The Politics of Democracy in Afghanistan

Every attempt of Karzai state institutions to establish themselves, to rationalize and integrate the villages and communities, they themselves became the object of a strategy on the part of the community, known in as Qawm, which involves not so much the assertion of power but the infiltration of those same institutions. There is no intelligentsia in Afghanistan who could leave the community to come to the state. The authorities in karzai administration, the aim is to insert the Qawm into the state institutions at a level which befits their own importance, from the minor local official to the minister. This operation is intended not only to produce material benefits (posts for the young, sinecures, exemptions), but especially to ensure that the local power game carries on as it has always done, and that the traditional rules of the game of politics will determine the way in which the state functions. Therefore, the current structure of the government which is influenced by very few has only not resulted in unprecedented corruption but it has also marginalized the majority from the state which is symbolized in the re-rise of Taliban.
Judging by the recent history of Afghanistan Qawm’s strategy has been a success, this is especially true when the state tend toward some liberal notion of democracy as Karzai and the state of Zahir shah and Doud, Karzai’s great mentors and political inspirers, it was tribal in the way that it was run, even and especially during the period which saw the establishment of a constitutional monarchy.
Because the Karzai government institutions have no certain bureaucratic stability, the state attempts to gain some by integrating the Qawms. Therefore the state has no other goal than that of perpetuating itself. This is not the end of it, the situation even get worst with foreign intervention. Because the foreigners are rightly not sure if the state is going to buy them both Qawm (community) and Qabila (tribe) buy in, they have set up aid agencies directly in touch with the community, the agencies are run by white people who have no idea of politics in Afghanistan. Their operation empower Qawm and Qabila and the result is undermining the state. That is why the great source of threat for establishment of government is not Taliban but all key aid and state players; its their mistakes in the first place which give hand to the rise of Taliban.
The last parliamentary and presidential election was nothing more than a joke; integrity Afghanistan a research organization reports that $35000 would buy a candidate a seat in the National Assembly. There has been numerous incidents of frauds which was not allowed to be investigated. The current parliament is a failure; I attribute this to the fact that political parties were not allowed. The election was based on a single non transferable voting STV system. Voters casted their vote for individuals. This absence of parties was a consequence not a cause of the weakness of the political class, for it took some time for parties to come into existence. The political class in the current government is depoliticized and rather islamised and oppurtunised. The MPs are representatives of their local qawms to obtain state benefits and privileges. This is well reflected in how votes were casted, every ethnicity went for their own candidate. The state is seen at the local level as a tool which is supported by resourceful foreign at whose expense they should profit as much as possible. The establishment is disunited because it lacks any coherent political goals; instead each tribe and ethnicity sought political dominance. The ruling class and especially the MPs have no conception of a unified state. The selection of political appointees clearly reflected the divisions within a society where primary allegiance was to the family and patronage was still a major factor; ultimate loyalties are not centred upon the state. No attempt is made to transcend the immediate group, or rather, if such an ideal determined the rhetoric used (state, the nation, Islam, democracy) it has no influence on individual behavior, nor even on the strategy pursued by a group. This explains for example why the struggles between various cliques within parliamentary groups often made it appear to the onlooker that they harboured a death wish. The state is no more than a stake in a larger game and the strategy of a Qawm consists in establishing an advantageous relationship with the institutions of the state.
This failure to reach out towards a broader social unity resulted in an ideological vacuum; political terms borrowed from the west circulates from one group to another, when it serves each best interest; losing their precision as they have so. the networks based on patronage and personal links remain firm, as if the most serious political disagreement did not exist; for example the former communist is an ally of Mujaheed or a form Taliban is an ally of US supported liberal.
The atmosphere in parliament (with high absention rate) is anarchic: a quorum can never be reached, there is a constant din, and simple-minded and fanciful speeches are the order of the day. the state is viewed by deputies much as the court is in the village by peasants ; each come to seek for favours. Each minister has complained that deputies are forcing them to appoint their Qawm or else they will be questioned in the parliament. In the parliament theatre it is truly a comedy, even the word ‘theatre’ is hardly a metaphor: the debates are broadcasted on radio and tv stations. Parliament is not news for journalists but a program. This democratic experiment is all form and no substance. Western democracy is only meaningful under certain circumstances: the identification of civil society with the state, and the evolution of a political entity which is something other than political theatre. The battles fought out on the sphere of politics must be a way of resolving tensions for the benefit of society and not a theatrical presentation of imported concepts and distorted ideas confined by Islam. Which tends to hide the fact that what is going on is a struggle for power within a restricted group. The alienation of political class from real politics especially when that class has social origin in qawm and countryside is another piece of evidence pointing to the separation between society and state. The MPs are made of warlords who have gained substantial power in the last two decades of war in the rural areas; their appointment to the parliament is inevitable in the desperate and collapsed state of Afghanistan, it is well explained by Hanna Arendt and Antonio Gramcia who have done extensive analysis of the origins of totalitarianism and the rise of fascism through democratic process; the rise of Islamism follows a similar suit. The intelligentsia hardly made it to the parliament and has no real power. Malalai Joya a critique of war criminals was expelled from the parliament by the majority of the Islamists. in no democracy an elected MP would be expelled for expressing her view of warlords.

