The Politics of Democracy in Afghanistan

Every attempt of Karzai state institutions to establish themselves, to rationalize and integrate the villages and communities, they themselves became the object of a strategy on the part of the community, known in as Qawm, which involves not so much the assertion of power but the infiltration of those same institutions. There is no intelligentsia in Afghanistan who could leave the community to come to the state. The authorities in karzai administration, the aim is to insert the Qawm into the state institutions at a level which befits their own importance, from the minor local official to the minister. This operation is intended not only to produce material benefits (posts for the young, sinecures, exemptions), but especially to ensure that the local power game carries on as it has always done, and that the traditional rules of the game of politics will determine the way in which the state functions. Therefore, the current structure of the government which is influenced by very few has only not resulted in unprecedented corruption but it has also marginalized the majority from the state which is symbolized in the re-rise of Taliban.
Judging by the recent history of Afghanistan Qawm’s strategy has been a success, this is especially true when the state tend toward some liberal notion of democracy as Karzai and the state of Zahir shah and Doud, Karzai’s great mentors and political inspirers, it was tribal in the way that it was run, even and especially during the period which saw the establishment of a constitutional monarchy.
Because the Karzai government institutions have no certain bureaucratic stability, the state attempts to gain some by integrating the Qawms. Therefore the state has no other goal than that of perpetuating itself. This is not the end of it, the situation even get worst with foreign intervention. Because the foreigners are rightly not sure if the state is going to buy them both Qawm (community) and Qabila (tribe) buy in, they have set up aid agencies directly in touch with the community, the agencies are run by white people who have no idea of politics in Afghanistan. Their operation empower Qawm and Qabila and the result is undermining the state. That is why the great source of threat for establishment of government is not Taliban but all key aid and state players; its their mistakes in the first place which give hand to the rise of Taliban.
The last parliamentary and presidential election was nothing more than a joke; integrity Afghanistan a research organization reports that $35000 would buy a candidate a seat in the National Assembly. There has been numerous incidents of frauds which was not allowed to be investigated. The current parliament is a failure; I attribute this to the fact that political parties were not allowed. The election was based on a single non transferable voting STV system. Voters casted their vote for individuals. This absence of parties was a consequence not a cause of the weakness of the political class, for it took some time for parties to come into existence. The political class in the current government is depoliticized and rather islamised and oppurtunised. The MPs are representatives of their local qawms to obtain state benefits and privileges. This is well reflected in how votes were casted, every ethnicity went for their own candidate. The state is seen at the local level as a tool which is supported by resourceful foreign at whose expense they should profit as much as possible. The establishment is disunited because it lacks any coherent political goals; instead each tribe and ethnicity sought political dominance. The ruling class and especially the MPs have no conception of a unified state. The selection of political appointees clearly reflected the divisions within a society where primary allegiance was to the family and patronage was still a major factor; ultimate loyalties are not centred upon the state. No attempt is made to transcend the immediate group, or rather, if such an ideal determined the rhetoric used (state, the nation, Islam, democracy) it has no influence on individual behavior, nor even on the strategy pursued by a group. This explains for example why the struggles between various cliques within parliamentary groups often made it appear to the onlooker that they harboured a death wish. The state is no more than a stake in a larger game and the strategy of a Qawm consists in establishing an advantageous relationship with the institutions of the state.
This failure to reach out towards a broader social unity resulted in an ideological vacuum; political terms borrowed from the west circulates from one group to another, when it serves each best interest; losing their precision as they have so. the networks based on patronage and personal links remain firm, as if the most serious political disagreement did not exist; for example the former communist is an ally of Mujaheed or a form Taliban is an ally of US supported liberal.
The atmosphere in parliament (with high absention rate) is anarchic: a quorum can never be reached, there is a constant din, and simple-minded and fanciful speeches are the order of the day. the state is viewed by deputies much as the court is in the village by peasants ; each come to seek for favours. Each minister has complained that deputies are forcing them to appoint their Qawm or else they will be questioned in the parliament. In the parliament theatre it is truly a comedy, even the word ‘theatre’ is hardly a metaphor: the debates are broadcasted on radio and tv stations. Parliament is not news for journalists but a program. This democratic experiment is all form and no substance. Western democracy is only meaningful under certain circumstances: the identification of civil society with the state, and the evolution of a political entity which is something other than political theatre. The battles fought out on the sphere of politics must be a way of resolving tensions for the benefit of society and not a theatrical presentation of imported concepts and distorted ideas confined by Islam. Which tends to hide the fact that what is going on is a struggle for power within a restricted group. The alienation of political class from real politics especially when that class has social origin in qawm and countryside is another piece of evidence pointing to the separation between society and state. The MPs are made of warlords who have gained substantial power in the last two decades of war in the rural areas; their appointment to the parliament is inevitable in the desperate and collapsed state of Afghanistan, it is well explained by Hanna Arendt and Antonio Gramcia who have done extensive analysis of the origins of totalitarianism and the rise of fascism through democratic process; the rise of Islamism follows a similar suit. The intelligentsia hardly made it to the parliament and has no real power. Malalai Joya a critique of war criminals was expelled from the parliament by the majority of the Islamists. in no democracy an elected MP would be expelled for expressing her view of warlords.

the concern of democracy is not social justice but social morality. the political class has a tendency toward regressive attitude and repression of all sorts of freedom, minorities and women, inevitably the situation is going get worst for them, as it has in the last three years.

Paris Conference: An Opportunity to Address Afghanistan’s Key Rebuilding Challenges

