Boarding Denied!

I was denied boarding Easyjet flight from Amsterdam to London Gatwick, Flight Number EZY8876, departing Tue 02 Feb 14:20. I was taken off the flight last minute at the boarding gate. The reason given was that I did not meet the security requirements of the Airline. Easyjet carries out security checks at the boarding gate to ensure all passengers are documented properly, in addition to these checks there are other measures in place too such as border control and airport security checks. Despite all these checks the airline has been carrying out special checks on me. Over the last year or so I have flown with easyjet four times and I have been subjected to special check on all instances. The first and second checks were in January 2015 when flying from London Gatwick to Amsterdam and on return. Back in January 2015 I reported mistreatment, abuse and aggressive questioning; Easyjet did not provide adequate response and the complaint was escalated to CAA. it took almost a year for CAA to investigate claims of harassment and abuse and a final response was provided by Easyjet Regulatory Support Team on 18th January 2016 where they conclude that on both instances I was subject of random security check.

I flew from London Gatwick to Amsterdam on the 28th Jan 2016 on easyjet flight EZY8881 and at the boarding gate I was again questioned, threatened and humiliated for a total of 11 minutes and 10 seconds in addition to checks carried out on all passengers. I was questioned by three staff members, two at the counter and a supervisor over the telephone on a range of issues that did not relate to the flight or were redundant questions that the airline was provided with documentation and details through the API (advance passenger information), operated by the airline. Hence the questioning did not serve any particular practical purpose but created a climate of intimidation, hostility and harassment where I felt humiliated and targeted. I will later provide an extraction of the transcript in order to give an accurate idea of the questioning.

On the 02 Feb 2016 when returning from Amsterdam to London Gatwick I was checked and boarded like all other passenger but the staff had another thought and was again selected for questioning and passed on to another staff member for detailed scrutiny. This does not fit the definition of random checks and I enquired as to why I am the subject of another security check. I was told that the reason was because of my national origin and it is a normal practice by the airline to target certain nationals for extra checks. I did not submit for the extra security check as I was assured by the airline that they do not discriminate on the basis of origin or belief through various correspondences. I presumed that it was a mistake and upon contacting supervisors the staff will let me board the plane but I turned out to be wrong and had to leave the airport and enter the Nederland through airport immigration in order to find another flight. While at the counter I called Dutch Emergency police number and asked for assistance, as I was a target or racism immediately miss a flight. The police refused to help as their assessment was that security checks were a normal feature of air travel and it did not constitute racial discrimination.

I believe I missed my flight because Easyjet rules are not clear, confusing and contradictory. I have been given different information as to why I am subject of special checks, it is unclear what the aim of such checks are, it is unclear what document and information I should supply at the spot and what information should be supplied before the flight. Most importantly its unclear why I am the only passenger that is on another category of document assessment. The rules only state that all passengers should be properly documented which I have always been and is demonstrated on the first instance.

In all honesty I am not interested in what motives they might have but only want this to stop. I should add that this pattern of harassment and threats is similar to attitudes displayed by other state and commercial organisation where I have dealings. I have been denied a money account, removed from premises or even not allowed to withdraw money from my bank account due to my national origin.

There is little that can be done, the UK does not have an ombudsman or enforcement agency to monitor and enforce the Equality Act 2010. The only redress of any infringement is to refer the issue to the court, which is a very time consuming and costly process. I am not alleging racial discrimination by the British state or the commercial companies but highlighting the fact that rights and privileges that citizen enjoy are established through customs, habits and practice. Citizen do not go by everyday to fight for their rights and such struggles will be impractical even in the UK where the rule of law is established and upheld. The rules become extremely complicated when dealing with people who are perceived as undesirable. Such person is only defined by his or her nationality through policies and practices of the state, media and society. As an Afghan there is a different set of rules for me that are extremely draconian and does not reflect any of the values Britain aspire to uphold. These rules govern public and commercial interactions, my relation to the state and even condition of living in the UK. I believe the provision of human rights is deliberately misleading in order to establish an egalitarian vision for the society but in reality it should be labelled “citizen rights” or “western rights” or more accurately “rights of citizens of desirable countries”.  

28^th January 2016 Event transcript

00:00:00

easyjet staff 1: do you have an extension?  

Sanjar: What extention is that?

easyjet staff 1: you need an extension on your passport. 

Sanjar: this is my passport i need no other extensions. 

easyjet staff 1:  yes you do need one. 

........

easyjet staff 1: that is nothing. this means nothing. you can not travel on that. 

.....

easyjet staff 1: you do need an extension you can not travel on that.

easyjet staff 1:  that is not valid. it is invalid. you can not travel on that. 

......