the concern of democracy is not social justice but social morality. the political class has a tendency toward regressive attitude and repression of all sorts of freedom, minorities and women, inevitably the situation is going get worst for them, as it has in the last three years.

Paris Conference: An Opportunity to Address Afghanistan’s Key Rebuilding Challenges

We often hear about Afghanistan’s domestic, regional, and transnational challenges each posed by the country’s abject poverty, the Taliban’s cross-border insurgency, and terrorism and drug trafficking that collectively destabilize Afghanistan. But we seldom pay attention to the greatest challenge posed to Afghanistan’s nation-building process by a lack of aid resources coupled with weak strategic coordination of aid implementation by the international community. Some of these challenges deserve special mention both to help overcome them and to avoid collective failure in a country where the international community continues to have the highest chance of success in view of Afghans’ optimism for a better future and their unlimited support for the international peace-building efforts in Afghanistan. Ends and Means Mismatched First, observers of Afghanistan are certain to recall that despite the tremendous rebuilding needs of Afghanistan, the international community re-engaged in the country with a very light footprint from the beginning. In the initial planning stages for the war in Afghanistan, coalition member states agreed that a sound strategy had to include and combine combat operations, humanitarian relief, and stability and reconstruction efforts. They seemed to have followed the prescribed hierarchy of nation-building tasks, whereby as the Taliban were overthrown, some humanitarian aid was provided to Afghans. But the international community failed to adjust their initial assessments of working towards longer-term stabilization and reconstruction efforts, which continue to lack the necessary degree of resources, civilian and military coordination, and firm political commitment from some of the coalition governments and their parliaments. The lead nations have neither fully committed to the task nor have they ensured that there is a match between ends and means. As former US Special Envoy to Afghanistan James Dobbins notes, “mismatches between inputs, as measured in personnel and money, and desired outcomes, as measured in imposed social transformation, are the most common cause for failure of nation-building efforts.” This is exactly the direction Afghanistan is heading towards at the moment because too few troops and resources were committed to the country from the beginning. In addition to this, the invasion and occupation of Iraq shortchanged Afghanistan’s rebuilding priorities, robbing the new Afghan government of much needed resources to establish its effective governance and security presence throughout the country. This has been established in recent reports on Afghan relief. According to a recent report by the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), for example, Afghanistan received just $57 per capita in foreign assistance, whilst Bosnia and East Timor received $679 and $233 per capita respectively, in the two years following international intervention. Per capita security assistance to Afghanistan also woefully remains low with 1.5 foreign troops per 1,000 people compared to 7 per 1,000 in Iraq and 19 per 1,000 in Bosnia. Consequently, too few troops and resources have proven useful for the potential peace spoilers, who had destabilized Afghanistan and committed serious human rights violations and atrocities against the Afghan people throughout 1990s. For example, the Taliban leadership regrouped and reorganized in Pakistan soon after their fall in 2001, and began launching cross-border terrorist attacks inside Afghanistan as early as 2003. While there has been recognition of the necessity to address Afghanistan’s complex rebuilding needs, resource levels to the country remain quite modest compared to other recent post-conflict countries, as pointed out earlier. The Missing Nation Builder Almost seven years since the fall of the Taliban, no clear institutional framework for Afghanistan’s nation-building and reconstruction has emerged. Despite broad international consensus and goodwill, for the rebuilding of Afghanistan from the beginning, the United Nations remained a weak player in Afghanistan until the recent appointment of a high profile special envoy. This is despite the fact that the United Nations provides the most suitable institutional framework for most nation-building measures, one with a comparatively low cost structure, a comparatively high success rate, and the greatest degree of international legitimacy. While the UN has played major operational roles in the more recent post-conflict countries including Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, the role of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan remains one of political consulting, providing good offices, and promoting human rights. In the beginning, the UN was deliberately denied an operational role in Afghanistan, perhaps, due to fears that donor fatigue would soon kick in, resulting in undelivered pledges of assistance to Afghanistan. Hence, a lead-nation strategy was adopted, whereby major resourceful countries assumed responsibility for the reform and building of Afghanistan’s key state institutions. The lead-nation strategy assigned the United States to reform and build the Afghan National Army (ANA); Germany the Afghan National Police (ANP); Japan