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The Release of Kidnapped Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan - In Exchange for Freeing Islamist Leaders

On February 11, 2008, Pakistani ambassador to Afghanistan Tariq Azizuddin went missing, along with his guard and driver, in the tribal district of Khyber Agency while travelling from Peshawar to Kabul. He is the most high-profile captive taken by the Taliban. Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmud Qureshi has denied any link between efforts to secure the release of Tariq Azizuddin and those to obtain the release of Sufi Muhammad.(10)
  
The Taliban have also sought to deny any role in the kidnapping of the diplomat. However, the facts prove otherwise. It was reported that the Pakistani government is engaged in negotiations with the kidnappers through the mediation of Sufi Muhammad. The Urdu newspaper Roznama Khabrain reported that during the talks, the Taliban put forward many demands, including one for the release of several militants.(11)
   
On April 19, 2008, a video confirming that Tariq Azizuddin was in Taliban custody was aired on television channels. After the release of the video, a spokesman of the Foreign Office in Islamabad confirmed that the government ''is using all possible sources to secure his release, and talks are ongoing.''(12)
  
Against this backdrop, the diplomat may be released any time now. The Pakistani government has not disclosed the names, ranks, and affiliation of militants whose release is being bartered for the freedom of Tariq Azizuddin and for peace in the Taliban-controlled region on the border with Afghanistan.
  
Significantly, Azizuddin went missing within a few days of the capture of Taliban commander Mansoor Dadullah in a military operation in Pakistan. A day after the kidnapping, the website of Pakistan's popular GEO Television Network quoted an unnamed Arab journalist based in Islamabad as saying that in exchange for freeing the Azizuddin, the Taliban were seeking the release of Mansoor Dadullah, brother of slain Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah.(13)

Legal Cases against Red Mosque Cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz

The talks were always focused on specific issues, for example, the release of diplomat Tariq Azizuddin, Pakistani soldiers held by the Taliban, or Islamist leaders in Pakistani jails. What expanded the scope of these talks was the victory of secular political parties in the February elections. The victorious parties, which blamed the violence in Pakistan on President Musharraf's policy of fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in cooperation with the West, had advocated a policy of reconciliation with extremists. Since coming to power, these parties initiated a policy of dialogue with all Taliban groups.
  
A day before the release of Sufi Muhammad, reports appeared in the media saying that Tariq Azizuddin's kidnappers had demanded the release of 12 top Islamist leaders, including Maulana Abdul Aziz, the cleric arrested while fleeing in a burqa during the 2007 military operation on his Red Mosque and the Jamia Hafsa madrassa in Islamadab; Taliban commander Mansoor Dadullah; Sufi Muhammad; five fighters of the Afghan Taliban; and others. According to a report, most of the militants proposed for release by the Taliban in exchange for their freeing of Tariq Azizuddin are supporters of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan chief Baitullah Mehsud.(14)
  
Currently, there is speculation over when Azizuddin will be freed and whether or not the Pakistani government will release Mansoor Dadullah and Maulana Abdul Aziz in exchange, and whether the timing of the two militants' release will be modulated in a way to distract the public attention from the exchanged deal. There are indications, however, that the government is moving in the direction of releasing Maulana Abdul Aziz.
  
Recently, the High Court in Islamabad granted bail to Maulana Abdul Aziz in four cases. With this, the radical cleric, with powerful connections inside the Pakistani military, has now been granted bail in 19 of the 27 cases filed against him. His release is expected as early as in May 2008, when the court will hear the next batch of his bail applications.(15)  

Baitullah Mehsud's Control of Tribal Districts and Pakistani Taliban 

The Gilani government has announced its plan to abolish the 1901 law so that these tribal districts could be integrated into Pakistan, possibly as a fifth province. While the Pakistani Taliban, who virtually control the region, welcomed the decision, they have made two demands: Pakistan must distance itself from the U.S. war on terror, and a system of shari'a must be implemented in the region.(16) 
  
The government is engaged in talks with a delegation of tribal elders nominated by Baitullah Mehsud. As a precondition for the talks, and at the time of Sufi Muhammad's release, Baitullah Mehsud asked his fighters not to engage in provocative actions that could mar peace in the FATAs as well as in parts of the North West Frontier Province.(17)
  
The nature of the talks between the government and Baitullah Mehsud's representatives came to light in a 15-point draft agreement. Some of its points included:(18)
  
a) The Political Administration and the Mehsud tribe will jointly monitor and report the likelihood of the presence of training camps for militants and of the preparation of terror attacks.
  
b) If the Mehsud tribe fails to eliminate suspicions of militant training in the area, the government will have the right to take action as per tribal customs and traditions, and the Frontier Crimes Regulation.
  
c) The exchange of prisoners of both sides will take place after the signing of this agreement. The government will release all prisoners from the Mehsud tribe.
  
d) Government troops will begin phased withdrawal from the region of Mehsud tribe after the agreement is signed.
  
