Afghan Tolo TV replicates dragons den

I believe there are two important factors contributing to the success of Mohsenis, the Australian group which owns Tolo TV and a couple of other stations. They have a secured pipe of funding from the Americans and foreigners in general, for instance the new program on Tolo TV is financed by the USAID. Secondly, they don’t have to have an idea. They know the west and they know what programs are popular in the west, they merely make an Afghan replica of the popular western program. The new program on tolo ‘fikr wa talash’ is based on the popular reality show ‘Dragon’s Den’ on BBC. it is a reality TV show series where contestants pitch their business ideas to a panel of tycoons in return for cash for their companies. As for Americans they see the show to encourage Afghans to start their own enterprises, stirring entrepreneurial spirits in a country that has been ravaged by three decades of war. The program is well financed by Americans and similar to other popular TV programs on Tolo are mentored by foreign experts. David Elliot is one of the development consultant hired by USAID to produce the program for Tolo TV. The first series ended in August with the final contestant winning $20,000 towards his plastic recycling business. I have a feeling that the afghan dragons den is going to be a success following Afghan star suite. Afghan Star is another popular program on tolo which is the imitation of X factor in Britain or American idol. Dragons den stirs competition among entrepreneurs and ambitious afghan individuals; the same thing as Afghan Star. Afghans who are entrepreneur and ambitious could struggle hard to appear on the TV and bring forth the best they could, this in turn benefits the program makers. The program also involves local businessmen; this group can bring resources and knowledge of afghan market which would make the program relevant to the audience and pitchers. Finally the program would succeed because neither tolo nor businessmen pay for it. Instead both receive money from Americans to do the program.

I very much like the work the Mohseni brothers do not because they value Afghanistan and their programs are reflecting Afghanistan; contrary because they don’t care about Afghanistan and all their ideas are foreign, yet they possess the skill to interpret and implement them in Afghanistan. This is a atypical expertise to possess, the international community unlike the Mohsenis failed to implement foreign ideas successfully in Afghanistan. Reality TV programs are dominating western media and Mohsenis have realised "Reality TV is very big all over the world, that's why we wanted to make something where we could both help people, get ideas and also provide entertainment," said Masood Sanjar, a production manager for Tolo TV to a western paper. This is not to say all Mohseni ideas have succeeded. Many program ideas similarly imported from the west failed because Afghan culture did not respond to it the same way as it did to the Afghan Star or other successful programs. The unsuccessful programs were not relevant to the Afghan life and aspirations. Mohsenis quite often face the problem of finding talented and the right people to materialise their ideas or rather the ideas they import. This is not a problem peculiar to Mohsenis or Tolo TV, its hard to find skilled and crafted individuals in Afghanistan. some of the failure stories of Tolo are ‘Parda Hai Raz’ a program about paranormals and supernatural creatures and magic, this is again based on the popularity of such programs in the west. ‘Yak Rouedad wa du Didgha’ is tolo hardtalk which didn’t turn into a bit hit. ‘Diwa’ is an imitation of Talking Movies, Siasat wa Mardum is an imitation of People on Aljazeera. These are off the top of my head but there are many more failures. However in a country like Afghanistan only a few success stories count because everything else is a failure. In the west you can’t afford to fail too often because then you go bankrupted; in Afghanistan you can fail many times to make a few successes and for people like Mohsenis and Tolo TV with a few success stories there is no bankruptcy, at least in the near future, because foreign money supports entrepreneurs who think Western and talk Western.

After hearing about the new program on Tolo I actually saw a couple of stories popping out in western media about the program, the stories were full of gleam and praise, then I wonder if there is ever anything negative about Tolo and Mohsenis in the eyes of foreigners and western media. I spent the morning searching the internet to find something negative about them but no joy. Mohsenis have set up a good TV station for the wrong reasons, but that is a totally different thing. They didn’t come to Afghanistan because they believe in freedom of expression and media but rather to run a business and make money. In some regards they have certainly been dodgy. Mohsenis have dubious relationships with certain power poles in Afghanistan and certainly mistreat their staff. But that is not a source of disconcert for westerners.