We often hear about Afghanistan’s domestic, regional, and transnational challenges each posed by the country’s abject poverty, the Taliban’s cross-border insurgency, and terrorism and drug trafficking that collectively destabilize Afghanistan. But we seldom pay attention to the greatest challenge posed to Afghanistan’s nation-building process by a lack of aid resources coupled with weak strategic coordination of aid implementation by the international community. Some of these challenges deserve special mention both to help overcome them and to avoid collective failure in a country where the international community continues to have the highest chance of success in view of Afghans’ optimism for a better future and their unlimited support for the international peace-building efforts in Afghanistan. Ends and Means Mismatched First, observers of Afghanistan are certain to recall that despite the tremendous rebuilding needs of Afghanistan, the international community re-engaged in the country with a very light footprint from the beginning. In the initial planning stages for the war in Afghanistan, coalition member states agreed that a sound strategy had to include and combine combat operations, humanitarian relief, and stability and reconstruction efforts. They seemed to have followed the prescribed hierarchy of nation-building tasks, whereby as the Taliban were overthrown, some humanitarian aid was provided to Afghans. But the international community failed to adjust their initial assessments of working towards longer-term stabilization and reconstruction efforts, which continue to lack the necessary degree of resources, civilian and military coordination, and firm political commitment from some of the coalition governments and their parliaments. The lead nations have neither fully committed to the task nor have they ensured that there is a match between ends and means. As former US Special Envoy to Afghanistan James Dobbins notes, “mismatches between inputs, as measured in personnel and money, and desired outcomes, as measured in imposed social transformation, are the most common cause for failure of nation-building efforts.” This is exactly the direction Afghanistan is heading towards at the moment because too few troops and resources were committed to the country from the beginning. In addition to this, the invasion and occupation of Iraq shortchanged Afghanistan’s rebuilding priorities, robbing the new Afghan government of much needed resources to establish its effective governance and security presence throughout the country. This has been established in recent reports on Afghan relief. According to a recent report by the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), for example, Afghanistan received just $57 per capita in foreign assistance, whilst Bosnia and East Timor received $679 and $233 per capita respectively, in the two years following international intervention. Per capita security assistance to Afghanistan also woefully remains low with 1.5 foreign troops per 1,000 people compared to 7 per 1,000 in Iraq and 19 per 1,000 in Bosnia. Consequently, too few troops and resources have proven useful for the potential peace spoilers, who had destabilized Afghanistan and committed serious human rights violations and atrocities against the Afghan people throughout 1990s. For example, the Taliban leadership regrouped and reorganized in Pakistan soon after their fall in 2001, and began launching cross-border terrorist attacks inside Afghanistan as early as 2003. While there has been recognition of the necessity to address Afghanistan’s complex rebuilding needs, resource levels to the country remain quite modest compared to other recent post-conflict countries, as pointed out earlier. The Missing Nation Builder Almost seven years since the fall of the Taliban, no clear institutional framework for Afghanistan’s nation-building and reconstruction has emerged. Despite broad international consensus and goodwill, for the rebuilding of Afghanistan from the beginning, the United Nations remained a weak player in Afghanistan until the recent appointment of a high profile special envoy. This is despite the fact that the United Nations provides the most suitable institutional framework for most nation-building measures, one with a comparatively low cost structure, a comparatively high success rate, and the greatest degree of international legitimacy. While the UN has played major operational roles in the more recent post-conflict countries including Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, the role of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan remains one of political consulting, providing good offices, and promoting human rights. In the beginning, the UN was deliberately denied an operational role in Afghanistan, perhaps, due to fears that donor fatigue would soon kick in, resulting in undelivered pledges of assistance to Afghanistan. Hence, a lead-nation strategy was adopted, whereby major resourceful countries assumed responsibility for the reform and building of Afghanistan’s key state institutions. The lead-nation strategy assigned the United States to reform and build the Afghan National Army (ANA); Germany the Afghan National Police (ANP); Japan to disarm, demobilize, and fully reintegrate (DDR) former combatants; Britain to fight and eliminate narcotics; and Italy to reform and build the judicial system. Except for substantive progress in the reform and building of ANA, the other sectors saw nominal or no progress, because although progress in each sector depended on progress in other sectors given their inter-connectedness, the lead nations neither established a collaborative mechanism to ensure strategic coordination across their assigned tasks nor did they bring enough resources to bear on implementing the reforms effectively. In the end, the lead-nation strategy was discontinued, as the designated countries reconsidered their roles as lead-partners—reasoning that only Afghanistan should be the lead-nation with them as its major implementing partners. Local Ownership or Afghans outside the Car? Although a buzz word of the aid community, local ownership as “Afghans in the driver’s seat” of the rebuilding process is mostly absent, since most of the aid resources bypass the Afghan government and go to foreign non-profit and private sector institutions. An estimated 40% of aid goes back to donor countries in corporate profits and consultant salaries, some $6 billion since 2001, according to ACBAR. For example, each full-time expatriate consultant costs $250,000-$500,000 a year. With resources diverted from Afghan state institutions, the government can hardly retain its competitive employees for effective service delivery, and often lose them to higher paid jobs with international organizations. The resulting weak institutional capacity coupled with underpayment causes corruption in the government system. This in turn harms the legitimacy of the government in the public eyes, leaving a deleterious effect on both governance and security across Afghanistan. In the long run, consequently, the international community will have still inherited a failing state in Afghanistan, unless they truly commit to enabling Afghans and their new state institutions to stand on their own feet to drive Afghanistan’s long-term development. Strategic Coordination in Words, Never in Action A multiplicity of actors with overlapping mandates, competitive relations, and minimal accountability for performance, characterize international presence in Afghanistan. The divergent and diffuse efforts of donors have created diverse opportunities for peace spoilers including the Taliban, drug traffickers, and criminals to undermine and derail the nation-building process in Afghanistan. Efforts to enhance structures for strategic coordination on the ground, both within the UN and beyond, have been frustrated by the sheer numbers of actors involved, the limited extent to which these actors accept the coordination authority and the absence of policy coordination structures at the headquarters level. More than 70 countries, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations are present in Afghanistan. Yet, they have consistently worked outside of the Afghan government. For example, of all technical assistance to Afghanistan, which accounts for a quarter of all aid to the country, only one-tenth is coordinated among donors or with the government. Nor is there sufficient collaboration on project work, which inevitably leads to duplication or incoherence of activities by different donors. This has seriously undermined the Afghan government’s ability to build its capacity for effective governance and implementation of the rule of law. Conclusion This Thursday at the Paris Support Conference, the Afghan government will launch the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) in an effort to jumpstart the rebuilding process and to provide strategic guidance and coherence to international aid efforts in Afghanistan. In addition, the government of Afghanistan will seek $50 billion in financial assistance from the international community to help implement the short- and long-term objectives of its integrated strategy for improving security, strengthening governance and the rule of law, and providing social and economic facilities and opportunities for the Afghan population. While generously pledging to fund the ANDS, donors must build on the lessons learned from six years of nation building in Afghanistan to ensure that their aid resources are used effectively through close coordination with Afghan partners, based on sound policies that are centered on local ownership of the development process, so that Afghans themselves can take responsibility for the future of their country. Failure to do so will repeat more of the same—resulting in additional pet projects and ad hoc quick fixes without sustainability at all. It is obvious that when tax payers in donor countries learn that their precious aid monies for Afghanistan are continually wasted, they will eventually tire and most likely withdraw their support from Afghanistan altogether. Neglected before, Afghans do not want their country to return to the chaos and violence of 1990s that made Afghanistan a no man’s land, a terrorist base for the Taliban and Al Qaeda. As we learned from the 9/11 tragedy and the suffering of the Afghan people throughout the 1990s, a failed Afghanistan is not an option for international peace and security. Success must be the only way forward. The Paris Support Conference offers a vital opportunity for all stake holders—Afghan and international alike—to address the key rebuilding challenges facing Afghanistan and to commit firmly to working together to implement the objectives of the ANDS for a free and prosperous Afghanistan.

M. Ashraf Haidari is the Political Counselor of the Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, DC. His e-mail is haidari@embassyofafghanistan.org

معتادی دخترش را بالای قمار بازان به فروش رسانید

معتادی دخترش را بالای قمار بازان به فروش رسانید

محمد جان مرد 55 ساله که از مدتی به اینسوبه مواد مخدر معتاد گردیده است بعد از فروش همه مال و متاع دست داشته ، دختر 14 ساله اش رانیز به فروش رسانید .

یک پدر معتاد به مواد مخدر بعد از فروش همه دارایی اش، دختر چهارده ساله اش را نیز به فروش رساند.
محمد جان 55 ساله از مدتی به این سوی به مواد مخدر معتاد شده و اکنون، جهت تداوی در یکی از مراکز تداوی معتادین تحت معالجه قرار دارد.

جان محمد می گوید:" وقتی همه چیز زند گی ام را از دست دادم ، از خانه خود را قمارخانه ساختم و در این فرصت، قمار بازان متوجه دختر 14 ساله ام شدند و از حالت بد اعتیاد من سوء استفاده نموده، مرا مجبور به فروش دخترم نمودند."

بیان این موضوع برای یک پدر مشکل می باشد و این نگرانی از چهره افسرده محمد جان به خوبی هویدا بوده و از ذکر این موضوع برایش تلخ و درد ناک معلوم می گردید.