It appears from the draft agreement that the talks are focused on Baitullah Mehsud's tribe – i.e. in the tribal districts of South and North Waziristan. It is also clear that the militants loyal to Baitullah Mehsud have wider control across the region than some of the Taliban groups in the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. The overall objective of the talks is to restore peace across the region, possibly through shared control as evident from the demand to jointly monitor the likely presence of terror camps in the region.
  
The negotiations are seen as a bargaining process by the Taliban. During the talks the Taliban delegation sought the release 250 militants from Pakistani jails in exchange for about 80-100 government officials and soldiers.(19)
  
It appear that the government, indeed, is making concessions: it was reported that it gave cash compensation worth more than 200 million Pakistani rupees to over 500 individuals for the Taliban fighters killed or wounded during the military operation begun by Pakistani troops in Waziristan in 2004. According to a report, about 150 senior Taliban commanders in Waziristan received huge undisclosed sums.(20)
  
By the last week of April, there was a deadlock in the talks over the issue of withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the region, leading to the suspension of the negotiations by Taliban. According to a report, the delegation of tribal elders returned from the talks, saying that the government was not agreeing to the troops' withdrawal.(21)
  
The Taliban are also demanding that they should be free to launch attacks across the border against U.S. and NATO troops deployed in Afghanistan – a demand that will transform the tribal districts into a military training base for the jihadist fighters, and all the more so if the Pakistani troops were to return to barracks.(22)
  
The suspension of the talks has focused on the nature of the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the region, also highlighting in the process the Taliban ambition to control the region without the presence of Pakistani troops. However, it is not clear whether the Taliban are demanding total withdrawal of the troops, or whether they will allow some kind of Pakistani military presence. For now, NWFP Chief Minister (executive head) Ameer Haidar Hoti has said that the demand for the withdrawal of troops is not correct, pleading for ''flexibility on the part of the Taliban in order to establish peace.''(23)
  
Even if the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan reached a deal with the government, there are many militant groups that act as per their own agenda. For example, a group called Lashkar-e-Islam recently asserted its control in the tribal district of Khyber Agency, vowing to spread Islam across the world.(24) 
  
Similarly, in the tribal district of Mohmand Agency the local Emir of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has established control, recently issuing an agenda for the implementation of the Islamic shari'a .(25)
  
And in late April, a significant development took place in the town of Darra Adam Khel in the NWFP, indicating the type of change that is coming in as a result of the government's policy of dialogue with the Taliban. As soon as the Pakistani troops withdrew from this area, Taliban fighters came rushing in. They parked their vehicles in front of a local politician's house, leaving a message that he should guard them until they complete setting up their control centers. The Peshawar-based Urdu-language newspaper Roznama Mashriq reported: ''The tribal elders are describing this new development to be the result of the government's new policy of establishing peace in these regions.''(26)
  
It appears though that the Pakistani government has succeeded in halting suicide bombings, possibly as a result of the talks with the Taliban groups. It is also evident that the Taliban have the upper hand, pursuing their own agenda and achieving success in a key demand for – at an early stage in the talks – a mini-shari'a state within Pakistan.