00:03:00

sanjar: why is my passport taking so long?

easyjet staff 1: because it does so. 

sanjar: it has been two dozen passengers who already boarded...

easyjet staff 1: its all fine. I am just checking your passport. 

sanjar: but why are you only checking my passport?

easyjet staff 1:  for the right documents, sir

sanjar: why is everyone else not checked for the right documents?

easyjet staff 1:  because they don't need the documents sir. 

sanjar: they don't need documents to get on the flight?

easyjet staff 1: not documents that you need. 

sanjar: what documents do i need?

easyjet staff 1: that is why I am checking.

At this point the easyjet staff 1 leaves the table without explaining what she is doing and where she is taking my passport and documents. 

00:04:06

easyjet staff 2: Sir, would you like to just come round?

.....

an easyjet staff takes me to another table. 

easyjet staff 1 is on the phone asking for instructions and guidance to deal with me. she asks for my UK residence card for inspection. 

00:05:05 

easyjet staff 1: how long are you going for?

sanjar: why do you need to know that?

easyjet staff 1: because my colleague asks?

sanjar: why do you need to know that?

easyjet staff 1: how long are you going for?

sanjar: you are not asking that question from anyone else.

......

00:05:40

easyjet staff 1: how long are you staying for?

....

easyjet staff 1: my colleague needs to know. 

sanjar: i am not telling you until you tell me why you need to know that.

easyjet staff 1: then you can not travel sir. 

00:06:30

easyjet staff 1: do you have any other family member that live there?

sanjar: I am boarding the flight why do you need to know about my family?

easyjet staff 1: my colleague needs to know. 

00:07:00

easyjet staff 2: now sir its very important for the border control to know these questions. 

sanjar: you are not border control. 

........ .......

easyjet staff 2: well. we can not let you on the flight. 

...............

easyjet staff 2: we need to know all the information to be able to let you on the flight.

sanjar: why

easyjet staff 2: because we need to know

sanjar: but why, is that the regulations?

easyjet staff 2: yes. 

................................

I am now asked to come back to the counter without offering an explaination of what is happening next. 

......

00:10:10

sanjar: can you please tell me what are we doing here?

easyjet staff 1: I am writing down your document details, sir. 

sanjar: what details do you need?

easyjet staff 1: it doesn't matter.

sanjar: it does matter, what details do you need.

easyjet staff 1: its all in here. 

please note throughout this despicable episode I am not explained the procedure and chauffeured around without being explained what is happening and why. most importantly please note the tone of intimidation and constant threats, I have highlighted in bold half a dozen instances where I am told the equivalent of not being allowed to fly.

An analysis of the deteriorating Security in Kunduz Province

In the series of analysis about the situation in Konduz I have set to look at factors that have led to the current precarious condition, in this post I going to have a brief look on the global political trends and its translation to Afghanistan situation and come to a conclusion based on the analysis offered in this series.  

International support for increasing local influence of the state

The state is the most effective way of organising the security and well-being of a population. International consensuses seem to emerge that identify lack of central authority as the obstacle to ensuring global security and prosperity. The challenge is to identify economic, military and political measure that can enhance the capacity of states in low-income countries to perform the functions that define them as states. Achieving well-governed sustainable states requires long-term preventive engagement with a wide range of policy instruments. One major policy challenge is to overcome the differences between a range of actors in understanding how to achieve the right balance between security, development and governance policies, through use of political dialogue, development assistance, trade agreements and military forces.[1]

International intervention in Afghanistan has primarily been concerned with security and has always taken that narrow approach to stability. In exchange for nominal control of regions international players have offered regional Strongmen key functions of the state. The Clientele state over time serves the interests of few and fails to meet its duties toward the public. The organisaiton of state was to maintain ethnic and tribal balance and provide roles for strongmen. The state in Afghanistan as built by the US led coalition is not intended to be a sovereign charged with the welfare of the public and establish monopoly of violence.

Conclusion

A strongman administers district and even village or cluster of villages since the fall of monarchy who is heavily armed and has replaced the traditional landowners. Strongmen are connected with the grassroots through informal and personal networks and affiliated to politico-military organization, generally organised along ethnic lines, but loyalties are shifting and elusive. The strongmen carries out and exceeds in what are the functions of Afghan state, services provided by external institutions include healthcare by INGO while administration of primary education is carried out by local elders. As such Afghan state is not a reality for Afghans living in the countryside. This sociopolitical environment sustains poverty and non-urban patchwork of fiefdoms that is tribal ethnographically and ultraconservative in character.

The strongmen regularly use a range of covert, coercive and agitative measures to obtain political and financial rewards from the state; strongmen also quarrel among themselves over financial, political and military interests. This game of survival of the fittest wrongs many and has huge collateral damage, such violations decree expiation for expedience and public concern of morality, but the state is unable to administer justice. The long-term impact of such dynamics creates community fragmentation, erodes national identity and prevents the creation of unitary nation.