محمد جان می گوید:" 25 هزار افغانی را در قمار باختم و بعد از سپری شدن 5 ماه ، دخترم را نیز در بدل 25 هزار افغانی دیگر برای قمار بازان از دست دادم."

وی با نگرانی گفت از این که بالای دخترش می گذرد هیچ اطلاعی ندارد.

در همین حال کارکنان صحی در مراکز معتادین مواد مخدر از افزایش روز افزون معتادین مواد مخدر سخن می زنند.
گلالی کارمند اجتماعی مرکز تداوی معتادین حانگه آماج گفت که در این اواخر، معتادین مواد مخدر نسبت به سال های قبل افزایش یافته است.

وی می گوید که معتادین مواد مخدر، برعلاوه کار های غیر مشروع، حاضر هستند که اولاد های شان را به فروش برسانند و از پول آن، مواد مخدر خریداری کنند.

خانم گلالی افزود که معتادین را که آنها تداوی نموده اند، کودکان و زنان می باشند، که در میان آنان شمار کودکان معتاد روبه افزایش است.

فروش دختران بخاطر بدست آوردن مواد مخدر در افغانستان حرف تازه نیست.

چندی قبل نیز یک پدر معتاد دختر هشت ساله اش را به دلی فقر و تنگدستی در بدل پنج هزار کلدار پاکستانی به فروش رسانده بود.

afghan police lack ammunition

video

view from a grain of sand

Women in Afghanistan were not suddenly plunged into brutal un-freedom when the Taliban came to power in 1996. Nor have they always been subject to repressive rule. In a documentary that is both intimate and broadly political, Meena Nanji offers a view of the past thirty years of Afghanistan's history through the lives of three women.

Wajeeha is a literacy instructor and activist with the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA); her husband died fighting against the Soviets in the 1980s. Roeena is a defiantly unmarried doctor who works in refugee camps populated mostly by people who fled Afghanistan when competing warlords reigned in the mid-1990s. Shapire, along with her husband and children, fled Afghanistan after the Taliban assumed power. She now teaches girls in a refugee camp.

Via interviews, narration, and vrit and archival footage, Nanji compellingly argues that the loss of women's rights in Afghanistan is not a simple story that revolves around the Taliban. It is a much larger-and continuing-story of a nation that has suffered through near-constant war and mass displacement over several decades.

in 1989, the foreign powers withdrew, leaving Afghanistan with a power vacuum and an organized, well-armed movement of religious fundamentalists. From 1992 to 1996, competing warlords ruled. Another wave of people fled. In 1996, the Taliban came to power. U.S. readers should be well aware of what happened in Afghanistan in 2001.

The women in View from a Grain of Sand have lived through all of this. The film was shot in refugee camps and within Afghanistan over three visits-in fall 2000 (while the Taliban reigned and the world mostly ignored it); in fall 2001 (just after 9/11); and in 2003 (after the U.S. attacks, the fall of the Taliban, and the creation of a parliament dominated by the very same warlords who had reigned during the chaotic years of 1992 to 1996). Meena Nanji has documented her subjects' stories as they moved from obscurity to a focus of global attention. She has also documented the constancy of their struggles. These women's lives reflect continuous repression, lack of resources, and active work for change through a series of power shifts, all of which have been marked by violence and instability.

letters to local radio station

The Release of Kidnapped Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan - In Exchange for Freeing Islamist Leaders

On February 11, 2008, Pakistani ambassador to Afghanistan Tariq Azizuddin went missing, along with his guard and driver, in the tribal district of Khyber Agency while travelling from Peshawar to Kabul. He is the most high-profile captive taken by the Taliban. Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmud Qureshi has denied any link between efforts to secure the release of Tariq Azizuddin and those to obtain the release of Sufi Muhammad.(10)
  
The Taliban have also sought to deny any role in the kidnapping of the diplomat. However, the facts prove otherwise. It was reported that the Pakistani government is engaged in negotiations with the kidnappers through the mediation of Sufi Muhammad. The Urdu newspaper Roznama Khabrain reported that during the talks, the Taliban put forward many demands, including one for the release of several militants.(11)
   
On April 19, 2008, a video confirming that Tariq Azizuddin was in Taliban custody was aired on television channels. After the release of the video, a spokesman of the Foreign Office in Islamabad confirmed that the government ''is using all possible sources to secure his release, and talks are ongoing.''(12)
  
Against this backdrop, the diplomat may be released any time now. The Pakistani government has not disclosed the names, ranks, and affiliation of militants whose release is being bartered for the freedom of Tariq Azizuddin and for peace in the Taliban-controlled region on the border with Afghanistan.
  
Significantly, Azizuddin went missing within a few days of the capture of Taliban commander Mansoor Dadullah in a military operation in Pakistan. A day after the kidnapping, the website of Pakistan's popular GEO Television Network quoted an unnamed Arab journalist based in Islamabad as saying that in exchange for freeing the Azizuddin, the Taliban were seeking the release of Mansoor Dadullah, brother of slain Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah.(13)

Legal Cases against Red Mosque Cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz

The talks were always focused on specific issues, for example, the release of diplomat Tariq Azizuddin, Pakistani soldiers held by the Taliban, or Islamist leaders in Pakistani jails. What expanded the scope of these talks was the victory of secular political parties in the February elections. The victorious parties, which blamed the violence in Pakistan on President Musharraf's policy of fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in cooperation with the West, had advocated a policy of reconciliation with extremists. Since coming to power, these parties initiated a policy of dialogue with all Taliban groups.
  
A day before the release of Sufi Muhammad, reports appeared in the media saying that Tariq Azizuddin's kidnappers had demanded the release of 12 top Islamist leaders, including Maulana Abdul Aziz, the cleric arrested while fleeing in a burqa during the 2007 military operation on his Red Mosque and the Jamia Hafsa madrassa in Islamadab; Taliban commander Mansoor Dadullah; Sufi Muhammad; five fighters of the Afghan Taliban; and others. According to a report, most of the militants proposed for release by the Taliban in exchange for their freeing of Tariq Azizuddin are supporters of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan chief Baitullah Mehsud.(14)
  
Currently, there is speculation over when Azizuddin will be freed and whether or not the Pakistani government will release Mansoor Dadullah and Maulana Abdul Aziz in exchange, and whether the timing of the two militants' release will be modulated in a way to distract the public attention from the exchanged deal. There are indications, however, that the government is moving in the direction of releasing Maulana Abdul Aziz.
  
Recently, the High Court in Islamabad granted bail to Maulana Abdul Aziz in four cases. With this, the radical cleric, with powerful connections inside the Pakistani military, has now been granted bail in 19 of the 27 cases filed against him. His release is expected as early as in May 2008, when the court will hear the next batch of his bail applications.(15)  

Baitullah Mehsud's Control of Tribal Districts and Pakistani Taliban 

The Gilani government has announced its plan to abolish the 1901 law so that these tribal districts could be integrated into Pakistan, possibly as a fifth province. While the Pakistani Taliban, who virtually control the region, welcomed the decision, they have made two demands: Pakistan must distance itself from the U.S. war on terror, and a system of shari'a must be implemented in the region.(16) 
  
The government is engaged in talks with a delegation of tribal elders nominated by Baitullah Mehsud. As a precondition for the talks, and at the time of Sufi Muhammad's release, Baitullah Mehsud asked his fighters not to engage in provocative actions that could mar peace in the FATAs as well as in parts of the North West Frontier Province.(17)
  
The nature of the talks between the government and Baitullah Mehsud's representatives came to light in a 15-point draft agreement. Some of its points included:(18)
  
a) The Political Administration and the Mehsud tribe will jointly monitor and report the likelihood of the presence of training camps for militants and of the preparation of terror attacks.
  
b) If the Mehsud tribe fails to eliminate suspicions of militant training in the area, the government will have the right to take action as per tribal customs and traditions, and the Frontier Crimes Regulation.
  
c) The exchange of prisoners of both sides will take place after the signing of this agreement. The government will release all prisoners from the Mehsud tribe.
  
d) Government troops will begin phased withdrawal from the region of Mehsud tribe after the agreement is signed.
  