Endnotes:
(10) Roznama Jasarat (Pakistan), March 23, 2008.
(11) Roznama Khabrain (Pakistan), April 24, 2008.
(12) Roznama Jang (Pakistan), April 20, 2008.
(13) Geo TV (www.geo.tv/urdu.asp), accessed February 12, 2008.
(14) Roznama Jasarat (Pakistan), February 21, 2008.
(15) Roznama Mashriq (Pakistan), April 29, 2008.
(16) Roznama Jang (Pakistan), March 31, 2008.
(17) Roznama Mashriq (Pakistan), April 24, 2008.
(18) Roznama Ausaf (London), April 24, 2008.
(19) Roznama Mashriq (Pakistan), April 28, 2008.
(20) Roznama Jasarat (Pakistan), April 30, 2008.
(21) Roznama Mashriq (Pakistan), April 29, 2008.
(22) Roznama Mashriq (Pakistan), April 28, 2008.
(23) Roznama Khabrain (Pakistan), April 30, 2008.
(24) Roznama Khabrain (Pakistan), April 18, 2008.
(25) Roznama Mashriq (Pakistan), April 17, 2008.
(26) Roznama Mashriq (Pakistan), April 23, 2008.

How long is the Afghan insurgency going to take?

The current conflict in Afghanistan is a battle of Will, the war challenges the will of international community to fight in Afghanistan, the will of Afghans in the future of their country and finally the will of Taliban and insurgents to continue their battle against the foreign troops. This story weighs up the will of Afghans and the lack of a self-rooted cause for having a peaceful country. The will and motivation of international community to continue the war is less significant than their resources. The will and support for the war in Afghanistan lies in democratic western public such as Britain. The will and support of the public is going to be challenged as the price of war both in human heads and dollars climb up. The war is basically challenging the resources of international community in Afghanistan. The question is how tough the war going to be and whether it will need more resources and can the international community afford it?

The will of Afghans for any future peace is affected by their perception of the politics in their country, deeply affected by the war in the past and the instigator of those wars. Militarization of politics in Afghanistan in the last three decades has turned the population into political cynics, distrusting politics and the ones involved at the cause of political leaders. Wars and armies in Afghanistan became heavily politicized in the 1970s as a result of two military coups. The politicisation of wars and the militarisation of politics continued as the country saw over a dozen regimes; ideologically opposing each other, extremely. The war and politics got very dirty in Afghanistan when gradually military fictions relied on their relevant ethnic groups for recruitment; gradually giving power to a variety of ethnic-regional factions, self-serving warlords, and criminal freebooters. The situation fostered an intense competition for enlargement of factional militias through indiscriminate recruitment from their respective ethnic constituencies or, in the case of some parties, increased reliance on non-Afghans. The process not only ethnicised the warring militias but also brought large numbers of bandits, thugs, and criminal elements to the ranks of the competing factions. Factional--and nominally national--leaders were reluctant to prevent their allies from criminal acts, fearing their defection to a rival party. This gave a free hand to armed groups that had carved the country into fiefdoms and were involved in narcotics, plundering public and private property, extortion, corruption, rape, war crimes and violence. The result was, population lost their trust in any military fiction, political party and self-declared leader.

The afghan conflict is characterised by international intervention, the international community has supported their fictions in the last three decades. These fictions including the ones currently in power, involved in gross human rights violation. UN plans for peace in Afghanistan has always failed and resulted in further bloodshed, UN plan for peaceful transfer of power from Najib regime to a transitional government, was a set up to oust Najib from power. led to an intense power struggle among the Mujahideen groups who had taken over different parts of the country and seized or looted the government. Foreign supported groups in Afghanistan has been cleverly drafted to emphasize in an internal division within the opposing camps, resulting the country sinking into devastating civil wars leading to foreign invasions, i.e. soviet 1979 - 1989, Pakistan 1994 – 2001 and international since 2001. Political polarization of the county intensified as the wars developed. The wars in the last three decade assisted by foreign interventions have caused tremendous social change, ripping society apart vertically and horizontally. The wars has been the battle of any afghan against any other afghan, at the end it has been realised that they are not the one who benefits, it’s the self dubbed leaders and their foreign backers. Resulting in afghan lost of trust in leaders and any political formation.

The reason for the growth of anti foreign and government insurgency after international intervention is the lack of sympathy among the population to the government and the international community. The population stands by as Taliban and insurgents disrupt the state building process. In the current intervention the international community has an agenda which is to root out terrorism so it’s no longer a threat to them. the question for Afghans is what is there for Afghans in it? Do they gain anything, yes, their country is getting reconstructed. But the people who have been brought to power by international community are not popular in the public eye, the international community seemed to intervene only to destroy Taliban and bringing the opposition to power. The international community intervened with 6000 troops while they committed 40000 to Kosovo a country which is one sixth of Helmand, one of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan, under British auspices. The international community clearly didn’t intervene to stabilise Afghanistan because the proportion of force was not enough for stabilisation. They depended on criminal elements and warlords accused of war crimes to control their respective territory. The international troop size swelled as the fight with Taliban got tougher. The international community put 50000 troops to fight the insurgency. The insurgency is not going to be won without public support which lacks the will to support the government.