to disarm, demobilize, and fully reintegrate (DDR) former combatants; Britain to fight and eliminate narcotics; and Italy to reform and build the judicial system. Except for substantive progress in the reform and building of ANA, the other sectors saw nominal or no progress, because although progress in each sector depended on progress in other sectors given their inter-connectedness, the lead nations neither established a collaborative mechanism to ensure strategic coordination across their assigned tasks nor did they bring enough resources to bear on implementing the reforms effectively. In the end, the lead-nation strategy was discontinued, as the designated countries reconsidered their roles as lead-partners—reasoning that only Afghanistan should be the lead-nation with them as its major implementing partners. Local Ownership or Afghans outside the Car? Although a buzz word of the aid community, local ownership as “Afghans in the driver’s seat” of the rebuilding process is mostly absent, since most of the aid resources bypass the Afghan government and go to foreign non-profit and private sector institutions. An estimated 40% of aid goes back to donor countries in corporate profits and consultant salaries, some $6 billion since 2001, according to ACBAR. For example, each full-time expatriate consultant costs $250,000-$500,000 a year. With resources diverted from Afghan state institutions, the government can hardly retain its competitive employees for effective service delivery, and often lose them to higher paid jobs with international organizations. The resulting weak institutional capacity coupled with underpayment causes corruption in the government system. This in turn harms the legitimacy of the government in the public eyes, leaving a deleterious effect on both governance and security across Afghanistan. In the long run, consequently, the international community will have still inherited a failing state in Afghanistan, unless they truly commit to enabling Afghans and their new state institutions to stand on their own feet to drive Afghanistan’s long-term development. Strategic Coordination in Words, Never in Action A multiplicity of actors with overlapping mandates, competitive relations, and minimal accountability for performance, characterize international presence in Afghanistan. The divergent and diffuse efforts of donors have created diverse opportunities for peace spoilers including the Taliban, drug traffickers, and criminals to undermine and derail the nation-building process in Afghanistan. Efforts to enhance structures for strategic coordination on the ground, both within the UN and beyond, have been frustrated by the sheer numbers of actors involved, the limited extent to which these actors accept the coordination authority and the absence of policy coordination structures at the headquarters level. More than 70 countries, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations are present in Afghanistan. Yet, they have consistently worked outside of the Afghan government. For example, of all technical assistance to Afghanistan, which accounts for a quarter of all aid to the country, only one-tenth is coordinated among donors or with the government. Nor is there sufficient collaboration on project work, which inevitably leads to duplication or incoherence of activities by different donors. This has seriously undermined the Afghan government’s ability to build its capacity for effective governance and implementation of the rule of law. Conclusion This Thursday at the Paris Support Conference, the Afghan government will launch the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) in an effort to jumpstart the rebuilding process and to provide strategic guidance and coherence to international aid efforts in Afghanistan. In addition, the government of Afghanistan will seek $50 billion in financial assistance from the international community to help implement the short- and long-term objectives of its integrated strategy for improving security, strengthening governance and the rule of law, and providing social and economic facilities and opportunities for the Afghan population. While generously pledging to fund the ANDS, donors must build on the lessons learned from six years of nation building in Afghanistan to ensure that their aid resources are used effectively through close coordination with Afghan partners, based on sound policies that are centered on local ownership of the development process, so that Afghans themselves can take responsibility for the future of their country. Failure to do so will repeat more of the same—resulting in additional pet projects and ad hoc quick fixes without sustainability at all. It is obvious that when tax payers in donor countries learn that their precious aid monies for Afghanistan are continually wasted, they will eventually tire and most likely withdraw their support from Afghanistan altogether. Neglected before, Afghans do not want their country to return to the chaos and violence of 1990s that made Afghanistan a no man’s land, a terrorist base for the Taliban and Al Qaeda. As we learned from the 9/11 tragedy and the suffering of the Afghan people throughout the 1990s, a failed Afghanistan is not an option for international peace and security. Success must be the only way forward. The Paris Support Conference offers a vital opportunity for all stake holders—Afghan and international alike—to address the key rebuilding challenges facing Afghanistan and to commit firmly to working together to implement the objectives of the ANDS for a free and prosperous Afghanistan.