حقوق بشر، شهروندی و دين

فرائت سنتی از دين يا دين تاريخی در دو محور در حوزه شهروندی با اعلاميه جهانی حقوق بشر وميثاقهای ملازم آن در تعارض است :
1- عدم برابری حقوق بين آحاد بشر به واسطه دين، مذهب، جنسيت، حريت (و رقيت) و گاه فقاهت، و فائل بودن "حق ويژه" و امتياز حقوقی برای برخی اصناف جامعه از جمله مومنان.
2- غير قابل گفتگو بودن و فراتر از نقد بودن احکام و تعاليم دينی، به نحوی که اين ضوابط و احکام نيازی به توجيه عقلایي ندارند و در صورت تعارض با حقوق شهروندی و حقوق بشر، احکام و تعاليم دينی از حق وتو برخورداراست.
قرائت روشنفکرانه از دين با نفی هر نوع نابرابری حقوقی از يک سو، و قابل گفتگو دانستن همه احکام دينی و نياز تعاليم دينی به توجيه عقلائی و ورود دروادی گفتگوی خردمندانه، در محور ديگری با لائيسيته چالش دارد. لائيسيته چه در قرائت حداکثری آن (دين زدائی از زندگی) و چه در قرائت حداقلی آن (دين زدائی از عرصه عمومی) هر نوع ابتناء مناسبات اجتماعی بر ارزشها و تعاليم دينی را برنمی تابد، و عرصه عمومی را "مشروط به نفی دين" يا "لا اقتضاء نسبت به دين" تعريف می کند.
از ديدگاه روشنفکر دينی عرصه عمومی را "مشروط به نفی دين" کردن مبتنی بر پيش فرض غير قابل اثبات (يا حداقل غير اتفاقی) مرجوحيت دين يا مردوديت آن است. اما عرصه عمومی را "لا اقتضاء نسبت به دين" تعريف کردن در حوزه های مورد اختلاف دينداران و لائيک ها ممتنع است، زيرا در حوزه ياد شده امر دائر بين نفی و اثبات دينی است. در واقع "لا اقتضاء نسبت به دين" به "مشروط به نفی دين" بر می گردد.
بحث در حوزه مورد اختلاف دينداران و لائيک ها (تعلیمات عمومی ابتدائی در مکاتب دولتی بلکه تعليمات عمومی اجباری، وسائل ارتباط جمعی عمومی، روابط آزاد جنسی خارج از ازدواج به ويژه پيش از ازدواج، همجنس گرائی،مشروبات الکلی و مواد مخدر، مرگ از روی ترحم، دخالت در ژنتيک انسان و . . . ) به يک بحث مبنائی منجر می شود. در اين بحث مبنائی اگر دينداران و لائيک ها نتوانند يکديگر را قانع کنند – آنچنانکه تا کنون نتوانسته اند – نمی توان به گزاره اثبات نشده يا تابوی مدرن "حقوق بشر بالذات لائيک است" استناد کرد. در اينجا دو "باور پايه" کاملا متفاوت مطرح است. از ديدگاه دينداران اينکه موارد حوزه ياد شده در زمره حقوق بشر است جای سوال دارد. بنا براينبحث به سوال بنيادی "قلمرو حقوق بشر و شهروندی" باز می گردد

US terrorist allies

US National Intelligence Estimate in1995 had warned of a new type of terrorism, many officials continued to think of terrorists as agents of states (Hezbollah acting for Iran ) or as domestic criminals (Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City ). The report tipped off that terrorists would strike on U.S. soil at landmarks in Washington or New York , or through the airline industry.

Back then US didn’t recognize Osama bin Ladin as the most serious threat to America . US state department, terrorism report, in 1995 recognizes Rabbani regime in Kabul as terrorism sympathizer; the report admits the regime has done little to curb the training of foreign militants. Abdul-Rasul Sayyaf, a regime backer is listed as a terrorism supporter who harbors and train potential terrorists in his camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan .

Pakistan security forces raided Sayyaf facilities near Peshawar in November 2005 after the bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad . All Mujhideen factions held some foreign militants in their captivity, the militants were arrested from camps run by other factions.

Afghanistan lacked an effective or recognized central government throughout the 1990s, the country was a training ground for Islamic militants and terrorists in 1995. All of the factions competing for political power in Kabul was brought to that position by American support, America had supported their terrorist activities by means of weapon and cash. After America abandoned these factions in the 90s, it still remained reluctant to act against these factions, even in the face of credible intelligence. Rabbani, Sayyaf and Hekmatyar were running camps that have trained terrorists from many nations who have been active in worldwide terrorist activity. Terrorists who trained in camps in Afghanistan perpetrated attacks in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, East Asia, and South Asia, including the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia in June 1995, bombings in France by Algerian militants, and the Manila-based plot to attack Western interests. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, suspected of involvement in this plot as well as the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, is linked to Afghan training. The group that claimed responsibility for the bombing in November of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad , Pakistan , also has extensive ties to the Afghan network.