It appears from the draft agreement that the talks are focused on Baitullah Mehsud's tribe – i.e. in the tribal districts of South and North Waziristan. It is also clear that the militants loyal to Baitullah Mehsud have wider control across the region than some of the Taliban groups in the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. The overall objective of the talks is to restore peace across the region, possibly through shared control as evident from the demand to jointly monitor the likely presence of terror camps in the region.
  
The negotiations are seen as a bargaining process by the Taliban. During the talks the Taliban delegation sought the release 250 militants from Pakistani jails in exchange for about 80-100 government officials and soldiers.(19)
  
It appear that the government, indeed, is making concessions: it was reported that it gave cash compensation worth more than 200 million Pakistani rupees to over 500 individuals for the Taliban fighters killed or wounded during the military operation begun by Pakistani troops in Waziristan in 2004. According to a report, about 150 senior Taliban commanders in Waziristan received huge undisclosed sums.(20)
  
By the last week of April, there was a deadlock in the talks over the issue of withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the region, leading to the suspension of the negotiations by Taliban. According to a report, the delegation of tribal elders returned from the talks, saying that the government was not agreeing to the troops' withdrawal.(21)
  
The Taliban are also demanding that they should be free to launch attacks across the border against U.S. and NATO troops deployed in Afghanistan – a demand that will transform the tribal districts into a military training base for the jihadist fighters, and all the more so if the Pakistani troops were to return to barracks.(22)
  
The suspension of the talks has focused on the nature of the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the region, also highlighting in the process the Taliban ambition to control the region without the presence of Pakistani troops. However, it is not clear whether the Taliban are demanding total withdrawal of the troops, or whether they will allow some kind of Pakistani military presence. For now, NWFP Chief Minister (executive head) Ameer Haidar Hoti has said that the demand for the withdrawal of troops is not correct, pleading for ''flexibility on the part of the Taliban in order to establish peace.''(23)
  
Even if the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan reached a deal with the government, there are many militant groups that act as per their own agenda. For example, a group called Lashkar-e-Islam recently asserted its control in the tribal district of Khyber Agency, vowing to spread Islam across the world.(24) 
  
Similarly, in the tribal district of Mohmand Agency the local Emir of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has established control, recently issuing an agenda for the implementation of the Islamic shari'a .(25)
  
And in late April, a significant development took place in the town of Darra Adam Khel in the NWFP, indicating the type of change that is coming in as a result of the government's policy of dialogue with the Taliban. As soon as the Pakistani troops withdrew from this area, Taliban fighters came rushing in. They parked their vehicles in front of a local politician's house, leaving a message that he should guard them until they complete setting up their control centers. The Peshawar-based Urdu-language newspaper Roznama Mashriq reported: ''The tribal elders are describing this new development to be the result of the government's new policy of establishing peace in these regions.''(26)
  
It appears though that the Pakistani government has succeeded in halting suicide bombings, possibly as a result of the talks with the Taliban groups. It is also evident that the Taliban have the upper hand, pursuing their own agenda and achieving success in a key demand for – at an early stage in the talks – a mini-shari'a state within Pakistan.

Endnotes:
(10) Roznama Jasarat (Pakistan), March 23, 2008.
(11) Roznama Khabrain (Pakistan), April 24, 2008.
(12) Roznama Jang (Pakistan), April 20, 2008.
(13) Geo TV (www.geo.tv/urdu.asp), accessed February 12, 2008.
(14) Roznama Jasarat (Pakistan), February 21, 2008.
(15) Roznama Mashriq (Pakistan), April 29, 2008.
(16) Roznama Jang (Pakistan), March 31, 2008.
(17) Roznama Mashriq (Pakistan), April 24, 2008.
(18) Roznama Ausaf (London), April 24, 2008.
(19) Roznama Mashriq (Pakistan), April 28, 2008.
(20) Roznama Jasarat (Pakistan), April 30, 2008.
(21) Roznama Mashriq (Pakistan), April 29, 2008.
(22) Roznama Mashriq (Pakistan), April 28, 2008.
(23) Roznama Khabrain (Pakistan), April 30, 2008.
(24) Roznama Khabrain (Pakistan), April 18, 2008.
(25) Roznama Mashriq (Pakistan), April 17, 2008.
(26) Roznama Mashriq (Pakistan), April 23, 2008.

How long is the Afghan insurgency going to take?

The current conflict in Afghanistan is a battle of Will, the war challenges the will of international community to fight in Afghanistan, the will of Afghans in the future of their country and finally the will of Taliban and insurgents to continue their battle against the foreign troops. This story weighs up the will of Afghans and the lack of a self-rooted cause for having a peaceful country. The will and motivation of international community to continue the war is less significant than their resources. The will and support for the war in Afghanistan lies in democratic western public such as Britain. The will and support of the public is going to be challenged as the price of war both in human heads and dollars climb up. The war is basically challenging the resources of international community in Afghanistan. The question is how tough the war going to be and whether it will need more resources and can the international community afford it?

The will of Afghans for any future peace is affected by their perception of the politics in their country, deeply affected by the war in the past and the instigator of those wars. Militarization of politics in Afghanistan in the last three decades has turned the population into political cynics, distrusting politics and the ones involved at the cause of political leaders. Wars and armies in Afghanistan became heavily politicized in the 1970s as a result of two military coups. The politicisation of wars and the militarisation of politics continued as the country saw over a dozen regimes; ideologically opposing each other, extremely. The war and politics got very dirty in Afghanistan when gradually military fictions relied on their relevant ethnic groups for recruitment; gradually giving power to a variety of ethnic-regional factions, self-serving warlords, and criminal freebooters. The situation fostered an intense competition for enlargement of factional militias through indiscriminate recruitment from their respective ethnic constituencies or, in the case of some parties, increased reliance on non-Afghans. The process not only ethnicised the warring militias but also brought large numbers of bandits, thugs, and criminal elements to the ranks of the competing factions. Factional--and nominally national--leaders were reluctant to prevent their allies from criminal acts, fearing their defection to a rival party. This gave a free hand to armed groups that had carved the country into fiefdoms and were involved in narcotics, plundering public and private property, extortion, corruption, rape, war crimes and violence. The result was, population lost their trust in any military fiction, political party and self-declared leader.