M. Ashraf Haidari is the Political Counselor of the Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, DC. His e-mail is haidari@embassyofafghanistan.org

معتادی دخترش را بالای قمار بازان به فروش رسانید

معتادی دخترش را بالای قمار بازان به فروش رسانید

محمد جان مرد 55 ساله که از مدتی به اینسوبه مواد مخدر معتاد گردیده است بعد از فروش همه مال و متاع دست داشته ، دختر 14 ساله اش رانیز به فروش رسانید .

یک پدر معتاد به مواد مخدر بعد از فروش همه دارایی اش، دختر چهارده ساله اش را نیز به فروش رساند.
محمد جان 55 ساله از مدتی به این سوی به مواد مخدر معتاد شده و اکنون، جهت تداوی در یکی از مراکز تداوی معتادین تحت معالجه قرار دارد.

جان محمد می گوید:" وقتی همه چیز زند گی ام را از دست دادم ، از خانه خود را قمارخانه ساختم و در این فرصت، قمار بازان متوجه دختر 14 ساله ام شدند و از حالت بد اعتیاد من سوء استفاده نموده، مرا مجبور به فروش دخترم نمودند."

بیان این موضوع برای یک پدر مشکل می باشد و این نگرانی از چهره افسرده محمد جان به خوبی هویدا بوده و از ذکر این موضوع برایش تلخ و درد ناک معلوم می گردید.

محمد جان می گوید:" 25 هزار افغانی را در قمار باختم و بعد از سپری شدن 5 ماه ، دخترم را نیز در بدل 25 هزار افغانی دیگر برای قمار بازان از دست دادم."

وی با نگرانی گفت از این که بالای دخترش می گذرد هیچ اطلاعی ندارد.

در همین حال کارکنان صحی در مراکز معتادین مواد مخدر از افزایش روز افزون معتادین مواد مخدر سخن می زنند.
گلالی کارمند اجتماعی مرکز تداوی معتادین حانگه آماج گفت که در این اواخر، معتادین مواد مخدر نسبت به سال های قبل افزایش یافته است.

وی می گوید که معتادین مواد مخدر، برعلاوه کار های غیر مشروع، حاضر هستند که اولاد های شان را به فروش برسانند و از پول آن، مواد مخدر خریداری کنند.

خانم گلالی افزود که معتادین را که آنها تداوی نموده اند، کودکان و زنان می باشند، که در میان آنان شمار کودکان معتاد روبه افزایش است.

فروش دختران بخاطر بدست آوردن مواد مخدر در افغانستان حرف تازه نیست.

چندی قبل نیز یک پدر معتاد دختر هشت ساله اش را به دلی فقر و تنگدستی در بدل پنج هزار کلدار پاکستانی به فروش رسانده بود.

afghan police lack ammunition