Taliban were not ousted for their poor human rights record, or international isolation because of their medieval treatment of women, or their imposition of far-reaching social restrictions such as compulsory beard, dressing code etc, or because of national economic failure. Taliban were ousted merely because of extensive links to Deobandi religious schools - ‘madrassas’, to foreign extremist networks, and to wanted terrorists such as Osama bin laden. As a matter of fact Taliban implemented several good social policies, such as eradication of administrative corruption, disarmament of fighting groups, stabilising the society and putting an end to village level ethnic conflict, and prevention of poppy cultivation and drug production. These are all provisions which the current government and the international community have failed to prevent. Topped up by rising social inequalities fuelled by drug money and international community generous bonuses to its allies.

The war against the Taliban is going to be a long battle; the question I posed at the beginning was whether the international community has the resources to fight this war. The insurgents are mostly the product of the past wars and guerrilla warfare, the military establishment is conceptually oriented toward a war of attrition. It is, in essence, a guerrilla war. This orientation shapes the underlying principles of its tactical and operational manoeuvre: elusiveness is considered the key to survival in drawn-out combat; the fight for survival calls for survival to fight; and trading territory for time constitutes the basis of operational resilience. The tactic is vivid in Helmand where they fighting British Army, the towns in Helmand province switch control between British army and Taliban. Taliban are reluctant to defend defensive lines at any cost. Taliban have a good understanding of foreign armies tactical weight and their enemy's offensive momentum. Taliban know they can’t stand against well-armed western armies but they know foreign armies are overstretched and sporadic attacks would pressure their resources and morale. Taliban are light force mounted on pickup trucks or motorbikes tailored to ambush ‘forward enemy basis’, caravans and government establishment. The war is against a ghost enemy, which retreats behind an imperceptible border into Pakistan. Pakistan is a safehaven for Taliban where they international forces is not allowed to chase them. The soviets lost the same war; history proves hard defeating a cross border insurgency. Americans lost a similar war in Vietnam against Vietcong. Taliban rely heavily on ethnic participation of Pashtuns, who see themselves isolated in the foreign mediated power share of current government, and popular support in south, south west and eastern Afghanistan. Taliban relies on religion to justify their fight and brutal punishment of civilians and enemy to intimidate the public.

The fight against Taliban is not going to be won unless there is a positive change in the will and aspiration of Afghan public. Democracy is an empty word for many Afghans, pronounced by political leader to exploit the ideology for their political ends; the word was popular from 60s to late 80s. It has resurfaced after the international intervention. More than words such as democracy is needed to reinstate Afghan trust in the government. The insurgency is not beatable and its going to draw more support from the public as the conflict escalates. The will of Afghan people might be positively affected if they see changes in their daily life. The current government is far too corrupt, manipulated by criminals and ineffective to be trusted. To change the government the international community need to pour more resources into Afghanistan, more money is need to reform the government bureaucracy, rebuild the infrastructure and more troops to provide security for the progress. Coupled with new state building strategies, the foreign aid need to stop spending less money on themselves and more on Afghanistan. Otherwise this is going to be a long and bloody war, not new to Afghanistan, but challenging to the will of international intervention.