The afghan conflict is characterised by international intervention, the international community has supported their fictions in the last three decades. These fictions including the ones currently in power, involved in gross human rights violation. UN plans for peace in Afghanistan has always failed and resulted in further bloodshed, UN plan for peaceful transfer of power from Najib regime to a transitional government, was a set up to oust Najib from power. led to an intense power struggle among the Mujahideen groups who had taken over different parts of the country and seized or looted the government. Foreign supported groups in Afghanistan has been cleverly drafted to emphasize in an internal division within the opposing camps, resulting the country sinking into devastating civil wars leading to foreign invasions, i.e. soviet 1979 - 1989, Pakistan 1994 – 2001 and international since 2001. Political polarization of the county intensified as the wars developed. The wars in the last three decade assisted by foreign interventions have caused tremendous social change, ripping society apart vertically and horizontally. The wars has been the battle of any afghan against any other afghan, at the end it has been realised that they are not the one who benefits, it’s the self dubbed leaders and their foreign backers. Resulting in afghan lost of trust in leaders and any political formation.

The reason for the growth of anti foreign and government insurgency after international intervention is the lack of sympathy among the population to the government and the international community. The population stands by as Taliban and insurgents disrupt the state building process. In the current intervention the international community has an agenda which is to root out terrorism so it’s no longer a threat to them. the question for Afghans is what is there for Afghans in it? Do they gain anything, yes, their country is getting reconstructed. But the people who have been brought to power by international community are not popular in the public eye, the international community seemed to intervene only to destroy Taliban and bringing the opposition to power. The international community intervened with 6000 troops while they committed 40000 to Kosovo a country which is one sixth of Helmand, one of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan, under British auspices. The international community clearly didn’t intervene to stabilise Afghanistan because the proportion of force was not enough for stabilisation. They depended on criminal elements and warlords accused of war crimes to control their respective territory. The international troop size swelled as the fight with Taliban got tougher. The international community put 50000 troops to fight the insurgency. The insurgency is not going to be won without public support which lacks the will to support the government.

Taliban were not ousted for their poor human rights record, or international isolation because of their medieval treatment of women, or their imposition of far-reaching social restrictions such as compulsory beard, dressing code etc, or because of national economic failure. Taliban were ousted merely because of extensive links to Deobandi religious schools - ‘madrassas’, to foreign extremist networks, and to wanted terrorists such as Osama bin laden. As a matter of fact Taliban implemented several good social policies, such as eradication of administrative corruption, disarmament of fighting groups, stabilising the society and putting an end to village level ethnic conflict, and prevention of poppy cultivation and drug production. These are all provisions which the current government and the international community have failed to prevent. Topped up by rising social inequalities fuelled by drug money and international community generous bonuses to its allies.

The war against the Taliban is going to be a long battle; the question I posed at the beginning was whether the international community has the resources to fight this war. The insurgents are mostly the product of the past wars and guerrilla warfare, the military establishment is conceptually oriented toward a war of attrition. It is, in essence, a guerrilla war. This orientation shapes the underlying principles of its tactical and operational manoeuvre: elusiveness is considered the key to survival in drawn-out combat; the fight for survival calls for survival to fight; and trading territory for time constitutes the basis of operational resilience. The tactic is vivid in Helmand where they fighting British Army, the towns in Helmand province switch control between British army and Taliban. Taliban are reluctant to defend defensive lines at any cost. Taliban have a good understanding of foreign armies tactical weight and their enemy's offensive momentum. Taliban know they can’t stand against well-armed western armies but they know foreign armies are overstretched and sporadic attacks would pressure their resources and morale. Taliban are light force mounted on pickup trucks or motorbikes tailored to ambush ‘forward enemy basis’, caravans and government establishment. The war is against a ghost enemy, which retreats behind an imperceptible border into Pakistan. Pakistan is a safehaven for Taliban where they international forces is not allowed to chase them. The soviets lost the same war; history proves hard defeating a cross border insurgency. Americans lost a similar war in Vietnam against Vietcong. Taliban rely heavily on ethnic participation of Pashtuns, who see themselves isolated in the foreign mediated power share of current government, and popular support in south, south west and eastern Afghanistan. Taliban relies on religion to justify their fight and brutal punishment of civilians and enemy to intimidate the public.

The fight against Taliban is not going to be won unless there is a positive change in the will and aspiration of Afghan public. Democracy is an empty word for many Afghans, pronounced by political leader to exploit the ideology for their political ends; the word was popular from 60s to late 80s. It has resurfaced after the international intervention. More than words such as democracy is needed to reinstate Afghan trust in the government. The insurgency is not beatable and its going to draw more support from the public as the conflict escalates. The will of Afghan people might be positively affected if they see changes in their daily life. The current government is far too corrupt, manipulated by criminals and ineffective to be trusted. To change the government the international community need to pour more resources into Afghanistan, more money is need to reform the government bureaucracy, rebuild the infrastructure and more troops to provide security for the progress. Coupled with new state building strategies, the foreign aid need to stop spending less money on themselves and more on Afghanistan. Otherwise this is going to be a long and bloody war, not new to Afghanistan, but challenging to the will of international intervention.

بیکاری معتادان تداوی شده را دوباره معتاد می نماید

بیکاری معتادان تداوی شده را دوباره معتاد می نماید
شماری از معتادان مواد مخدر بنابر عوامل مختلف بعد از تداوی و ترک اعتیاد دو باره معتاد می شوند.
مسوولان کشور دلیل آن را فقر اقتصادی، نبود زمینه های کاری، عدم مصروفیت های سالم و فشار های روحی گوناگون عنوان می کنند.
مردی که نخواست نامش فاش شود می گوید که از مدت 7 سال بدینسو معتاد به مواد مخدر بوده و بعد از تداوی ترک اعتیاد کرده اما به دلیل این که کار برایش پیدا نگردید، دو باره به اعتیاد رو آورده است.
این مرد 35 ساله میگوید که طعنه حرف های مردم، بیکاری و غریبی وی را واداشته است تا دو باره به استفاده از مواد مخدر رو آورد تا بتواند برای مدت کوتاهی غم هایش را فراموش کند.
وی اضافه کرد:"هر بار که مواد مخدر استفاده می کنم خوش و راحت خود را احساس میکنم و غم های زندگی و بیکاری را نیز از یاد می برم."
یک معتاد دیگر که خود را رحمت الله و 30 ساله معرفی می کند می گوید به دلیل این که پس از تداوی دو باره به استفاده از مواد مخدر رو آورده است، فامیلش وی را از خانه اخراج کرده است.
این مرد معتاد با چهره لاغر و نحیفی که یارای حرف زدن را ندارد میگوید:" بعد از تداوی دو باره معتاد شدم، تمام زحمت هایم به خاطر ترک اعتیاد به خاک یکسان شد."
وی افزود، زمانی که برای پیدا کردن کار به هر اداره مراجعه می کرد جواب رد می شنید و زمانی که برای غریب کاری به چهار راه ها رفت نیز کاری پیدا نتوانست زیرا مواد مخدر وی را ضعیف نموده و مردم نیز افراد قوی هیکل را برای غریب کاری می برند.
میکردم جواب رد میشنیدم خود به خود مایوس شده با خود میگفتم اعتیاد چیزیست که غم و درد را فراموش میسازدبنا براین دو باره به این عادت دیرین روی آوردم .
وی نیز می گوید همین که نمی توانست کاری پیدا کند و هر روز با دستان خالی به خانه و نزد فامیلش مراجعه می کرد، یک نوع مایوسی احساس کرده و روحا فشار سختی را تحمل می کرده که بلاخره توانست این مشکلات را متحمل شود، دو باره به استفاده از مواد مخدر رو آورد.
داکتر طارق مسوول مرکز تداوی معتادین مرکز نجات گفت که در مجموع در تمام جهان این موضوع وجود دارد که برخی از معتادین نظر به مشکلات اجتماعی، فامیلی، فردی و محیطی دو باره به استفاده از مواد مخدر رو می آورند.
وی افزود که حتا در ممالک پیشرفته جهان 60 در صد افراد معتاد پس از تداوی و ترک اعتیاد دو باره از مواد مخدر استفاده می کنند.
به گفته وی تداوی معتادین مواد مخدر در کشور 40 در صد موفقیت آمیز بوده و 60 در صد آن بنابر عوامل چون عدم کاریابی و عدم مصروفیت سالم آموزشی بعد از صحت یاب شدن باعث دو باره رو آوردن آنان به مواد مخدر می شود.
داکتر طارق علاوه کرد که هر معتاد پس از صحت یاب شدن 3 الی 5 سال باید مصروف یک کار باشد تا به درستی مواد مخدر را فراموش نماید.
به عقیده وی، سطح دانش آگاهی در اکثریت مناطق کشور پائین بوده که بعضی سخنان و عکس العمل ها مردم که معتادین را به چشم حقارت می بینند، آنها را تحقیر نموده و زمینه رجوع دو باره به مواد مخدر را مهیا می سازد.
وی علاوه کرد، بیشتر دیده شده برخی افرادی که از نگاه جنسی ضعیف اند و خانواده ها بی خبر آنها را به ازدواج وا میدارند، ولی آنها موضوع را اظهار کرده نمیتوانند نا گزیر برای معالجه موقتی به مواد مخدر رو میاورند و این شیوه باعث معتاد شدن افراد به مواد مخدر میگردد.
دا کتر عبدالله وردک رییس کاهش تقاضای مواد مخدر در وزارت صحت عامه میگوید که اگر زمینه کار یابی و مصروفیت های سالم و آموزش مسایل حرفوی برای یک معتاد تداوی شده مهیا نگردد امکان میرود که آنان دو باره به مواد مخدر رو بیاورند.
این در حالیست با وجود که میلیون ها دالر برای مبارزه با مواد مخدر در کشور به مصرف رسیده است، اما شمار معتادان مواد مخدر در کشور افزایش یافته است.
مطابق آمار اخیر که وزارت مبارزه با مواد مخدر اعلام داشته است، معتادین مواد مخدر در کشور به یک و نیم میلیون نفر رسیده است.