After the soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan , Mujaheeden factions showed no capability to form a government in Afghanistan . Bloody civil war provided the ground for terrorist groups to take root. America lost interest in Afghanistan and didn’t want to intervene political. America thought it might have a carrot for Afghanistan 's warring factions in a project by the Union Oil Company of California (UNOCAL) to build a pipeline across the country. This was a pure miscalculation on the American side, during years of internal war Mujaheeden showed no will for negotiation and power share. There was never much chance of the pipeline actually being built, America hoped that the prospect of shared pipeline profits might lure faction leaders to a conference table. Mujaheeden has been traditional friends of America ; the US government has invested greatly on them to turn them into a fighting machine. This is when Taliban came to the stage, a group with a vision beyond military success. US turned to Taliban, after years of internal war and support for terrorism, Mujaheeden were no more the best policy option for Clinton administration. The idea with Taliban was to conquer Afghanistan by them, a group which doesn’t have the traditional relation with foreign militants who would also facilitate the ground for the pipeline, U.S. diplomats were willing at the time, as one official said, to "give the Taliban a chance”. U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Bill Richardson, led a delegation to Afghanistan-in April 1998. No U.S. official of such rank had been to Kabul in decades. Ambassador Richardson went primarily to urge negotiations to end the civil war. In view of Bin Ladin's recent public call for all Muslims to kill Americans, Richardson asked the Taliban to expel Bin Ladin. They answered that they did not know his whereabouts. In any case, the Taliban said, Bin Ladin was not a threat to the United States .

American policy returns to Mujaheeden:

Mujaheeden might have not been the best policy tool for America in Afghanistan but it was after 1998 attack that US realized Mujaheeden is their best option for Afghanistan . After the August 1998 attacks, Clinton administration had to reevaluate the threat posed by Bin Ladin. Was this just a new and especially venomous version of the ordinary terrorist threat America had lived with for decades, or was it radically new, posing a danger beyond any yet experienced.

Though hauntingly prescient, the CIA's 1995 National Intelligence Estimate did not yet name Osama bin Laden as a terrorist threat.

Individuals who trained in Afghanistan in 1995 were involved in wars or insurgencies in Kashmir , Tajikistan , Bosnia , Chechnya , and the Philippines . In Tajikistan , the government claimed in May to have arrested a group of Afghan-trained Tajiks who were responsible for attacking a bus carrying Russian border guards in Dushanbe in February. Manila claims that veterans of Afghan camps are working with Philippine opposition groups that attacked and destroyed a village in April.

The Rabbani regime in Kabul has done little to curb the training of foreign militants. Indeed, one regime backer, Abd al-Rasul Sayyaf, continues to harbor and train potential terrorists in his camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan ; the Government of Pakistan raided his facilities near Peshawar in November after the bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad . The Rabbani regime did arrest foreign militants from camps run by other factions. Many remain in jail in Kabul , but some have been released.
Initially, the DCI's Counterterrorist Center and its Bin Ladin unit considered a plan to ambush Bin Ladin when he traveled between Kandahar , the Taliban capital where he sometimes stayed the night, and his primary residence at the time, Tarnak Farms. After the Afghan Mujaheeden reported that they had tried such an ambush and failed, the Center gave up on it, despite suspicions that the Mujaheeden story might be fiction. Thereafter, the capture plan focused on a nighttime raid on Tarnak Farms.

Although not all CIA officers had lost faith in the Mujaheeden capabilities-many judged them to be good reporters-few believed they would carry out an ambush of Bin Ladin. The chief of the Counterterrorist Center compared relying on the Mujaheeden to playing the lottery. He and his associates, supported by Clarke, pressed for developing a partnership with the Northern Alliance, even though doing so might bring the United States squarely behind one side in Afghanistan 's long-running civil war.

The Northern Alliance was dominated by Tajiks and drew its strength mainly from the northern and eastern parts of Afghanistan . In contrast, Taliban members came principally from Afghanistan 's most numerous ethnic group, the Pashtuns, who are concentrated in the southern part of the country, extending into the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces of Pakistan .

Because of the Taliban's behavior and its association with Pakistan , the Northern Alliance had been able at various times to obtain assistance from Russia , Iran , and India . The alliance's leader was Afghanistan 's most renowned military commander, Ahmed Shah Massood. Reflective and charismatic. But his bands had been charged with more than one massacre, and the Northern Alliance was widely thought to finance itself in part through trade in heroin. Nor had Massood shown much aptitude for governing except as a ruthless warlord. Nevertheless, Tenet assessed Massood as the most interesting possible new ally against Bin Ladin.

In February 1999, Tenet sought President Clinton's authorization to enlist Massood and his forces as partners. In response to this request, the President signed the Memorandum of Notification whose language he personally altered. Tenet says he saw no significance in the President's changes. So far as he was concerned, it was the language of August 1998, expressing a preference for capture but accepting the possibility that Bin Ladin could not be brought out alive. "We were plowing the same ground," Tenet said.

In fall 1999, DCI Tenet unveiled the CIA's new Bin Ladin strategy. It was called, simply, "the Plan." The Plan aimed to close gaps in technical intelligence collection (signal and imagery) as well. In addition, the CIA would increase contacts with the Northern Alliance rebels fighting the Taliban.

It was in 2001 that Bush administration decided to form a post Taliban government, after the 9/11 attacks. Mujheeden were used to chase out Taliban from Kabul and Kandahar after American air bombardment. The new government is predominantly made up of Mujheeden elements.

Who is responsible for the conflict in Georgia

I lay the blame for the escalation of the conflict in Georgia on the shoulders of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Although he dominates the world's press with his rhetoric, at times proclaiming victory, at times ranting about Russian aggression or democracy and Western values. Over the last few days I have watch Saakashvili on BBC literally shouting in joy or frowning in anguish; not sure whether he is moody or his plans swing so quickly. I do not believe this man for a minute, he is not sincere and he is loud. He has crushed several demonstrations against his rule, committed electoral fraud and reducing the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali to rubble in an overt act of unprovoked aggression.

Despite the tailwind from the West, one thing is nevertheless clear: The Georgian president has grossly miscalculated. The Georgian president has confused his desires with reality, and blatantly misjudged the situation. He did not seriously reckon with retaliation by Moscow. Either that or he simply planned to blame Russia. In the first instance any student of politics would understand that Russia would not reserve the use of force when threatened by a small nation or group; Russian compaign of Czechoslovakia 1968, Afghanistan 1979-1989 and Hungary 1954 are my proof. If Saakashvili knew the overwhelming response of Russia but counted on NATO to come to its rescue then the man was wrong again. Nato would never confront Russia, it successfully avoided it during the cold war and would not confront Russia even if Georgia is annexed. It seems like Saakashvili want to play the blame game and gain some sympathy of the west by victimising the Georgian nation. Such a notion is anti-democratic in principle and counter productive in action. Georgia will lose foreign investment because the country has proven instable and Georgia’s way to Nato and EU has become even bumpier. Nato and EU do not want Georgia with outstanding territorial disputes and conduct of aggression. The failure of Georgia in the last fifteen years to comply with the Council of Europe Declaration on minorities, which Georgia is a signatory to, is one thing but its policy of aggression against minorities is another.

In the aftermath of the conflict, we ought to see some implications: Russia will have a stronger position in the Georgian separatist enclaves and its influence will stretch behind pre war borders. If any decision is to be reached regarding the faith of the separatist regions, it is going to be placing them more out of Georgian control. Secondly, there is going to be mounting pressure on Saakashvili to leave the office for killing thousands and putting Georgia even further from it’s aspiration to join Nato and EU. This time it won’t be the same as the ‘Rose Revolution’ of 2003 which brought Saakashvili to power, but it is going to be rather down the stem, something similar to a ‘thorn revolution’. Saakashvili is a student of George Bush and a follower of his policies. He relies on the creation of an external enemy to justify his policies and position in power. Saakashvili is an hypocrite, same as Bush, and uses Neocon rhetoric i.e. freedom, democracy… to appeal to sensationalism.

It is going to be wrong to blame Saakashvili for all political failures of Georgia. It has been established that democracies doesn’t work in politically and economically instable countries. In the aftermath of the war, it is to be seen which direction Georgia is going to take; pursuing it’s ambition to shift closer to the west or lean back on Russia.