
friendlies, their gain was compounded by the ignorance of Taliban. They could
have never imagined that the Allies knew about their commanders and command
centres. Oblivious to their predicament they had gathered in a command centre
to sip on some green tea. Not only that,
but the information would be offered to a supercomputer (not the internet, I
mean literally) which would make it available to other computers that are run by
middle management. The middle management then distil the data into usable form
while perceiving local situation. The computer would also tell the man on the
top about the second and third order knock on effect. This is called Effect
Based Operation in military it is shortened for EBO. EBO is offering the
leadership a precise outcome of a tactical decision, therefore enabling them to
guide troops on the ground. The rise of hierarchical organisation owes much to
the invention of this concept. In the business world this concept is known as
‘the big picture’, the leader at the top of the organisation has an intrinsic
claim on information in order to build the big picture. Resources, tools and a
level of staff time are dedicated to supplying information for the leader. The
leader then studies the market and competition before embarking on the most
suitable course of action.
There are a few reasons that could
possibly explain why the US led bombing campaign had become more inaccurate.
The arrival of close air support and ground attack aircrafts to combat theatre
did not contribute to inaccurate targeting. The reason was that the bombing
campaign had become more extensive and from few targets a day had expanded to
hundreds a day. This was bound to contain tragic loss of civilian life, contributed
by the magnification of marginal error. Moreover, operations that grow in scope
and scale within a short period of time tend to contain errors. At this stage, the ‘big picture’ strategy
advocates introduction of standard operating procedures (SOPs). it is feasible
to eliminate operator level errors; by gathering accurate information the
organisation can reduce the number of accidents and mitigate its impact. This
sounds like conventional wisdom but why is it not working?
Boris Gromov was the commander of
the 40th army, the core force of Soviet occupation in Afghanistan.
Gromov served three tours of two years in Afghanistan. He undertook one of the
most daunting duties in the history. He wanted to create institutions with
apparatus that would be capable to connect with communities across Afghanistan
and collect information that would enable him to curb the resistance and win
over the support of the population. This was the first attempt in Afghanistan,
individual only interacted with the tribe not with the state and no institution
has ever had the power of collective enforcement. Gromov created branches for
the government to engage with the tribes, the ministry was financed and tasked
to liaise with the tribes. In November 1987 when a Mujahidin force of up to
20,000 strong laid siege to Khost, Gromov got the minister for tribes and
ethnic affairs Suleiman Huskien to organise a Loya Jirga under the auspices of
the president to encourage Zadran tribe to allow the supply convoy to pass
through tribal controlled territory. The same concept of tribal council was later used by the
Coalition forces, the Allied forces arranged for a series of Loya Jirga to
endorse what would normally be the task of constitutional tribunal and
parliament, such as drafting constitution and appointing an interim president.
Gromov modernised radio and television broadcasting and created sophisticated
media campaigns that was tailored to address audience illiteracy and reach
rural masses. These mobile multimedia propaganda units were sent out during
Khost siege to villages around the road leading to Khost in order to tip
loyalty in his favour.
Gromov had put
together an army of thousands of bean counters and field agents to provide him
the information for making calculated strike. The establishment of this
sophisticated system of data management enabled Gromov to calculate the impact
of his action and estimate likely movement and reaction of the enemy. He was
able to make some strategic manoeuvres that would seem as unnecessary and risky
by an onlooker at first glance, while his intention was to lure in the enemy
into calculated situation. For Gromov to have an illustrative idea of what is
happening where, he needed detailed maps. In 1985 he started a massive task
to map Afghanistan and created a range of topographic, geological and
agriculturl maps. It is the most detailed mapping of the country with 500 meter
in 1 cm. The map has been an invaluable resource to NATO forces and was used to
support USGS projects in Afghanistan. Contours and English tags were generated in computerised terrain
modelling processes which then added cartographic rendering for all branches of
NATO forces.