TV stations under government pressure

Minister of information and culture, Abdul Kareem Khuram, has ordered several private TV stations to stop broadcasting popular soap operas that allegedly contains ‘offensive’ scenes. The minister went further by describing offensive as being "un-Islamic". Apparently the ministry reached the decision under pressure from the parliament and clerics.

The Soap Operas are very popular television programs and if any form of formal audience rating was possible in Afghanistan I have no doubt the shows would rate the highest. The serials provide vital revenue for TV stations. The soap operas are dubbed into Pashto and Farsi. Banning the program could be a financial blow to TV stations and the end of the young dubbing sector.

The minister of information warned of sever action against TV station neglecting the decision but did not clarify what. In a freedom liking system the law outlines all sanction in the interest of ensuring consistency and avoiding arbitrary action by those in power. The media law has envisaged no disciplinary measures in this case because the action of the minister is not in the law.

the Parliament has also passed a resolution seeking to bar not the soaps but any TV programme from showing dancing and other practices that are "un-Islamic".

The parliament is a house built by secular west to host radical muslims. This resolution was passed two months after the one which supported the death sentence for Parwez Kambakhsh, a journalist, for downloading an article criticising Islam's stance on women's rights.

The latest action of the parliament and the government once again shows who run the country under the shadow of secular western military. The Afghans can’t do anything which is not endorsed by these fundamentalists. When Islam was introduced there was no TV so we can’t know what islam says about TV and its professional conduct, but now we have to deal with a situation under a bunch of thugs and criminals that anything which has not been covered by Islam becomes the domain of their authority.

The fundamentalist Afghan officials take advantage of western financial assistance and their military protection. They don’t mind to be protected from the ruthless hand of Taliban by westerners. They live in modern buildings and drive in convoys which are paid by western tax payer money but their black moral framework has not changed.

The fundamentalist for decades enforced a restrictive system where basic human curiosity has been seriously curtailed. Any new step by an Afghan is rejected in their view on the ground that its unfamiliar and not in line with Islam. The islam of fundamentalists is a static faith; their faith will never accept innovative television programs because television is a threat to their authority and better television is even serious threat.

Why are we silent, and by ‘we’ I mean all of us: people of Afghanistan, millions of Afghans watch these soap operas and they love it. they need to stand up for something they like and challenge the authority of the criminal fundamentalists. We know that these criminals should be put behind bars not on a chair to govern our lives again. Their actions once again remind us that they never went through a period of self-reflection after their atrocities. The fundamentalists should not dictate to the entire Afghan society the rule of the game, they have had enough control. The rule of law should replace the arbitrary interpretation of their Islam.

These fundamentalists call for the murder of an innocent person for reading a piece and we know that not only democratic society but any humane society condemns the murder of a person for freedom of thought.

But I know that the mass (all and any Afghan) will remain quiet because We are a society caught in a mental cramp of cognitive dissonance, and we will be for a long time. The whole society fall victim to this type of Islam. Nobody can raise their voice because that would be considered unislamic, the mantra of the criminal fundamentalists has worked so well that Afghans are fearful of natural pursuit of life and watching what makes them happy.

اعلامیه اتحادیه ملی ژورنالیستان افغانستان در مورد تهدید به قتل اعظم رهنورد زریاب

در حالی که دو هفته از تهدید به قتل اعظم رهنورد زریاب، مشاور ارشد اتحادیه ملی ژورنالیستان افغانستان و نویسنده شهیر کشور می گذرد، هنوز نهاد های امنیتی، هیچ گزارشی در مورد عاملین این تهدید نداده اند.

اتحادیه ملی ژورنالیستان افغانستان در حالی که اقدام ریاست امنیت ملی برای تامین امنیت جانی آقای زریاب را قابل تقدیر می داند، تذکر چند نکته را ضروری می پندارد.

نخست این که چرا با وجود در خواست های رسمی این اتحادیه از وزارت امور داخله و ریاست امنیت ملی، هنوز اقدام محسوسی در جهت رد یابی عاملین سؤ قصد بر جان آقای زریاب، صورت نگرفته است.

دوم این که اتحادیه ملی ژورنالیستان افغانستان قبلا به نهاد های امنیتی و وزارت اطلاعات و فرهنگ شکایت کرده است که فردی به نام فرهنگپال در شماره 26 حوت جریده پلوشه آقای زریاب را .واضحا تهدید کرده است. با این حال هیچ کدام از این نهاد ها در زمینه شناسایی این فرد و انجام تحقیقات از وی اقدامی نکرده اند.

اتحادیه ملی ژورنالیستان افغانستان یک بار دیگر از این نهاد ها می طلبد که در زمینه شناسایی و تحقیق از فردی به نام فرهنگپال، اقدامات سریع و عملی نمایند.

اتحادیه ملی ژورنالیستان افغانستان با اغتنام از فرصت، مراتب امتنان خود را از حکم معاون دوم رییس جمهور مبنی بر نام گذاری یک جاده به نام "جاده شهید اجمل نقشبندی" ابراز می دارد.