The most successful institution to reign in the strongmen and stop them from tearing the country apart was Taliban. Their effort was spearheaded by disarmament and integrating the main body of militia into their ranks. The presence of foreign troops altered the dynamics and made the competition among strongmen less violent by means of military pressure, monetary and political reward and taking out the irreconcilable ones under the label of Taliban. The majority of strongmen targeted by the US and allies were Pashtuns and over the years they have gone after sub commander too. This vicious cycle of violence, ethnic conflicts, injustice and creation and propping of a new elite class has had destabablising impact, pitting some who seek vengeance against some who protect their interests.

---

[1] DEVELOPING AN EU STRATEGY TO ADDRESS FRAGILE STATES.

An analysis of the deteriorating Security in Kunduz Province

following my last post on dynamics of power in Konduz and in the series of analysing the situation in this post I will be focusing on:

From Harpoon to Tycoon

Jihadi commanders now in charge of local governance are effectively controlling the state they have a say in earmarking, permission and certification of international development funds. Instead of using to procedure to enhance efficiency in private and non-profit sector implementation of development projects it’s used as a source of revenue by collecting kickbacks in exchange for permission to implement projects.

The strongmen was also directing international funding that was aimed at bringing anti-government forces or armed groups into the social fold. Hundred of millions of dollars was spent through programmes such as Commander’s Emergency Response Programme (CERP) or Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), this money was used by the Strongmen to expand their patronage network.

The most viable source of strongmen is a drug trade which is likely to continue after most western aid has dried out. Many sources report that Kunduz strongmen run a lucrative drug network smuggling narcotics to Russia and Europe through Tajikistan.[1] In June 2012 the government of Tajikistan issued an extradition warrant for  Mir Alam and Latif Ibrahimi the governor of neighboring Takhar province to face trial for charges of drug trafficking, terrorism and other crimes.[2] Needless to say the government of Afghanistan is unable to effectively respond to the request.

The private armies the strongmen are funded to maintain are not only a revenue source but a security asset for the protection of narcotic business.

 In September 2012 after more than 12 civilians were killed in clashes between militia inside the provincial capital the attorney general office issued a warrant for Mir Alam to be presented in Kabul for questioning. Many sources put him at the scene of the killing and he was one of the prime suspects.[3] Thousands of people took to streets to protest against the decision and Kunduz governor downplayed the warrant which eventually died out.[4] The ability to insert influence with such impunity and in the face of states inability to curb strongmen power many

The strongmen as an effective anti government force

Another perspective into the debate would be to ask the question why is the state better than local strongmen?  It could be argued the role played by the strongmen in much of Afghanistan has convinced some that it was efforts to reform the corrupt and warlord-dominated Afghan state that kicked off the insurgency by weakening those who had been holding a lid on it and depriving the Afghan government of key sources of support.[5] US President Barack Obama acknowledged this in 2009 and dubbed a tactical errors, described as too few boots on the ground, disenfranchising the Afghan population and allowing corrupt elites too much leeway to develop clientelist structures of personal dependencies.[6] Obama remedied it by a “surge” strategy which was “clear, hold, build” and then “transfer” to local state authorities.[7] But there was no one to transfer to as Antonio Giustozzi[8] notes there are few professional police to go around same goes for district level civil servant. By 2010 the Obama administration was convinced that the Afghan state does not have the capacity to create responsive subnational governance and launched several projects to strengthen local governance with little success, key among them was an alternative to local governance and support for local strongmen to fill the void through Arbaki and ALP programs. Maj. Michael Waltz, a former Special Operations Forces officer told New York Times in an interview: “We can’t sacrifice security for this multigenerational effort to build rule of law.”[9]

Few can argue with Waltz on militia effectiveness, the mobilisation of these militias, often in agreement with local police forces already staffed by individuals linked to the same strongmen in the past, represented a turning point, where NATO, Afghan police, and the Afghan army had until then been unable to contain the expansion of the insurgency.[10]

Jamiat and its effective offshoot Shurai Nizar are wary of elements inside the Afghan government, which are willing to reach a compromise with the Taliban; this is perceived as a threat to security in the north. Amrullah Saleh leader of Afghan Green Trend, former head of Afghan spy agency (NDS) and prominent affiliate of Jamiat wrote on his Facebook page that there are elements in the government seeking to eliminate remnants of Jamiat in Kunduz province. [11] During a visit to Kunduz province Ahmad Zia Massood a counsel to the Afghan president, and brother of the prominent Jamiat figure Ahmad Shah Massood, said the former Jihadi strongmen are important in defeating the Taliban. This remark is more a rhetoric of Jamiat than the official line of Afghan government policy, it’s a curious case of where Mr. Massood allegiance lay. Given high level support of Jamiat for maintaining militia there are three policy implications.