Big picture management strategy
came about with the rise and increasing influence of institutions in our modern
life. Institution utilises the sum of
knowledge to provide efficient mechanism and reduce costs. However, sustaining
institution is very expensive and gathering the correct information is
difficult. In order to obtain the desired information a large workforce is
needed. Assembling such force and then enabling them to collect the relevant
information is time consuming. Running any analysis on the information would
also take weeks if not months, so by the time the data is produced, it will not
be applicable to the situation. It makes it very easy to conclude that
organisations would become much more efficient in gathering and analysing data
only if they had superior computing power. Only if Gromov had satellite surveillance
and advanced aerial imaging, only if the massive maps were available in digital
format, only if his massive bank of data and ground resources were
computerised; then he would have known that the resistance was not interested
in negotiating. They had created a network of bunkers with the funding of CIA
and expertise of Osama bin Laden and his associates. The enemy was provided by
CIA supplied advanced stinger SAM (surface to air missile), multi launcher
rocket batteries, self-propelled guns and artillery. The enemy was well dug in
and the road approaching Khost that passed through Sotikandaw valley was mined
for several miles. Most importantly the Mujahidin believed that they could not be
dislodged from fortified mountain positions, and peace talk would only buy them
more time.
Fast forward twenty years and
the same man, Jalaluddin Haqqani, who tormented the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan supported by USSR is giving Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
supported by USA a very hard time. They are tagged “Haqqani Network” by NATO
and has conducted some of the most daring attacks. This time USA is after
compiling the most comprehensive military planning based on superfast
processers that the soviets lacked. Fusion cell is US principle strategy to
integrate and coordinate Afghan counter insurgency activities and capabilities
across the US Army and joint services. The strategy has a small core “cell”
that includes the Director, and has a large “in-house” staff accounts for building ANSF (Afghan National
Security Forces) capacity, stability operations and the integration of
unconventional warfare and counterterrorism. They are also in charge of
revising COIN doctrine; COIN (counter insurgency) is the tactic used by NATO to
fight Taliban. NATO has embedded
hundreds of mentors in ANSF to Train Afghans in research, compilation, and analysis methods to map
incident and crime trends and patterns. Billions was spent on equipment and
resources to enable ANSF to conduct hourly mapping updates. The program is
heavy on training ANSF in the use of computer software to prepare intelligence
briefings and use the maps in PowerPoint slides as visual references.
There is nothing inherently wrong
with PowerPoint or GPS mapping but they do impact the way we conduct ourselves.
In a centrally planned institution our critical faculties disengage. Bigger and
faster computer are introduced, complicated and burdensome processes are
created to ensure the flow of information to the “big picture” and await
instructions. All to contribute to an elusion of control. As Sydney Haris put
it half a century ago “The
real danger is not that computers will begin to think like men, but that men
will begin to think like computers.” The trainer embedded with ANSF is
primarily tasked to “transfer knowledge” through daily mentoring, workshops and
seminars. If I hazard a guess on other activities of the mentor, I am pretty
sure after the end of the day he or she takes a ride in an Armoured Vehicle
that is leased to NATO at US$8,000 a month from a company owned by a cousin of
some senior Afghan minister. The trainer then arrives in a heavily fortified
compound where he has access to a good stash of cold beer and latest episode of
Homeland after some threadmail in shorts. The trainer does not speak Farsi or
Pashto, integrate with Afghans, understands about Afghan culture and way of
life, and does not maintain a healthy curiosity about Afghan condition and
aspiration. Then comes the insider attacks, ANSF members turning their guns
against their mentors in anger and frustration. The principle NATO strategy,
train and equip ANSF to take over the mission, is in disarray. Training
programs have been suspended and the isolation gap is spiralling.
There are many dedicated and smart
service men and women who have come to realise the need for change at many
level. When Petraeus took over NATO command he issued a 24-point under COIN strategy.
It reads as a list of pieces of advice, including: live among the people; walk,
don’t ride, on patrols; take off your sunglasses when talking with locals. And
drink lots of tea. But
before drinking tea NATO has to revise the chain of command and the people
running the show as part of institutional transformation.
The National Health Service (NHS) provides free healthcare
for all UK residents. The service is undergoing a major revamp since budget
cuts. Hospitals and branches are shutting down around the country and the
institution is putting to experience any idea that seem half decent. One of the
key strategies of NHS for the future of healthcare is community based health
care. The recent analysis of National Audit Office (NAO) of the NHS's quest
to make £20bn of efficiency savings by 2015 said: "There is broad consensus
that changing how health services are provided is key to a financially
sustainable NHS. Such changes will include integrating care and expanding
community-based care." NAO is working with Healthcare leaders and has
suggested “service transformation”. Experts believe that we will see a
transformation of Healthcare in the UK and developed countries in general
toward community based if the service is to cope with the double burden of
ageing and long-term conditions. For this brave new dawn lobby groups such as
Kings Trust is pushing NHS to reduce investment on Hospitals and state of the
art machinery and focus on health awareness as well as preventative and
rehabilitative treatment. Central London
Community Healthcare Trust is already in Swing and has no fancy building,
PowerPoint presentation or cutting edge machinery. Instead it is run by
community-based healthcare staff such as district nurses, occupational
therapists and physiotherapists. It works in four London boroughs –
Westminster, Kensington and Chelsea, Hammersmith and Fulham, and Barnet. Last
year they responded to some quarter of a million patients, most of whom were
visited in their homes and the Trust only has 3200 staff.
We live in a
world where knowledge is localised and not obvious to the outsiders.
Sustainable institutions are not only dealing with the problems of the present
but addressing the future. Sustainable institutions focus on locally integrated
service delivery and investment in the community. The intelligence gathering
and central planning efforts boosted by NATO is not useless; it is just incapable of
capturing tacit knowledge. NATO just like NHS has the plan and the state of the
art hardware but it is weakness is community integration to harness the
implicit knowledge.
The silver lining is that NHS has
been fairly successful in adapting and providing reasonable service quality. It
is very tempting to conclude that institutionalised planning will allocate the
resources necessary to undertake creative projects. The proponents of planning
would argue that institutions are the best entities for nurturing creativity
and rightly point out that most of the key and sustainable initiatives have
come out of institutional investment.
We are now in the twelfth year of
NATO military presence in Afghanistan. It is fairly safe to conclude that
changes in planning the conduct of war and building the Afghan state had
occurred and those changes are generally in the positive direction. However,
This does not explain why a US operated CH-47 Chinook was brought down in a
meticulously planned operation by Taliban using inaccurate and simple weapons. The Taliban lured US forces into the trap by transmitting false
intelligence. The US military is hacking Taliban phones to gather information
and location data. A Taliban commander, Qari Tahir, aware of the US hacking
capability fed the hackers with false information that a Taliban meeting was
taking place in the area. The incident happened in August 2011 in Tangi Valley
of Wardak province. Afghan and US forces attacked a compound which turned out
to be an ambush. This is a populated village and NATO could not issue advance
warning for civilians to evacuate as that would tip of the Taliban. The scope
of air strike was limited so NATO called for reinforcement. This is exactly
what the Taliban planned to happen. The only way the reinforcement could
respond quickly was with helicopter insertion. The Taliban knew which route the
helicopter would take. It is the only route, so they took position on the
either side of the valley on mountains and as the helicopter approached, they
attacked it with small arms and RPG. It was brought down by multiple shots. All
38 on board Chinook were killed, 30 of the dead were elite US commandos.
There is no doubt that experience
is crucial to purify the information. Therefore, long-term engagement in a well
planned institution is bound to meet success. This also suggests the process of
data gathering is as important as the final outcome. In order to obtain the
information that closely correspond to reality the actor need to revise the
data, filter the sources, close loopholes and address inconsistencies. In
reality big picture planner will face a number of challenges to prevent them
from refining the data. The most important of the challenges is corruption. It
hinders the ability of institution to implement the process. NATO has been
planning to tackle the wide spread corruption in the entire apparatus of Afghan
government. This has been unsuccessful as the planner fundamentally misunderstands
the nature of it.
Idiosyncratic jazz pianist Thelonious Monk said “don’t play
everything (or every time); let some things go by … what you don’t play can be
more important than what you do.” Planners always face the dilemma of choose. Their
priorities are always the subject of contention but I would like to point to
the importance of information deemed trivial. The action priority hierarchy
created by information classification should be implementable, this require
highlighting the key while omitting the trivial. But trivial could turn into
trend and go unnoticed. After the fall of Taliban government in 2001 it was
generally believed that Taliban were gone for good. On May 1, 2003, Hamid
Karzai told BBC's David Frost during an interview on June 8, 2003: “I don't see
a resurgence of the Taliban." He continued by saying: "As far as the
defeat of the Taliban is concerned, they are defeated, they are gone-as a
movement, as a government, as a structure, a political structure, a religious
structure-they are not there." Donald Rumsfield and George W. Bush had
voiced the same opinion on a number of occasions, they were so confident that
the administration felt comfortable to pick another war.
Right about this time thousands of
Taliban fighters were regrouping without being noticed by recon planes or
security forces. Hundreds of Taliban fighters infiltrate to Dai Chopan district
of Zabul province. Setting up camps launching attacks on government buildings
and military installation killing aid workers, government employees, US and
Afghan forces. Offering rewards for
Dai Chopan residents who fight against the US and issuing death warrants for US
soldiers, aid workers, Afghan police, and all journalists. They had realised
that it is not only the overhead technology that assists the allies but people
like aid workers and journalists who gather ground information that could be
used by the coalition. on June 8, 2004 the
22nd Expeditionary Unit of US marines were ambushed by hundreds of Taliban
fighters. Calling in AV-8 Harriers, A-10 Thunderbolts and Apache helicopters to
suppress the insurgents. This wasn’t a tactical challenge that a large force of
Taliban could regroup without advance detection it was a fundamental failure of
the planned system. In late 2003 a group of local elders from Zabul province
met with President Karzai and warned him about Taliban activities in Shajoy and
Dai Chopan districts, but he paid no heed as far as the president was concerned
the major trend was that Taliban were gone for good.
The best theoretical frame to use for
understanding the resurgence of Taliban is the Circular cumulative causation theory of non-equilibrium systems developed by Swedish Nobel prize
winning economist Gunnar Myrandal. He
studied underdeveloped societies and noted that events are multi-causal and a
change in one part of the society will lead to successive changes in other
institutions. These changes are circular, cyclical, perpetual and cumulative in
that they persist in each round. Changes are coming about in small portion,
change doesn’t occur all at once because that would lead to chaos. Taliban were
never going to have a massive come back but by nature of grassroots change it
would be slow and as explained by Myrandal in stages. This resurgence would
have impact on the building of Afghan State. These impacts and the slow crawl
of Taliban were not detected by the planners.
Knowledge is spread locally, this
seem very intuitive but you have to imagine that organisations are not set up
to reach wide locally, especially when they run a foreign country where the gap
of living standards create two races of local and foreigners, segregated and
often hostile toward one another. The allied forces aware of their predicament
earmarked billions of dollars to contract US firms to deliver projects that
would interact with Afghans at district and community level, SIKA, AMDEP, ASI,
ASOP, Harakat and ASMED are projects that are designed to implement small scale
projects that addresses issues particular to a community. The underpinning
principle is that lack of improvement in community livelihood is fuelling
disillusionment, resulting in sympathy toward Taliban and communities would
support the government if they see the government is capable of delivering
public services to them.
I am a self-proclaimed expert in
this area and was contracted together with my wife over two dozens of these
small projects to be implemented across Afghanistan at a total value of US$
1Mil. These projects only delivered limited success and the fundamental problem
is that they serve the big picture strategy. The US government branch funding
the program plans all the stages of the project. The community is not in charge
of success or failure and does not deal with the consequences of failure while
not taking the ownership of success. The system only succeeds in bringing issues
that the local manager wants to bring to the attention of funder. They can
conceal anything that they don’t want them to know. The selection is not
limited to good news vs bad news by local manager but far worst. The manager
receives financial support as an incentive for collaborating with the project.
He would like to see the revenue to continue and only provides distorted
information that he believes would prolong the flow of cash, rendering central
planner incapable of building an accurate picture of what is happening on the
ground. The system suffers the phenomena economist pretentiously call Market Failure.
The exact type of Market Failure is a misplacement of incentive. Incentive in
economics is very important and the market economy system is the best way of
regulating incentives (with a few exceptions). The local manager has no
incentive of providing the desired information until the market principle of
competition, customer service and financial accountability is introduced.
I have executed over half a dozen
project to make local entities financially sustainable. It often starts with
collecting financial information, without any exception such information is contradictory
and paradoxical and I seek to verify them. I then create a verification tool which
is time consuming to implement and develop. The verification assessment often
comes back negative which means the community manager deliberately provides us
with the wrong information. However, the funder will insist that a workable solution
should be found without demanding antagonising the local manager. The project
will receive millions more to deal with the problem seeking alternative and
creative problem solving while avoiding to address incentives. The money will be
earmarked under the disguise of capacity building.
The nature of knowledge is to be
localised and fleeting. The local agent will use the information he possesses
for his own benefit. The
computerised math “modelling” that explains local forces and illuminates
causation is not what is truly significant (given that it was achievable). It
is entrepreneurial learning in the context of changing local conditions. The
theory of entrepreneurial learning offered by Fredrick Hayed and Ludwig Mises illuminates
the significance of non-permanent knowledge and localised learning by
entrepreneurs that form the bedrock of western capitalism.
Success depends on having sensible people on the ground that
can make sound judgements on the spot and a little bit of luck helps too. Central planning has been a failure for
managing complex system, especially when we have little data about the system.