بیکاری معتادان تداوی شده را دوباره معتاد می نماید

بیکاری معتادان تداوی شده را دوباره معتاد می نماید
شماری از معتادان مواد مخدر بنابر عوامل مختلف بعد از تداوی و ترک اعتیاد دو باره معتاد می شوند.
مسوولان کشور دلیل آن را فقر اقتصادی، نبود زمینه های کاری، عدم مصروفیت های سالم و فشار های روحی گوناگون عنوان می کنند.
مردی که نخواست نامش فاش شود می گوید که از مدت 7 سال بدینسو معتاد به مواد مخدر بوده و بعد از تداوی ترک اعتیاد کرده اما به دلیل این که کار برایش پیدا نگردید، دو باره به اعتیاد رو آورده است.
این مرد 35 ساله میگوید که طعنه حرف های مردم، بیکاری و غریبی وی را واداشته است تا دو باره به استفاده از مواد مخدر رو آورد تا بتواند برای مدت کوتاهی غم هایش را فراموش کند.
وی اضافه کرد:"هر بار که مواد مخدر استفاده می کنم خوش و راحت خود را احساس میکنم و غم های زندگی و بیکاری را نیز از یاد می برم."
یک معتاد دیگر که خود را رحمت الله و 30 ساله معرفی می کند می گوید به دلیل این که پس از تداوی دو باره به استفاده از مواد مخدر رو آورده است، فامیلش وی را از خانه اخراج کرده است.
این مرد معتاد با چهره لاغر و نحیفی که یارای حرف زدن را ندارد میگوید:" بعد از تداوی دو باره معتاد شدم، تمام زحمت هایم به خاطر ترک اعتیاد به خاک یکسان شد."
وی افزود، زمانی که برای پیدا کردن کار به هر اداره مراجعه می کرد جواب رد می شنید و زمانی که برای غریب کاری به چهار راه ها رفت نیز کاری پیدا نتوانست زیرا مواد مخدر وی را ضعیف نموده و مردم نیز افراد قوی هیکل را برای غریب کاری می برند.
میکردم جواب رد میشنیدم خود به خود مایوس شده با خود میگفتم اعتیاد چیزیست که غم و درد را فراموش میسازدبنا براین دو باره به این عادت دیرین روی آوردم .
وی نیز می گوید همین که نمی توانست کاری پیدا کند و هر روز با دستان خالی به خانه و نزد فامیلش مراجعه می کرد، یک نوع مایوسی احساس کرده و روحا فشار سختی را تحمل می کرده که بلاخره توانست این مشکلات را متحمل شود، دو باره به استفاده از مواد مخدر رو آورد.
داکتر طارق مسوول مرکز تداوی معتادین مرکز نجات گفت که در مجموع در تمام جهان این موضوع وجود دارد که برخی از معتادین نظر به مشکلات اجتماعی، فامیلی، فردی و محیطی دو باره به استفاده از مواد مخدر رو می آورند.
وی افزود که حتا در ممالک پیشرفته جهان 60 در صد افراد معتاد پس از تداوی و ترک اعتیاد دو باره از مواد مخدر استفاده می کنند.
به گفته وی تداوی معتادین مواد مخدر در کشور 40 در صد موفقیت آمیز بوده و 60 در صد آن بنابر عوامل چون عدم کاریابی و عدم مصروفیت سالم آموزشی بعد از صحت یاب شدن باعث دو باره رو آوردن آنان به مواد مخدر می شود.
داکتر طارق علاوه کرد که هر معتاد پس از صحت یاب شدن 3 الی 5 سال باید مصروف یک کار باشد تا به درستی مواد مخدر را فراموش نماید.
به عقیده وی، سطح دانش آگاهی در اکثریت مناطق کشور پائین بوده که بعضی سخنان و عکس العمل ها مردم که معتادین را به چشم حقارت می بینند، آنها را تحقیر نموده و زمینه رجوع دو باره به مواد مخدر را مهیا می سازد.
وی علاوه کرد، بیشتر دیده شده برخی افرادی که از نگاه جنسی ضعیف اند و خانواده ها بی خبر آنها را به ازدواج وا میدارند، ولی آنها موضوع را اظهار کرده نمیتوانند نا گزیر برای معالجه موقتی به مواد مخدر رو میاورند و این شیوه باعث معتاد شدن افراد به مواد مخدر میگردد.
دا کتر عبدالله وردک رییس کاهش تقاضای مواد مخدر در وزارت صحت عامه میگوید که اگر زمینه کار یابی و مصروفیت های سالم و آموزش مسایل حرفوی برای یک معتاد تداوی شده مهیا نگردد امکان میرود که آنان دو باره به مواد مخدر رو بیاورند.
این در حالیست با وجود که میلیون ها دالر برای مبارزه با مواد مخدر در کشور به مصرف رسیده است، اما شمار معتادان مواد مخدر در کشور افزایش یافته است.
مطابق آمار اخیر که وزارت مبارزه با مواد مخدر اعلام داشته است، معتادین مواد مخدر در کشور به یک و نیم میلیون نفر رسیده است.