First, high level of Jamiat influence on the government with coinciding hardliner American approach in seeking military solution to what is labelled as the Taliban problem prevented initiatives for political solution. Without a long term solution tensions in Kunduz as well as other parts of the north is a ticking bomb that would go off under certain situation.

Second, attempts to build support for a national state by addressing community grievance and insert sovereignty of state by monopolising violence will hit significant political and factional obstacles. Elders from Kunduz petitioned former President Karzai to address militia problem in Kunduz.[12] Anwar Jagdalik the former governor of Kunduz and Karzai nominee was sent to Kunduz from Kabul with the mandate to resolve the militia problem that was already causing headache in 2011. Karzai got the Americans behind the project by cutting funds for militia in Kunduz.[13] The task of dismantling, disarming and melding was left to Anwar Jagdalik, it did not take place.[14] Perhaps because the international mission was winding down its military operation and there was little interest or funding for what could potentially be a long-term strategy of disarmament and reintegration. The governor lacked the resources had less than 1500 national police at its disposal that clearly was not enough to take on the militia.

Third, the infighting within the Afghan government of unity on the one side Ashraf Ghani and his team and on the other side Abdullah Abdullah with support from Northern Alliance will lend itself for exploitation by anti government forces. Wall street Journal has argued that Taliban have already exploited the rift,[15] in an interview with Ashna Television Mirza Mohammad Yarmand former Deputy minister of interior has argued that the instability in Kunduz is caused by rivalries in Afghan National Unity government.

First of all support and funding militia is contrary to the aim of state building which was the US official state strategy for Afghanistan and against the doctrine of COIN, counter insurgency, which emphasises on political solution in addressing the root cause of war.

Organising a large-scale war effort on the basis of armed forces organised patrimonially is difficult and inefficient. The individual strongmen will demand rewards for their participation, which may constrain the ability of the government to make decisions and appoint officials as required by the political environment. In the North, sources in contact with several of the strongmen involved in the militia movement report that most of them have negotiated deals with the Taliban, carving out spheres of influence and focusing on the control of their home turfs.129 There is therefore a strong argument that, relatively unhindered by an inefficient repression, the Taliban kept spreading around Afghanistan.

The outlying districts of Kunduz are run by militia who are unpopular among the community, they do not provide an efficient repression force to keep the Taliban in check due to lack of command and control. The militia project the power of strongman and is a tool for the commander to pursue his interests; in exchange militia members are given a free hand in extorting from the population. For the population the Taliban provide a better alternative with proven record of stamping out thievery and criminality. The militia can only fight a war against another militia if they launch preemtive strikes and organise effective defences. The militia does not have the discipline to carry out force protection, guard duties and orchestrated battles with segmented group tasks. Pre-emptive strike and effective defences depend on good intelligence and surveillance for which the militia need to be well connected to the community, without strong community support the militia have no chance of fighting the Taliban.   

---

[1] Afghanistan News centre, who is controlling the drug routes, http://www.afghanpaper.com/nbody.php?id=29832

[2] Roushd News Agency, Jihadi leaders are disturbing security in Badakhshan of Tajikistan, http://www.roushd.com/newsIn.php?id=11164

[3] باز داشت ده ها تن در کنم کندز از سوی وزارت دفاع

  , Farsi.Ru 13,09, 2012 http://www.farsi.ru/doc/5965.html

[4] Razaq Mammon, September 2012, Mir allam is accused of the Killing in Kunduz, http://www.razaqmamoon.com/2012/09/blog-post_8895.html

[5] For Karzai’s own opinion, see “Helmand Ex-Governor Joins Karzai Blame Game,” IWPR, 3 March 2008

[6] (A. Rashid, 2008)

[7] (Bowman, 2011: 154)

[8] Drivers of anti government mobilization in Afghanistan, AREU, http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1203E-Drivers%20of%20Conflict%20IP%202012.pdf

[9] http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/31/opinion/the-wrong-afghan-friends.html?_r=1

[10] Reuter, “The Northern Front.”

[11] https://www.facebook.com/AmrullahSaleh.Afg?fref=ts

[12] Gul Rahim Niazman, ‘The Short Arm of the State’, Afghanistan Today, 17 January 2012, accessed 31 July 2013, http://www.afghanistan- today.org/article/?id=203

[13] Anand Gopal, The Wrong Afghan Friends, 30 May 2014,NY times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/31/opinion/the-wrong-afghan-friends.html

[14] Gul Rahim Niazman, ‘The Short Arm of the State’, Afghanistan Today, 17 January 2012, accessed 31 July 2013, http://www.afghanistan- today.org/article/?id=203

[15] NATHAN HODGE and HABIB KHAN TOTAKHIL, Taliban Heat Up Battle in Kabul, Militants Exploit Government Infighting, Seek to Oust Foreigners. Nov. 30, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/taliban-heat-up-battle-in-kabul-1417385209?mod=WSJ_hppMIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsSecond