An analysis of the deteriorating Security in Kunduz Province

following my last post on dynamics of power in Konduz and in the series of analysing the situation in this post I will be focusing on:

From Harpoon to Tycoon

Jihadi commanders now in charge of local governance are effectively controlling the state they have a say in earmarking, permission and certification of international development funds. Instead of using to procedure to enhance efficiency in private and non-profit sector implementation of development projects it’s used as a source of revenue by collecting kickbacks in exchange for permission to implement projects.

The strongmen was also directing international funding that was aimed at bringing anti-government forces or armed groups into the social fold. Hundred of millions of dollars was spent through programmes such as Commander’s Emergency Response Programme (CERP) or Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), this money was used by the Strongmen to expand their patronage network.

The most viable source of strongmen is a drug trade which is likely to continue after most western aid has dried out. Many sources report that Kunduz strongmen run a lucrative drug network smuggling narcotics to Russia and Europe through Tajikistan.[1] In June 2012 the government of Tajikistan issued an extradition warrant for  Mir Alam and Latif Ibrahimi the governor of neighboring Takhar province to face trial for charges of drug trafficking, terrorism and other crimes.[2] Needless to say the government of Afghanistan is unable to effectively respond to the request.

The private armies the strongmen are funded to maintain are not only a revenue source but a security asset for the protection of narcotic business.

 In September 2012 after more than 12 civilians were killed in clashes between militia inside the provincial capital the attorney general office issued a warrant for Mir Alam to be presented in Kabul for questioning. Many sources put him at the scene of the killing and he was one of the prime suspects.[3] Thousands of people took to streets to protest against the decision and Kunduz governor downplayed the warrant which eventually died out.[4] The ability to insert influence with such impunity and in the face of states inability to curb strongmen power many

The strongmen as an effective anti government force

Another perspective into the debate would be to ask the question why is the state better than local strongmen?  It could be argued the role played by the strongmen in much of Afghanistan has convinced some that it was efforts to reform the corrupt and warlord-dominated Afghan state that kicked off the insurgency by weakening those who had been holding a lid on it and depriving the Afghan government of key sources of support.[5] US President Barack Obama acknowledged this in 2009 and dubbed a tactical errors, described as too few boots on the ground, disenfranchising the Afghan population and allowing corrupt elites too much leeway to develop clientelist structures of personal dependencies.[6] Obama remedied it by a “surge” strategy which was “clear, hold, build” and then “transfer” to local state authorities.[7] But there was no one to transfer to as Antonio Giustozzi[8] notes there are few professional police to go around same goes for district level civil servant. By 2010 the Obama administration was convinced that the Afghan state does not have the capacity to create responsive subnational governance and launched several projects to strengthen local governance with little success, key among them was an alternative to local governance and support for local strongmen to fill the void through Arbaki and ALP programs. Maj. Michael Waltz, a former Special Operations Forces officer told New York Times in an interview: “We can’t sacrifice security for this multigenerational effort to build rule of law.”[9]

Few can argue with Waltz on militia effectiveness, the mobilisation of these militias, often in agreement with local police forces already staffed by individuals linked to the same strongmen in the past, represented a turning point, where NATO, Afghan police, and the Afghan army had until then been unable to contain the expansion of the insurgency.[10]

Jamiat and its effective offshoot Shurai Nizar are wary of elements inside the Afghan government, which are willing to reach a compromise with the Taliban; this is perceived as a threat to security in the north. Amrullah Saleh leader of Afghan Green Trend, former head of Afghan spy agency (NDS) and prominent affiliate of Jamiat wrote on his Facebook page that there are elements in the government seeking to eliminate remnants of Jamiat in Kunduz province. [11] During a visit to Kunduz province Ahmad Zia Massood a counsel to the Afghan president, and brother of the prominent Jamiat figure Ahmad Shah Massood, said the former Jihadi strongmen are important in defeating the Taliban. This remark is more a rhetoric of Jamiat than the official line of Afghan government policy, it’s a curious case of where Mr. Massood allegiance lay. Given high level support of Jamiat for maintaining militia there are three policy implications.

First, high level of Jamiat influence on the government with coinciding hardliner American approach in seeking military solution to what is labelled as the Taliban problem prevented initiatives for political solution. Without a long term solution tensions in Kunduz as well as other parts of the north is a ticking bomb that would go off under certain situation.

Second, attempts to build support for a national state by addressing community grievance and insert sovereignty of state by monopolising violence will hit significant political and factional obstacles. Elders from Kunduz petitioned former President Karzai to address militia problem in Kunduz.[12] Anwar Jagdalik the former governor of Kunduz and Karzai nominee was sent to Kunduz from Kabul with the mandate to resolve the militia problem that was already causing headache in 2011. Karzai got the Americans behind the project by cutting funds for militia in Kunduz.[13] The task of dismantling, disarming and melding was left to Anwar Jagdalik, it did not take place.[14] Perhaps because the international mission was winding down its military operation and there was little interest or funding for what could potentially be a long-term strategy of disarmament and reintegration. The governor lacked the resources had less than 1500 national police at its disposal that clearly was not enough to take on the militia.

Third, the infighting within the Afghan government of unity on the one side Ashraf Ghani and his team and on the other side Abdullah Abdullah with support from Northern Alliance will lend itself for exploitation by anti government forces. Wall street Journal has argued that Taliban have already exploited the rift,[15] in an interview with Ashna Television Mirza Mohammad Yarmand former Deputy minister of interior has argued that the instability in Kunduz is caused by rivalries in Afghan National Unity government.

First of all support and funding militia is contrary to the aim of state building which was the US official state strategy for Afghanistan and against the doctrine of COIN, counter insurgency, which emphasises on political solution in addressing the root cause of war.

Organising a large-scale war effort on the basis of armed forces organised patrimonially is difficult and inefficient. The individual strongmen will demand rewards for their participation, which may constrain the ability of the government to make decisions and appoint officials as required by the political environment. In the North, sources in contact with several of the strongmen involved in the militia movement report that most of them have negotiated deals with the Taliban, carving out spheres of influence and focusing on the control of their home turfs.129 There is therefore a strong argument that, relatively unhindered by an inefficient repression, the Taliban kept spreading around Afghanistan.

The outlying districts of Kunduz are run by militia who are unpopular among the community, they do not provide an efficient repression force to keep the Taliban in check due to lack of command and control. The militia project the power of strongman and is a tool for the commander to pursue his interests; in exchange militia members are given a free hand in extorting from the population. For the population the Taliban provide a better alternative with proven record of stamping out thievery and criminality. The militia can only fight a war against another militia if they launch preemtive strikes and organise effective defences. The militia does not have the discipline to carry out force protection, guard duties and orchestrated battles with segmented group tasks. Pre-emptive strike and effective defences depend on good intelligence and surveillance for which the militia need to be well connected to the community, without strong community support the militia have no chance of fighting the Taliban.   

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[1] Afghanistan News centre, who is controlling the drug routes, http://www.afghanpaper.com/nbody.php?id=29832

[2] Roushd News Agency, Jihadi leaders are disturbing security in Badakhshan of Tajikistan, http://www.roushd.com/newsIn.php?id=11164

[3] باز داشت ده ها تن در کنم کندز از سوی وزارت دفاع

  , Farsi.Ru 13,09, 2012 http://www.farsi.ru/doc/5965.html

[4] Razaq Mammon, September 2012, Mir allam is accused of the Killing in Kunduz, http://www.razaqmamoon.com/2012/09/blog-post_8895.html

[5] For Karzai’s own opinion, see “Helmand Ex-Governor Joins Karzai Blame Game,” IWPR, 3 March 2008

[6] (A. Rashid, 2008)

[7] (Bowman, 2011: 154)

[8] Drivers of anti government mobilization in Afghanistan, AREU, http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1203E-Drivers%20of%20Conflict%20IP%202012.pdf

[9] http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/31/opinion/the-wrong-afghan-friends.html?_r=1

[10] Reuter, “The Northern Front.”

[11] https://www.facebook.com/AmrullahSaleh.Afg?fref=ts

[12] Gul Rahim Niazman, ‘The Short Arm of the State’, Afghanistan Today, 17 January 2012, accessed 31 July 2013, http://www.afghanistan- today.org/article/?id=203

[13] Anand Gopal, The Wrong Afghan Friends, 30 May 2014,NY times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/31/opinion/the-wrong-afghan-friends.html

[14] Gul Rahim Niazman, ‘The Short Arm of the State’, Afghanistan Today, 17 January 2012, accessed 31 July 2013, http://www.afghanistan- today.org/article/?id=203

[15] NATHAN HODGE and HABIB KHAN TOTAKHIL, Taliban Heat Up Battle in Kabul, Militants Exploit Government Infighting, Seek to Oust Foreigners. Nov. 30, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/taliban-heat-up-battle-in-kabul-1417385209?mod=WSJ_hppMIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsSecond

An analysis of the deteriorating Security in Kunduz Province

following on my last post on the summary of the situation in this post I will analyse:

The Dynamics of Power and Politics in Kunduz

The Northern Alliance which consists of Jamiat Islami, Ittahad Islami, Junbish Islami, Hizb Wahadat and smaller Tanzims[1] gained power after the fall of Taliban, on the insistence of the West and particularly the US Hamed Karzai was installed as the president but for the first few years he lacked any real power and all important official positions below the president on the national level was occupied by northern alliance.

One of the key challenges Karzai faced during his entire term was to make the government national by reducing the influence of military political faction, i.e. Northern alliance and make the government inclusive by giving place to Pashtuns in the government. Hamid Karzai installed a range of Pashtuns and Tajik technocrats at important positions in Kabul and Pashtuns to replace Northern Alliance at provincial level. Most Pashtuns were formerly members of Hizbi Islami or Taliban, the staunch enemy of Northern Alliance.

Kunduz traditionally have had strong Tanzim presence with strong local commanders, the provincial capital of Kunduz was overrun by Jihadists early in August 1988 right after Soviet combat troops withdraw from the city garrison but was recaptured by the government forces that only remained in control of the provincial capital.[2] Hizb, Jamiat and Ittahad have had military base in Kunduz, some of the strongest commanders such as Aref Khan, Arbab Mohammad Hashem,  Mirza Mohammad Naseri, Latif and Rauf Ibrahimi defected to Taliban and in the post 2001 climate where power was assigned by the US they remained marginalised or were killed. In addition, several hundred sub-commanders of Kunduz that surrendered to Northern Alliance with their 4000 men in 2001 were massacred by Dustom men in Dasht lailly. Two commanders of Jamiat Gen. Daud Daud and Mir Alam became the most influential strongmen of Kunduz after successfully reducing most opponents with assistance from the US military.

General Daud and Mir Alam run Kunduz like a fiefdom, this was not acceptable for the Kabul government, in an attempt to break their grip Karzai lured Gen. Daud to Kabul by appointing him as the national deputy minister of interior in 2004.

Mir Alam for his influence was not bestowed with a position in the government. A state position would greatly enhance his legitimacy and contact with regional, national and international powers. He started to cause trouble for the Kabul regime, for instance in 2005 Mir Alam men launched several attacks on Afghan police and security forces.[3] This is just before the parliamentary election when security is paramount; in order to ensure security Karzai’s most viable choice was to reward Mir Alam with a senior position in the government. Mir Alam was appointed chief of police of neighbouring Baghlan province in June 2005. To become the chief of police, he had to hand over a large cache of 765 weapons plus ammunition to Motaleb Beg as part of the deal.[4]  Mir Alam soon found himself in quarrel with another Jamiat strongman, the commander of the North and Northeast Highway Police brigade turned 20th AMF Brigade, Abdul Khalil Andarabi. According to US government information, they competed for the control of drug traffic routes[5]. Since Andarabi and his influential father, Juma Khan, originated from this province, he apparently gathered more supporters and edged out Mir Alam.

From 2009 with the US military surge and the accompanying worsening security situation Shurai Nazar faction and Jamiat Islami also successfully used efforts to contain the Taliban to improve their own power position.

In 2010 the Americans enlisted Mir Alam among others to run the Arbaki programme in Kunduz. He received millions in cash and weapon in exchange for fighting the Taliban, which very often meant his political opponents.[6] Given military power without any political strain meant that Mir Alam men had a free rein in looting the villagers with impunity.

In September 2010, the appointments of two other famous commanders of Jamiat also affected the security set up in Kunduz. General Daud returned as 303rd Pamir Police Zone commander to the north. The charismatic Sayedkheli became the Kunduz provincial chief of police. He had gained a legendary reputation in Shura-ye Nazar as the defender of his home area, Shomali near Kabul, against Taliban and Pakistani forces in the late 1990s. In Kunduz, Sayedkheli successfully sidelined the mayor of Kunduz City, Mohammad Ghulam Farhad, a Pashtoon who supported Taliban in the 1990s.

Bismillah, Daud, and Sayedkheli  all Shurai Nizar of Jamiat acted as trio in fighting the Taliban in Kunduz. From his ministerial position, Bismillah provided 1,125 ALP positions for the organisational chart (tashkeel) of the province in addition to the original 1,810 regular ANP officers. Of these ALP positions, 300 each went to Chahar Dara, Dasht-e Archi, and Imam Sahib, while Kunduz district received 225. In Kunduz, Sayedkheli therefore could use the ALP positions to establish a clientele. Mir Alam’s force, which was mainly in Khanabad, was not integrated. Since no complaints by him are known, it seems that he preferred to remain in the NDS-operated Arbaki programme. Nabi Gechi on the other hand, who had fought previously against Shura-ye Nazar got nothing.

In October 2010, Sayedkheli negotiated successfully with Taleban leaders in who had previously fought on the insurgents’ side. He persuaded them with positive incentives – assets in the form of ALP positions and goods from the internationally funded Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) to ‘reintegrate’ insurgents – and with threats – such as bringing down the wrath of the mighty US army on them. These successful negotiations allowed Sayedkheli’s ANP and US infantry forces, together with militias led by Mir Alam and another Shurai Nizar subcommander Nawid, to recapture Aliabad and the south of Chahar Dara district in October and November 2010.

The US surge of 2010 and the Afghan militia campaign delivered a serious blow to the Taliban in Kunduz; after 2010, they did not control significant territory anymore. However, they continued to exist as an armed group and successfully changed their strategy, refocusing on clandestine operations.

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[1] A political and military organisation that is expanding since the demise of the monarchy.  A Tanzim is a conglomerate of local commanders who are loose loyal to the organization for foreign support and balancing regional power structure.

[2] Soviets Complying On Afghan Withdrawal, U.S. Says, August 16, 1988|By Thom Shanker, Chicago Tribun http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1988-08-16/news/8801230289_1_afghan-withdrawal-soviet-soldiers-afghan-army

[3] Schetter and Glassner, ‘Neither Functioning, nor Failing . . .’, [see FN 5], 145

[4] Radio Afghanistan, ‘Commander Surrenders Weapons in Afghan North’, BBC Monitoring South Asia, 25 June 2005; Stapleton, ‘Disarming the Militias . . .’, [see FN 123], 7–8.

[5] US Embassy Kabul, ‘Kunduz Politics . . .’, [see FN 142]

[6] Commander Rauf of the Ibrahimi family of Hezbi Islami Tanzim integrated surrendered Taliban fighters into his force and occupied the old fortress of Kunduz, Bala Hisar. Mir Alam group called in US warplane and bombed the fortress. Rauf had to move from his position, which was immediately taken by Mir Alam’s men.  Interview with police officer and former fighter of Jamiat, Kunduz, December 2012; International Crisis Group, ‘Disarmament and Reintegration . . .’, [see FN 72], 10

An analysis of the deteriorating Security in Kunduz Province

situation summary

Since 2013 anti government forces are mounting pressure to capture an entire province outside the volatile south and east; thousands of anti government fighters has been battling Afghan forces for the control of Kunduz. Major fighting took place around 23 April 2015 and 28 September 2015. Since early 2015 Afghan officials have said that several areas of Kunduz Province have been under the jihadist control, giving them positions from which to besiege Kunduz city - including positions to the south of the city where the strategic Kunduz Airport is located[1]. The Jihadist captured the provincial capital on the 28 September 2015.

Taliban forces assaulted the districts of Imam Sahib, Aliabad, and Qala-i-Zal as well as areas in Kunduz city in April 2015. The chief of Kunduz’s provincial council claimed that “about 2,000 heavily-armed insurgents attacked” the district centre in Imam Sahib, and that contact with more than 500 Afghan security personnel in the district has been lost, Pajhwok Afghan News reported.[2] The Taliban has released a videotape on its website showing the group in control of Imam Sahib after the fighting and displays a large some of weapons, vehicles and security forces captured by Jihadists. The film shows inside the military bases that now seem to be in Taliban control.[3]

Since the beginning of 2015 the head of the provincial council estimated that more than 65 percept of the province is under Taliban control. The governor of Mohammad Omar Safi told RFERL that this is going to be a very tough fight for them without the combat support of NATO.  The power structure and politics of Kunduz led to the fall of a major city into the Jihadist hands.

I argue this is directly related to US priority to wage punitive war against remnant of Taliban that ignored dynamics of politics in Afghan countryside as well as undermined the Afghan state that should have been its key ally. The US allied itself with local strongmen particularly those affiliated with Northern Alliance, staunch opponent of Taliban, in exchange for rewards and power. The US recruited a network of spies and mercenaries whom often sought to settle old scores with their rivals using the US war machine. Pashtuns as well as Tajiks and Uzbeks who were not aligned with Northern Alliance perceived this as another proof that the Northern Alliance has got Americans in their pockets, which hindered the creation of a broad base national government. 

Some of the strongmen militia were institutionalised under programmes such as Arbaki and Afghan Local Police. This approach was widely condemned by Afghans and international community due to a track record of human rights abuse by the militia. Irregular Militia is not an alternative to the state bound by the rule of law and aimed at furthering population wellbeing. The militia have a loose command structure and serves the interests of local strongmen; they lack training, vetting, oversight and accountability.  They generally live of the population and use fear and brutality to impose its authority.[4]  This oppression is misconceived as effective counterinsurgency and stability while in reality it impeded reconciliation and caused further community fragmentation that eventually led to full-blown hostilities.

in posts to come I will continue the analysis of the situation. 

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[1] RFERL, Afghan Forces Struggle To Push Taliban Back From Besieged Kunduz http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-taliban-offensive-kunduz-battle/26987354.html

[2] Pajhwak, H. Hamdard 27 April 2015 http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/04/27/contact-lost-500-security-men-imam-sahib

[3] Taliban operation in Kunduz, http://www.shahamat-movie.com/index.php?option=com_webplayer&view=video&wid=146

[4] HRW report, Just don’t call it Militia, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/12/afghanistan-rein-abusive-militias-and-afghan-local-police

Refugees are the greatest existentialist challenge for the EU

Hungarian Camera woman is the tip of the iceberg. Eastern Europe emerged from along history of Fascism and Communism as homogenous countries and was integrated into the EU without redesigning the educational system to promote pluralism. Eastern Europeans respect and revere the West for their wealth and higher culture and have been the beneficial of hundreds of billions of funds and free movement. Social tension with the West was not a probability since the West was not their counterpart. The west turned a blind eye on their treatment of minorities such as Russians in the Baltic and Roma in the southern parts most of who fled and were offered asylum in the West. Instead of reforming their education system to root out xenophobia and racism by promoting human rights and equality they have tried to whip nationalism and religious revivalism. In this political climate the refugees are seen as marauders who will undermine their social fabric and not as individuals with dignity who deserve our respect. The influx of refugees who come from different ethnic and religious background poses the greatest challenge to the EU as the Eastern part is not willing to take part in any EU wide plan to help.