ما اقدام وزارت اطلاعات و فرهنگ مبنی بر نام گذاری یک جایزه رسانه یی به نام اجمل نقشبندی را نیز قابل تقدیر می دانیم

Nato fires artillery shells at $150000 a round

The US and Canadian armies in Afghanistan are now using GPS-guided artillery shells at the cost of $150,000 a round. This is the most conventional artillery shell or as a matter of that the most expensive conventional ammunition ever fired by the armies.

In 2004 I met a mercenary working for Dyncorp in Kabul. The man came from Texas and had very little idea of the world, the man argued that the western armies are in Afghanistan to test their weapon systems. He continued, US army spends billions on training and weapon systems; Afghanistan is the best place to put the training in practice and use the weapons. At that time, I laughed at the man. I couldn’t take his serious because he was lacking information about most of the subjects he was talking about. This discredited his mentioned argument.

Four years on I realised that the man was right to some extent. The use of weapons like this makes one think that NATO is testing their weapon systems. The US and Canadian armies for the first time purchased some experimental shells to go along with its brand new 155-millimetre M-777 howitzers. The Excalibur shell uses satellite signals and software to guide it to within 10 metres of its intended target, even when fired from up to 40 kilometres away.

The diverse climatic and geographical condition of Afghanistan suits the introduction of GPS-guided artillery shells; western armies can test shell's performance under different weather and terrain. Live targets, such as Taliban insurgents, serve to identify the vulnerability of the weapon system. By firing at Taliban NATO can see if any counter-measures such as jamming GPS signals of the shell could take place. The question of whether the Excalibur has been led astray by sophisticated interference technology is still something both the army and defence industry officials are reluctant to address.


I wonder what happened to armament critics and activists. The cost of a single shell equals around 7 school buildings or changing teaching curriculum for grade three, which still refers to the presence of foreign forces as Soviet occupiers or the Red Army. Over four million kids in Afghanistan are studying in open air.

Afghanistan doesn’t benefit from this war, contractors like Raytheon pockets the money. Raytheon is the defence contractor which developed Excalibur. The more scared NATO is the more they use expensive weaponry and that means less money for reconstruction. A new study by ACBAR has found out that more than 60% of the international fun allocate for assisting Afghanistan reconstruction goes to western cooperates. the report adds that reconstruction assistance is a fraction of military spending. Since 2001 the United States has appropriated $127 billion for the war in Afghanistan and the US military is currently spending nearly $100 million a day in the country, some $36 billion a year. Yet the average volume of international aid provided by all donors since 2001 is woefully inadequate at just $7 million per day.

UK to send judges for Sharia training to the Taliban

Recently the Anglican Church [Archbishop of Canterbury Dr. Rowan Williams] expressed that there was nothing wrong with the British legal system adopting some laws from Islamic shari'a and implementing them for British citizens of the Islamic faith.

The UK and the rest of civilized world has been accused of hypocrisy before in their support of regimes such as Karzai in Afghanistan which is implementing Sharia law, the entire legal system of Afghanistan is based around Sharia. This comes contrary to any human right value and the secular notions which exist in UK and Europe. an Islamic system include shari'a criminal law – that is, punishments such as killing the apostate (a Muslim who converts to another religion), amputating a thief's hand, cutting off a brigand's opposing hand and foot... stoning the adulterer to death, publicly flogging wine drinkers, killing homosexuals by throwing them from a high place, or allowing a relative of a [murder] victim to deal with the murderer, instead of the state. This is the system supported by UK in Afghanistan but Archbishop of Canterbury want to introduce it in Europe. This is the first time a high ranking religious figure in Europe expresses support for Sharia inside Europe. An Islamic legal system in Europe as suggest by Anglican Church would mean:

"1) Permit polygamy for European Muslim citizens, and not punish them for it – even though this is considered criminal under European law;

"2) Permit European Muslim citizens to beat their wives to discipline them, as the Koran urges;

"3) Allow men to unilaterally decide to divorce without requiring any court proceedings, as this is a right guaranteed to men by shari'a;

"4) Give daughters only half the inheritance rights that sons have, while widows receive only an eighth of the inheritance;

"5) Not consider women's testimony the equal of men's in shari'a courts;

"6) Deprive a divorced woman of custody of her children if she remarries;

"7) Allow European Muslim citizens to marry in traditional marriages without the need to officially register these marriages;

"8) Eliminate adoption, since it is contrary to shari'a;

"9) Force a woman whose Muslim husband converts to another religion to divorce him, because he is an apostate;

"10) Prevent European Muslim women from marrying non-Muslims…"

European countries will never accede to these catastrophic demands, for reasons more practical than humanist. If so, why does the statement of the Anglican Church matter? the fact that they were proposed by the British archbishop sends the wrong message to the Islamic world. The gist of this message is that there is no contradiction between Islamic shari'a and Western civilization if shari'a applies only for Muslim citizens. To absolve itself of responsibility in the eyes of fundamentalist Muslims, who will be persuaded by the Church's statements that the clash is not between Christians and their Church on the one hand and Muslims on the other but a clash between Muslims and the secular states. This will create greater hostility among Muslim citizens of European countries to their host countries, and will lead to increased violence and terrorism in the future…

These statements by the Archbishop of Canterbury also mean that the Church – or at least part of it – still does not believe in human rights legislation, and takes every opportunity to cast doubt on the universality and comprehensiveness of the humanist principles.

Although the demands announced by the bishop are far from implementation in a Europe that long ago distanced itself from medieval values and thought, the reverberations of these demands will have a grave impact on the Islamic world. fundamentalist in places like Afghanistan are picking fights with the liberals who can’t dare to oppose sharia openly, and their attitude is: 'How can you oppose shari'a law in your own countries when we see that the Anglican Church is seeking its implementation in Europe?'

more about this topic in the Arab liberal e-journal Elaph.

Nato launches Psy Ops to distract the hostile Afghans

Nato and its member states have faced increasing public criticism in Afghanistan. Mass protest was lounged against Denmark, Holland and other western countries for printing Mohammad Cartoons; voices of concern were also heard among political circles against the appointment of Lord Ashton as UN representative to Afghanistan. Public protests in Afghanistan against western countries would negatively affect NATO presence. Nato, appears, to have learned from the culture of protest and can turn it around to its own benefit.

A credible source within Polish Contingent of NATO, which preferred to remain unanimous, has confirmed that the PsyOps Unit of Polish contingent based in Gardez and Sharana was involved in an operation resulting in a mass protest on Monday. PsyOps stands for Psychological Operation and is the military version of Public Relation. The protest took place after a Polish Newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza wrote an article about possible Russian contribution to Nato operation in Afghanistan. the article was translated into Farsi and Pashtu by Polish PsyOps unit and circulated among Gardez citizens. Azizuddin an employee of Gardez Information and Culture Department said to a local journalist that copies were delivered to the State Radio and TV station in Gardez too. The demonstration was staged in the southeastern Paktia province against a Russian plan to contribute peacekeepers to International Security Force. Attended by hundreds of Gardez, Paktia provincial capital, residents. Provincial Ulema Council head Maulvi Khaleq-Dad told Pajhwok News Agency that “deployment of Russian forces will amount to aggression against our motherland; we are staunchly averse to that proposal.” A declaration issued at the conclusion of the protest denounced the proposed deployment of Russian troops to Afghanistan as an act of aggression that would be stoutly resisted. This is the first cleric gathering in Afghanistan in the last few months not to protest against the Nato member states or the Cartoon publishing. The clergy managed to rally thousand of Afghans in the cities of Mazar, Kabul, Hirat, Nangarhar and Kandahar to protest against cartoon reprint. Political analysts have pointed out that the aim was to distract public, or specifically the Mullah and clergy, attention from Holland and Denmark for the reprint of controversial cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad and the forthcoming film.

Gazetta Wyborcza’s story had no mention of the Russian side amid the statements made by the first deputy press secretary of the Russian president, Dmitry Peskov, defying rumours of Russia sending troops to the Afghanistan. NATO has a well funded PsyOps unit in Afghanistan to influence public opinion or to persuade them to act in certain ways. For this reason the Afghan operation is most popularly dubbed “Winning Hearts and Minds”. Although the name psychological operation is associated with guerilla warfare, rebellion and subversion Nato has made no effort to camouflage it. to give an example of the scale of NATO propaganda; in 2007 an Afghan marketing agency, alone was contracted for six million dollars by the International Forces to set up hundreds of NATO friendly billboards. The techniques used to influence the public attitude and opinion so far has been the use of positive messages and promises for a better future through the use of newspapers, radio and television. Nato PsyOps is not subject to Afghan media law and legislation, based on the agreement signed by the afghan government and UN in Bonn in 2001. Afghanistan provides unregulated media access, radio and TV frequency for Nato.

In spite all Nato investment the propaganda so far hasn’t been a very successful operation partly because Nato hasn’t yet built a good knowledge of Afghan psychology. The message Nato was trying to put through was to promote women’s’ rights, peace, anti-Talibanism and disarmament; those messages didn’t get through very well. This is the first time that Nato has manipulated a rally through operatives and propaganda. It is quite easy to manipulate the mass organised around the clergy, Afghan warlords and tribal leaders have managed to do this with a very low budget. Clergy rallies are organised around sensationalism, the hot temper of participants are used to intimidate opponents and gather commitment from participants. Afghan Rallies are effective to use if the Psychology is understood. Rallies are organised around trusted authorities or clergy. The participants have little knowledge of the protest and are mostly uneducated, therefore they accept information uncritically. Information is wrapped in Islamic concepts to make it believable for participants. Most often participants do not understand their own motivations or reasons for their presence.

Its hard to understand the purpose of the newspaper for running the story other than lack of facts. But the subsequent circulation is intended to stimulate anger among a fanatic group by reminding of an external threat in order to provide a reasonable justification for NATO's military presence in Afghanistan.

islam is looking backward

The taboos in Saudi Arabia are different from the taboos in Lebanon, and from the taboos in Egypt and afghanistan, and so on. they tend to view the taboo itself as fundamental. This was not the case in the past. Islam have reached the point where everything is ruled by prohibitions. Everything is prohibited unless it is proven to be permitted. This is the problem of muslim society and culture. Instead of making progress, we are regressing and if only we were regressing in a reasonable manner. Unfortunately, we are regressing in a superstitious and unreasonable manner.

Muslim societies were more open, more accepting of other opinions and different behavior. But the so-called 'religious awakening' – it is a religious 'slumber,' not as an awakening The Prevalent Culture Is Backward, Yet The Political Regime Uses This Culture To Glorify Itself, Without Realizing That It Is Destroying The Future

The question is why this ideology has spread. this is a kind of psychological mechanism. With all the defeats and disappointments of the muslims. If you examine the history of the muslims in the 20th century, you will see one defeat after another, one disappointment after another. The future has become uncertain and dark, rather than enlightened.

the political regime is to be blamed and the prevalent culture. It is a mixture of many things. Another example is when intellectuals turn everything into ideology, riding a wave of populism and flirting with the peoples, instead of enlightening them. They flirt with the peoples and follow them, rather than leading them. The prevalent culture is stagnant. It does not recognize the 'other,' and does not want to recognize that it is one of many cultures in the world. It considers itself to be the 'number one' culture – the world itself.

From the early 20th century to this day, we constantly hear in the muslim world: ‘We should adopt the good things from the West and ignore the bad.’ You cannot do such a thing. When you consider the products of modern civilization – the car, the computer, and so on – these are all products of a certain philosophy, a certain way of thinking. If you adopt the product, but ignore the producer – you have a problem. You cannot do such a thing. For us the product is new, but the thought is not. We move forward with our eyes looking backward.

ختم دوره آموزشی غرض تولید فلم های مستند

مرکز فرهنگی آلمان(گویته انستیوت ) جهت رشد تولید فلم های مستند افغانی   برنامه آموزشی   سه ماهه را درکشور راه اندازی نموده بودکه هفته گذشته به پایان رسید .

در این برنامه 5 فلم مستند 20-15 دقیقه یی در زمینه وضعیت زنده گی کودکان افغان آماده شده است که بیشتر سناریو آن روی شرایط زنده گی اطفال افغان میچرخد .

گفته میشود که  هزینه مالی این برنامه از سوی مر اکز فرهنگی کشورهای فرانسه وآلمان  پرداخته شده است .

هم چنان سال گذشته گویته انستیوت ده فلم مستند را آماده نموده بود که در فیستیوال های  بین المللی نیز  نامزد شد . مرکز فرهنگی المان در بخش های دیگر نیز فعالیت ها یی داشته است. به گفته مسولین این مرکز،    برای آگاهی از خطر ماین  چندین نمایشگاه عکاسی  نیز در کابل از سوی   مرکزنامبرده راه اندازی شده است  .

 

سرباز اردو محکوم به اعدام شد

یک تن از خورد ضابطان قول اردوی 207 ظفر ولایت هرات، شام روز پنجشنبه در یک محکمه علنی به اعدام محکوم شد.این خورد ضابط در ماه سرطان سال جاری چهارتن از منسوبان اردوی ملی و یک تن از سربازان قوت های ایتلاف را به قتل رسانده و 7 تن دیگر از همقطارانش را نیز مجروح نموده بود.

جلندر شاه بهنام قوماندان قول اردوی 207 ظفر هرات می گوید که این سرباز به اساس حکم فقره های 5 و 6 ماده 395 قانون جزای کشور، از سوی هیات قضاییه ریاست محکمه ابتدایی عسکری قول اردوی 207 ظفر، به اعدام محکوم شده است.

صفوف اردوی ملی مملو از جنگجویان جنگ های تنظیمی میباشد، این اشخاص بنابر نداشتن تجربه و اخلاق اجتماعی نتوانسته اند به شغلی دیگر بپیوندند و دوباره به یک دستگاه جنگی پیوسته اند. بعضی از جنگجویان تنضیمی و جانیان جنگی های داخلی نتوانستند از عهده تعلیمات نظامی، که برا اساس نظم و دسپلین نظامی بنا گشته، برایند و ارتش را قبل از اختطام تعلیمات ترک گفتند. بنابر همین دلیل است که حدود 40 فیصد از سربازان قبل از اختطام آموزش های نظامی ارتش را ترک میکنند. اما گروه از ایشان در ارتش موجود اند و دست به جنایت میزنند. چند قبل نیز دو سرباز این قول اردو در حالی محکوم به اعدام شده بودند که در ولایت غور هنگام اجرای وظیفه از مردم به زور پول اخذ نموده و دو تن را به قتل رسانده بودند.